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The very essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases of state law are pre-
sumed to be communicable by the parties to a federal judge no less than to
a state judge.'
INTRODUCTION
Within the limits of the federal judicial power defined by Article
III of the Constitution, Congress has nearly complete control over
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.2
Despite the breadth of these potential powers, Congress largely has
allowed the Supreme Court a free hand in designing the features of
judicial federalism, the system of rules and policies which divides
power between the state and federal courts.
From the early days under the Constitution, the jurisdiction
which Congress has chosen to confer on the federal courts generally
I. Salve Regina College v. Russell, Ill S. Ct. 1217, 1225 (1991).
2. Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts beyond the judicial
power as defined in Article Ill, § 2. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337
U.S. 582, 607, 645, 655 (1949) (view of six concurring and dissenting justices; Justices Jackson,
Black, and Burton disagreed); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). See gener-
ally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 473-78 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the prohibition on Congress's expanding federal judicial
jurisdiction beyond Article IlI's limits).
Within the federal judicial power as defined in Article Ill, the vast powers of Congress to limit
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts are well established. See id. at 362-424. It is arguable
that Congress has complete power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to any
subset of the maximum jurisdiction allowed under Article Ill of the United States Constitution.
Many cases suggest that Congress can specify which constitutionally founded causes of action
cannot be heard by a federal court. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (stating
that Congress's authority to create lower federal courts includes the power of "withholding juris-
diction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good"); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (upholding a federal statu-
tory restriction on a federal trial court's jurisdiction); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-
49 (1850) (stating that Congress controls the existence of inferior courts and, thus, also controls
the scope of their jurisdiction). But see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (expres-
sing serious doubts regarding the constitutionality of any statute which included a provision bar-
ring federal courts from reviewing the constitutionality of the statute's substantive provisions);
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.) (suggesting that Congress must
not exercise its power over the jurisdiction of lower courts in a manner that deprives citizens of
their constitutional rights), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
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has been regarded as mandatory.3 There had, however, long been
some exceptions to the mandatory jurisdiction requirement even
before 1941 when the Supreme Court first used the word "absten-
tion" to describe a doctrine requiring a federal trial court to stay its
hand in favor of state court proceedings despite the existence of fed-
eral question or diversity jurisdiction.4 Other imprecisely defined
and overlapping abstention doctrines followed.6
Some of these forms of judicial self-restraint have proved trouble-
some and enigmatic.6 This has been particularly true of the absten-
tion doctrine that originated fifty years ago in Burford v. Sun Oil
Co. 7 The litigation in Burford itself posed questions of the validity
of state administrative action challenged under both state and fed-
3. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we [the Supreme Court] must decide it, if it be
brought before us.").
4. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). In Pullman, the Supreme
Court required the trial court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. Id. at 501-02. At least in
close cases, however, the Pullman formulation allows lower federal courts discretion over whether
to abstain. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.2, at 603 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
5. For a discussion of the various abstention doctrines, see infra part I.
6. One example is the Colorado River abstention doctrine, formulated in Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-17 (1976). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
4, § 14.3, at 668-74 (discussing Colorado River); see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text. Another example is the Supreme Court's vacillating approach to the availability of federal
habeas corpus review of state criminal court proceedings, discussed infra note 556. See part V for
a detailed discussion of overlapping doctrines of judicial federalism.
7. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). For a discussion of the enigmatic nature of Burford abstention, see
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1196 (1st Cir. 1979) (Coffin, C.J., concur-
ring dubitante) (calling at least one subcategory of the Burford doctrine "delphic"); Construction
Aggregates Corp. v. Rivera de Vicenty, 573 F.2d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 1978) (describing Burford
abstention as "particularly difficult to define and apply"); see also BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at
1367 ("The lower courts have ... found the Supreme Court's pronouncements less than pellucid,
and the decisions are contradictory."); PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES. FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 566 (2d ed. 1989).
Worthwhile discussions of Burford abstention are found in MARTIN H. REDISH. FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 243-49 (1980); Julia S. Davies,
Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitu-
tional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1986); Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1153-63 (1974);
David M. Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case. Its Effect on the Abstention
Doctrine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157, 158-66 (1966); Charles
S. Treat, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The
Scope of the Burford Doctrine, 46 U. CHI L. REV. 971, 980-88 (1979). All suffer the substantial
disadvantage of preceding the New Orleans case discussed in the text above. All but Davies also
precede Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), which is discussed
infra notes 341-53, 373-75. None fully traces the origins of Burford or explores arguments con-
cerning the reasons for treating administrative cases differently. The best post-Pennhurst and New
Orleans discussion is in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 12.2.3, at 608-12 (1989), § 12.2.3, at 110-
12 (Supp. 1990).
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eral law.' The Supreme Court ordered the federal trial court to stay
its hand so that sensitive issues of state administrative law could be
dealt with by a specialized state court, one familiar with the work-
ings of the state administrative agency.9 However, the Supreme
Court's Burford opinion does not precisely identify when the in-
volvement of state administrative action would justify a federal
court decision to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. 10
According to the most recent Supreme Court formulation of the
Burford doctrine, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of
New Orleans," a federal court must refuse equitable relief when
granting it would interfere with orders or proceedings of state ad-
ministrative agencies:
(1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the re-
sult in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review of
the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state ef-
forts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern.""
This description of abstention is unintelligibly abstract without the
illustration provided by actual case decisions and opinions. A sub-
stantial part of what follows in other sections of this Article is an
attempt to determine the meaning of Burford abstention and its
place in the constellation of related doctrines of judicial federalism.
Even the basic scope of the Burford doctrine seems to fluctuate
8. Burford, 319 U.S. at 316-17. Although the dual state/federal law nature of the challenge is
not highlighted in the Supreme Court's opinion, the Burford Court does refer to it, stating, "On
the other hand, if the state procedure is followed from the Commission to the State Supreme
Court, ultimate review of the federal questions is fully preserved here." Id. at 334. The Supreme
Court agreed with the opinion of the lower court that the proceedings presented a simple suit in
equity. Id. at 314. The lower court held that the plaintiffs could present a unified challenge to a
state agency regulatory order, based upon on alleged violations of both local law and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10, 16 (5th Cir.
1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
9. Burford, 319 U.S. at 325-34. The district court declined jurisdiction. Id. at 318. The court
of appeals initially affirmed and then, on rehearing, reversed. Burford, 130 F.2d at 18. The Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstating the district court's order. 319 U.S. at 334.
Part of the Supreme Court's opinion gives the appearance of deciding only that the district court
had discretion to refuse the case. Id. at 318. However, later dicta in the opinion stated that the
district court was actually required to dismiss the case. Id. at 334. For a more detailed discussion
of the Burford opinion, see infra part II.
10. See infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Burford opinion and its ef-
fect on future cases).
11. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
12. Id. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 814 (1976)).
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with each new statement by the Supreme Court. The doctrine has
been regarded widely as being aimed at protecting state administra-
tive processes.1" Indeed, the passage from New Orleans quoted
above defines Burford abstention in terms of interference with ad-
ministrative agencies. Yet there remains some doubt even as to this
basic point. Ankenbrandt v. Richards,4 decided by the Supreme
Court last term, states that it is "not inconceivable" that Burford
abstention would apply to some cases involving deference, not to
state agencies, but to state court proceedings in which certain sensi-
tive issues of local law would be determined.15
It is not clear whether Ankenbrandt signals careful reconsidera-
tion of the New Orleans formula. I assume that the controlling rules
are to be found not in Ankenbrandt's brief and speculative refer-
ences to Burford, but rather in New Orleans's more carefully
crafted and formulaic statements."6 These statements better reflect
the weight of the case law in limiting Burford abstention to suits
involving state administrative agencies.17 Even if this is true, other
13. The Supreme Court's most recent Burford formula presented in New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), appears to limit Burford abstention to cases
involving state administrative law. Many post-Burford courts of appeals cases also recognize or
strongly suggest such a limit. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 891 F.2d
1343, 1344-45, 1348 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 813 (1990); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177, 185 (1st Cir. 1949). See generally BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at
1364 (stating that Burford is "often regarded as establishing a distinct form of abstention, often
called 'Burford' or 'administrative abstention' "). The widespread agreement is not universal. See
infra notes 439-65 and accompanying text which discuss the following cases that either dispensed
with an administrative requirement for Burford abstention or diluted it so substantially as to
render it virtually meaningless: West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1984)
(providing a Pullman abstention alternate ground); Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins.
Co., 629 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959), which the Supreme Court had connected with Burford ab-
stention); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1194 (1st Cir. 1979).
14. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
15. Id. at 2216. The Ankenbrandt Court stated, in dictum, that it was not "inconceivable" that
Burford could apply to require federal court deference to state determinations of "elements of the
domestic relationship" presumably yet to be made in pending divorce, alimony, or custody pro-
ceedings. Id. These determinations would almost certainly take place in state courts and not in
state agencies. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 313 (1986) ("Only a few
states now have separate family court systems .... "). Such disputes typically are adjudicated by
courts. 2 HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 97, 257,
346, 483 (1987) (dealing respectively with divorce, alimony, child support, and custody
proceedings).
16. New Orleans presents a formula for Burford abstention, 491 U.S. at 361, while Anken-
brandt simply suggests that Burford abstention might be appropriate in certain circumstances,
112 S. Ct. at 2216.
17. See infra note 237 and accompanying text (collecting cases demonstrating the significance
of the involvement of state administrative action in determining whether to abstain under the
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questions remain. The Burford doctrine's limitation to administra-
tive cases has been reiterated but never justified in the case law and
commentary. Is this limitation justifiable? Additionally, what quali-
fies as "administrative" action within the Burford doctrine, and in
what ways must such action be connected to a case in order to jus-
tify abstention?18
As I will demonstrate, New Orleans clarifies Burford abstention
in some respects, seriously shrinking its domain of operation, but it
clouds the doctrine in other ways. 19 Confusion over the scope of
Burford abounds, both in Supreme Court opinions and in those of
the lower courts. The confusion and formulaic vacillation has been
perpetuated by a failure to understand Burford's origins and to
come to terms with whether such a doctrine can be justified today,
given the changes in our view of judge-made law, administrative
law, and federalism. This Article will attempt to clarify what Bur-
ford was, is, and sensibly might be, by tracing its roots within the
context of developments in federal administrative law occurring at
the time Burford was decided, and by looking at developments since
that time.
In later sections of this Article, I show that the usual jurisdic-
tional assumption underlying the regime of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins20 gave way when principles developed for federal judicial
review of federal administrative agencies were applied to federal
suits challenging state administrative action. Under Erie, state law
governed issues not directly controlled by federal law, both in suits
grounded on diversity jurisdiction and in those grounded on federal
question jurisdiction." Under Erie, unclear state law alone did not
warrant abstention: federal courts were forced to anticipate how
state courts would interpret the state law involved.22 Burford, how-
ever, saw unsettled state administrative or regulatory law as differ-
ent and viewed its presence as justifying a federal court's refusal to
,provide a forum for a dispute substantially involving such law.
The distinctiveness of administrative law was a product of its con-
centration, in individual agencies, of theoretically distinct and sepa-
Burford doctrine).
18. For a suggested response to these two questions, see infra parts VI.B and VI.A respectively.
19. For an analysis of the effect of New Orleans on Burford abstention, see infra notes 290-304
and accompanying text.
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Id. at 78.
22. See id. at 78-79.
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rated powers: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. This
had the effect of blurring distinctions between the processes of mak-
ing, interpreting, and applying the law. The distinction between law-
finding and law-making began to melt down especially rapidly in the
New Deal world of administrative law. As this happened, it became
clear that what an agency often did, not just in rule-making pro-
ceedings, but in administrative adjudications as well, was to make
law and policy, not simply to "find" and apply it.2" Concern that a
federal court might cut short or, worse, usurp state policy-making
animated the Burford decision."
Beyond explaining the original Burford doctrine and its early
evolution, these facts help clarify the choices that must be made
today in deciding whether there is a place for Burford in its original
form, in some modified form, or indeed whether there is still a place
for it at all. Subsequent developments in administrative law, and in
jurisprudence generally, seriously call into question whether the dis-
tinction between "law-making" and "law-finding" can bear the
weight placed upon it by Burford.2 As a result, it will be necessary
to ask whether Burford should be scrapped entirely or extended to
some cases not involving state administrative decisions in any signifi-
cant sense.26
While dealing with the issues summarized above, this Article de-
scribes the present ambiguous contours of Burford abstention, as
shaped by the few Supreme Court opinions and the many lower
court opinions which apply it or expound on it.27 It considers how
the somewhat kindred doctrines of judicial federalism, such as claim
preclusion, 28 "primary jurisdiction,' 29 the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine,30 Pullman abstention,"' Younger abstention, 2 and Eleventh
23. See infra part lII.C.2.b.
24. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Needless federal conflict with the
state policy [is] the inevitable product of this double system of review.").
25. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Consti-
tutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1756-63 (1991) (discussing how much the distinc-
tion between law-making and application of law has blurred).
26. See infra part VIII.
27. See infra part IV.
28. For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra part V.C.
30. For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra part L.A and notes 368-73 and accompanying
text.
32. For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra part I.C and notes 365-67 and accompanying
text.
1993]
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Amendment law33 overlap with Burford, rendering it otiose to a sig-
nificant degree. 4 Finally, it offers a criticism of Burford35 and pro-
posals for its redefinition, as well as a wider critique of the regime of
judicial federalism, whose problems are in many ways exemplified
by Burford.8
I. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES
Throughout this Article, Burford is compared to other abstention
doctrines. The major varieties of abstention are described briefly be-
low. Later, this Article explores the relationship these doctrines
have to Burford, as well as their impact upon it.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has frequently changed its
view regarding the number of abstention doctrines and the precise
contours of each one.3 7 Most recently, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that it recognizes four major varieties of abstention, 8 named
for four cases: (1) Pullman,9 (2) Burford,"' (3) Younger,"1 and (4)
Colorado River.4 The next subsections discuss these doctrines in
the order of their recognition by the Supreme Court as distinct
forms of abstention, although the precise order is disputable if pre-
cursor equitable doctrines are taken into consideration. 4 To these
four doctrines I have added a fifth, Thibodaux abstention, 44 con-
nected to Burford in many ways but of uncertain status after New
Orleans.
A. The Pullman Doctrine (1941)
In 1941, the Supreme Court first used the word abstention to de-
scribe a doctrine requiring a federal trial court to stay its hand in
33. See infra notes 332-57, 360-61, 374-75 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment bar and the judicially created exceptions to it).
34. See infra part V.
35. See infra parts VI, VII, and VIII.
36. See infra part VIII.
37. 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4241, at 26 (2d ed.
1982 & Supp. 1992).
38. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976).
39. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
40. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
41. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
42. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-19.
43. For a collection of such cases, primarily cases antedating Pullman, see Burford, 319 U.S.
at 333 n.29. For a collection of earlier cases, see Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01.
44. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1959).
[Vol. 42:859
FEDERAL ABSTENTION AND STATE LAW
favor of state court proceedings, despite the existence of federal
question or diversity jurisdiction."' The Court held that such absten-
tion was often appropriate if a state court might resolve an unclear
issue of state law in a way that would spare a federal trial court the
need to decide a constitutional question.4 The Court justified ab-
stention based on the equitable nature of the case before the federal
district court.4 7 The Court concluded that a federal court consider-
ing a request for equitable relief could decline to grant a remedy for
a host of prudential reasons, including the avoidance of unnecessary
constitutional pronouncements."
Today Pullman abstention has been extended to suits at law,49
but its other requirements remain essentially the same." It is appli-
cable if state court resolution of substantially uncertain state law
might eliminate or significantly narrow an important federal consti-
tutional issue which is before a federal trial court. 1
The procedure immediately following Pullman abstention differs
from that following federal court abstention under Burford. After a
decision to invoke Pullman, the abstaining federal court may retain
jurisdiction passively while the litigation proceeds in the state
45. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501. A Lexis search of the form "'abstention' and date before 3/3/
41" reveals that the word abstention was used by the Supreme Court just eight times prior to
Pullman, but it was not used in reference to refusals of jurisdiction.
Pullman involved a constitutional challenge to a regulatory commission order requiring all
sleeper cars to be continuously in the charge of an employee with the rank of conductor. Id. at
497-98. At the time, all train conductors were white and all porters black, and the order was
implemented in response to a practice on lightly traveled routes of leaving cars in the charge of
porters. Id.
46. Id. at 501.
47. Id. at 500. The Supreme Court required the federal trial court to abstain so that the Texas
courts could determine whether the regulation was within its authority as conferred by statute. Id.
at 501-02.
48. Id. at 500.
49. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1962) (requiring
abstention, in a suit seeking a monetary award, in order to permit state judicial construction of
unclear state law so that a federal constitutional ruling might be avoided); see also BATOR ET AL..
supra note 2, at 1362 n.8 (citing Ideal Cement, 369 U.S. 134 and its discussion of extending
Pullman to actions at law).
50. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Winter v. Lavine, 574 F.2d
46, 69 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the variety of shapes the Pullman doctrine has taken in
the various circuits, see Thomas G. Buchanan, Note, Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the
Boundaries, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1243, 1251-58 (1986).
51. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 236. For a recent application of Pullman abstention, see Catlin v.
Ambach, 820 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987), which held that Pullman abstention is appropriately in-
voked to avoid an unnecessary decision as to whether the state's residency requirement violated
the equal protection rights of handicapped students.
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courts.52 The Supreme Court has adjusted federal doctrines of issue
preclusion so that a litigant may reserve her right to return to fed-
eral court for determination of federal issues of law after a state
court has ruled on the state issues before it."3 If such rights are
reserved, a resolution of the federal issues by the state court will not
bar their relitigation on return to the formerly abstaining federal
court."' The differing Burford post-abstention procedure is de-
scribed in the following section.
. B. The Burford Doctrine (1943)
Burford abstention is normally viewed as appropriate in certain
cases involving difficult questions of state law connected with state
administrative processes. 5 A more precise definition remains elusive
under the varying results and abstract verbal formulations found in
'cases addressing the meaning of this doctrine. Exploring and criti-
cizing the likely contours of the present Burford doctrine is the task
of most of the remainder of this Article.
One procedural clarification is useful at this early stage. The post-
abstention protocols under Burford have been seen as sharply differ-
ent from those under Pullman. Unlike Pullman abstention, Burford
abstention is generally understood to entail a federal court's outright
dismissal of the case before it, leaving the state court as the sole
forum for the resolution of the dispute. 56 The federal court does not
retain jurisdiction, and the parties are not permitted to reserve the
right to return to federal trial court after the conclusion of the state
52. See Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California, 601 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1979). For
occasional exceptions to this procedural aspect of the Pullman doctrine, see 17A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 37, § 4243, at 66-67.
53. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
54. Id. at 417. The England Court also held that where a party freely and without reservation
submits his federal claims to a state court for decision, he has elected to forego his right to return
to federal court. Id. at 419.
55. One category of Burford abstention, as described in New Orleans, explicitly refers to avoid-
ance of difficult questions of state law while the other refers to avoidance of disruption as a result
of federal court intervention. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 391 U.S.
350, 362 (1989). Disruption would not occur if state law were so clear that the federal courts
could tolerably anticipate state court results. Burford itself refers to a history of mistaken federal
court predictions. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327-28 (1943). Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992), raises, at least, some doubt as to whether Burford remains limited
to cases involving administrative agencies. Ankenbrandt's possible effect on the shape of Burford
abstention is discussed supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
56. Isthmus Landowners Ass'n, 601 F.2d at 1090.
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court proceedings.57 Any later filing of the same case in a federal
court will almost certainly be dismissed on grounds of claim or issue
preclusion."8 Hence Burford abstention, unlike the Pullman variety,
normally results in a complete loss of a federal forum for the resolu-
tion of any issues of federal law raised in a case. 9 However, the
recent statements of the Supreme Court in Ankenbrandt v. Rich-
ards"0 suggest that the Pullman approach, at least occasionally,
may be appropriate in cases of Burford abstention.61
C. The Younger Doctrine (1971)
In Younger v. Harris,2 the Supreme Court recognized a general
prohibition against using federal court injunctions to stay pending
state court criminal proceedings.6" As originally conceived, Younger
abstention resembles Pullman abstention in some respects; in others
it resembles the Burford variety, but in still other ways it differs
from both. First, to the extent that both Pullman and Burford ab-
stention are grounded on the fear that federal courts will errone-
ously apply state law, Younger abstention is different." The propri-
ety of Younger abstention depends entirely upon the type of state
proceeding with which a federal suit might interfere, and not on the
57. Id.; Sabato v. Florida Dep't of Ins., 768 F.2d 1562, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 12.3, at 617-19 (comparing and contrasting the procedural ramifi-
cations of the various abstention doctrines).
58. For a discussion of claim preclusion in this context, see infra note 324 and accompanying
text. Burford itself suggests that after abstention, the only further federal court involvement
would be certiorari from the state proceedings to the United States Supreme Court. Burford, 391
U.S. at 334.
59. The federal forum is lost not only in federal question suits, but also in diversity suits in
which federal questions may be dispositive of the result as well. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jeffer-
son Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 175-76 (1942). Along with the loss of a federal forum to resolve
federal legal issues, in both federal question and diversity suits, Burford abstention results in the
loss of fact-finding made or supervised by federal judges.
60. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
61. Id. at 2216 n.8 (suggesting that in some circumstances, it may be appropriate for a federal
court to retain jurisdiction under the Burford abstention doctrine).
62. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
63. Id. at 41.
64. In Pullman, the Supreme Court stated: "Reading the Texas statutes and the Texas deci-
sions as outsiders without special competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our
independent judgment regarding the application of that law to the present situation." 312 U.S.
496, 499 (1941). In Burford, the Court stated that "[conflicts in the interpretation of state law,
dangerous to the success of state policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention of the
lower federal courts." 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943). By contrast, the applicability of Younger absten-
tion generally turns, not on the clarity of state law, but on the form and stage of the state proceed-
ings against which a federal injunction is sought. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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lack of clarity of state law involved in that proceeding. Younger re-
quires abstention only where certain state judicial style proceedings
are attacked, whether or not the state law to be applied in them is
unclear. 6' Originally these included only state criminal proceedings,
but coverage has been extended to important civil and administra-
tive proceedings of a judicial nature brought by a state in its own
tribunals.6 In contrast, Burford abstention is concerned with the
possible misreading of state law by federal judges, 67 for it is gener-
ally recognized as applying only where there are issues of state law
which are difficult for the federal courts to resolve.68
In terms of post-abstention procedure, Younger originally resem-
bled Pullman more closely than it did Burford. When Younger was
decided, convicted criminal defendants generally had the right to
return to federal courts (in habeas corpus proceedings) after state
criminal litigation had run its course.69 However, given recent limi-
tations on federal habeas corpus actions,"' the consequences of
Younger abstention have become more like those of Burford absten-
tion. Thus, increasingly the de facto consequence of Younger ab-
stention is the absolute dismissal of a federal attack on pending
state court criminal proceedings, with no possibility of returning
later to federal court to relitigate the federal issues."
65. 401 U.S. at 43-44. In extreme cases, the clarity of a state law against a prosecution might
indicate a bad faith prosecution, one circumstance the Younger Court recognized as an exception
to its prohibition of federal injunctions against state criminal prosecutions. Id. at 48-49.
66. See Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (extending Younger to protect state civil contempt
proceedings because of their "importance"); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627-28 (1986) (extending application of the Younger doctrine to state
administrative proceedings against a private school for alleged gender discrimination in violation
of state law).
67. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 327; infra note 55.
68. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
69. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-22 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-65
(1953); BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1487-94.
70. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 316, 318-21 (1989) (holding by a majority of
Justices, in separate opinions, that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be rec-
ognized or applied in habeas corpus proceedings unless they are "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty"); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (tightening the requirements for rais-
ing, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, issues not properly raised in the state criminal
proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 (1976) (holding that federal habeas corpus relief
may not be granted to state prisoners on unconstitutional search or seizure grounds if "full and
fair" opportunity for litigation of the issue is provided by the state).
71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (indicating the increasing difficulties in obtaining
federal habeas consideration of state criminal cases).
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D. The Colorado River Doctrine (1974)
Colorado River abstention is a doctrine of very limited applica-
tion. The general rule is that federal courts are not permitted to
abstain simply because the parties before them are pursuing the
same case in state court. 2 In Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States,73 however, the Supreme Court created an
exception to this rule based upon what it characterized as "truly
unusual" facts.74 While the Supreme Court's and lower federal
courts' exposition of this doctrine is not clear, the doctrine's main
focus is on geographic convenience to the parties and on the possi-
bility of harm from duplicative state and federal litigation.7" Colo-
rado River abstention does not focus primarily on the nature of the
issues litigated or their lack of clarity as do the Pullman, Burford,
and Younger varieties of abstention. Because Colorado River ab-
stention is rarely used and because its overlap with Burford is
largely serendipitous, an understanding of Colorado River absten-
tion is not crucial to an understanding of Burford's current contours
or whether these contours are grounded in sound reason.
E. The Thibodaux Doctrine (1959)
A fifth abstention doctrine merits mention although its current
status has been rendered uncertain by the Court's latest descriptions
of Burford abstention. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux,76 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a federal
district court to abstain from hearing a state eminent domain pro-
ceeding filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.77 The
Court implied that the lack of clarity of state law, in combination
with the importance of the matter to the state, warranted
abstention.78
72. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910) (stating that it is well recognized "that
the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter
in the Federal court having jurisdiction").
73. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
74. Id. at 817-20. The suit involved challenges by various Native American tribes to a state
engineer's allocation of state water rights. Id. at 805. There were over 1,000 defendants. Id. at
820.
75. Id. at 820 (finding it significant that 300 miles separated the Denver federal district court
and the state court).
76. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
77. Id. at 30.
78. See id. at 29-30.
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A later Supreme Court case suggested that Thibodaux abstention
may be a subset of the Burford variety.7 9 This suggestion is impor-
tant to an understanding of Burford because Thibodaux did not in-
volve the potential interference with state administrative processes
usually thought to be the hallmark of Burford abstention. If the
matter litigated in Thibodaux had been brought in the state system,
it would have originated in state court and not in an administrative
proceeding. 0 Thus, the state legislature entrusted the application
and development of the system of law involved in Thibodaux to the
state courts rather than to an agency, and yet abstention was per-
mitted on the grounds that an unclear and sensitive state law matter
would be better resolved in the state courts. Writing for the Court,
Justice Frankfurter justified abstention based upon the importance
of avoiding a federal court guess as to unclear and disputed state
law so "intimately involved with sovereign prerogative." Thus, he
enlarged abstention that is based on state law beyond the set of
cases involving state administrative agencies. 1
Despite these differences between the two cases, the 1976 Colo-
rado River opinion strongly links Thibodaux and Burford, even sug-
gesting that, the former is a variety of Burford abstention. 2 But, as
discussed more fully later in this Article, the Supreme Court, in its
recent decision New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans,88 seems to have retracted this suggestion."' Compounding
the confusion further, recent cryptic statements in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards"8 may have retracted the New Orleans "retraction." 86
Depending on how one reads the enigmatic case law, Thibodaux
currently may be viewed as part of the Burford doctrine, as a sepa-
rate major or minor doctrine, or as no doctrine at all. Indeed, as this
Article suggests later, it may make sense not only to recognize a
connection between the two forms of abstention, but also to see
Thibodaux as a broader, general category subsuming all or part of
79. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814; see infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
80. Not all proceedings in state court are judicial. Some are administrative or legislative. See
infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
81. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28-29.
82. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
83. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
84. Id. at 361. The Court seemed to limit Burford to the administrative realm, whereas
Thibodaux did not involve an agency. See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 25.
85. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
86. Id. at 2216. Unlike New Orleans, Ankenbrandt indicates that Burford may apply to cases
not involving state administrative agencies. See supra note 15; infra notes 296-305.
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the Burford doctrine. Ankenbrandt offers possible support for this
position. 7
After these extremely brief sketches of Burford and its siblings, it
is time to turn to a more detailed discussion of the case in which
Burford abstention originated.
II. BURFORD V. SUN OIL CO. AND ITS BACKGROUND.
In 1943, Sun Oil Company sued Burford and the Texas Railroad
Commission (Commission) in federal district court, invoking diver-
sity and federal question jurisdiction."8 The suit attacked the valid-
ity of a Commission order permitting Burford to drill four wells on
a small lot located on the East Texas oilfield, asserting that such
action was invalid on both federal constitutional and state statutory
grounds."9
Under Texas law in place at the time the Burford controversy
arose, "the holder o'f an oil lease [owned] the oil in place beneath
the surface" of his land."° However, the value of those ownership
rights was sometimes imperiled by the possibility that others with
surface ownership over the same pool would pump more than their
fair share of oil.9" Texas statutory law assigned to the Commission
the task of determining how much oil each leaseholder could extract
from such pools, in effect limiting each leaseholder to the approxi-
mate amount of oil underlying his land in order to prevent
,'waste.", 2
Meeting these less than determinative mandates required careful
adjustments of a complex but highly integrated system. Drilling
87. See infra part VI.B.I, particularly notes 437-67 and accompanying text.
88. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 316-17 (1943).
89. Id.
90. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 579, modified, 311 U.S. 614
(1940).
91. Id. In the Court's words: "Each leaseholder ... is at the mercy of all those who adjoin
him, since oil is a fugacious mineral, the movements of which are not confined by the artificial
boundaries of surface tracts." Id.
92. Burford, 319 U.S. at 320-23. The Court further defined waste as the ultimate loss of oil
through means such as excessive production or unwise dissipation of reserves. Id.
93. See id. at 318-24. As to the vague regulatory standards set by the Texas legislature for
Railroad Commission implementation, see id. at 323 n.15 ("'We believe it would be impossible
for the Legislature to lay down a definite standard by which it could be determined correctly just
when and under what conditions an oil producing area should be divided into drilling units and
what size and shape the units should be.'" (quoting Patterson v, Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77
P.2d 83, 91 (Okla. 1939))).
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one well could affect pressure in another miles away;94 therefore,
providing protection from waste was a complicated matter. The
Commission could not always respond cautiously in an abstractly
evenhanded way. Doing so could lead to waste, for sometimes pres-
sure decreased rapidly in a region of the pool so that oil not pro-
duced immediately would be lost forever. 95 Exercising the large dis-
cretion granted it under the Texas enabling act, the Commission
promulgated Rule 37, which mandated minimum spacing between
wells, but which also allowed exceptions to prevent waste or the con-
fiscation of property.9 6
By the best estimate available to the Supreme Court at the time
the Burford controversy arose, over two-thirds of the approximately
25,000 wells in the East Texas oilfield existed as Commission-
granted exceptions to its own Rule 37.97 The order attacked by Sun
Oil allowed Burford to drill four wells as exceptions to the Rule 37
spacing requirements.98 Because it would lose oil as a result of Bur-
ford's pumping new wells over the common pool, Sun Oil alleged
that it would suffer injury from the exception granted Burford. 99
The company argued that this injury was actionable on two inde-
pendent bases: (1) that the Commission order constituted a confisca-
tion of its oil without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment due process protection for property; and (2) that the
order was invalid under state law.' 00
The district court dismissed the suit based on a line of Supreme
Court cases it read as relegating most oil and gas conservation cases
to the state courts. 1 1 In its initial opinion, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, based on its similar reading of those cases.'0 2 On rehearing,
the circuit court reconsidered the significance of those authorities in
the context of a recent Texas case. The court viewed the Texas case
as clarifying the task of a Texas court reviewing a decision of the
state Railroad Commission, hence making manageable the task of a
94. Id. at 324.
95. Id. at 319, 322.
96. Id. at 322.
97. Id. at 324 n.17.
98. Id. at 316-17.
99. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
100. Burford, 319 U.S. at 317, 332.
101. Burford, 124 F.2d at 468. The line of Supreme Court cases the district court referred to
culminated in the Court's decision in Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S.
573, 577, 583-89, modified, 311 U.S. 614 (1940).
102. Burford. 124 F.2d at 468-70.
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federal court asked to make the same judgment. 103 The circuit court
withdrew its original affirmance and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a decision on the merits as to: (1) the validity of the
state administrative action under state law; and (2) if necessary, its
validity under the Federal Constitution as well.' 0"
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, initially sug-
gesting that it was upholding the district court's discretion to ab-
stain, 10 5 but later indicating that the district court had made the
only appropriate choice under the circumstances. 06 The Supreme
Court's Burford opinion never endorsed the precise reasoning of the
district court but rather supplied its own rambling explanation of
why the circumstances warranted abstention. 0 7
The Supreme Court's Burford opinion provides no formula for
applying this variety of abstention. Any guidance must be extracted
from the facts, both physical and institutional, which were empha-
sized by the Court in reaching its decision. The Court justified ab-
stention on grounds of equitable discretion, stressing the following
factors:
(a) Congress left the regulation of oil and gas to the states;10 8
(b) the state regulation was important because of the significance
of conservation of oil and gas generally, but more particularly, in
light of the vital importance of those minerals to the Texas
economy; 109
(c) each oil and gas field had to be regulated as a unit because of
great factual complexities;1 0
(d) because the standards applied in a given case involving oil
leaseholds necessarily affected the "entire state conservation sys-
tem," suits such as Burford were seen as public in nature, not
merely as suits between private parties;"'
(e) because of the public ramifications surrounding private activi-
ties within the oil industry, the Texas legislature delegated to the
Texas Railroad Commission the task of adjusting the complex rela-
103. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1942).
104. Id. at 16.
105. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943).
106. Id. at 334.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 108-16 (detailing the Burford Court's reasoning).
108. Burford. 319 U.S. 315, 319.
109. Id. at 320, 324.
110. Id. at 319, 323 (noting that activities in one portion of an oilfield can have unpredictable
effects miles away).
11 I. Id. at 324.
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tionships among those with interests in the oilfields; 112
(f) the Commission was given "'broad discretion' in administer-
ing the law";113
(g) judicial review of decisions of the Railroad Commission was
confined to a single expert court, under a statutory directive to ac-
quire a specialized knowledge of oil and gas regulation;1"
(h) by statutory directive, the function of the specialized court
was not simply to engage in ordinary judicial review, but also to act
as a "working partner" with the Railroad Commission, having some
arguably "legislative powers" in "shaping" regulatory policy;115
(i) there was a history of mistaken federal court predictions of
state regulatory law regarding oil allocation so disruptive that at one
point the governor thought it necessary to impose martial law.116
The opinion did not indicate which of the bewilderingly large
number of possible combinations of these factors would be sufficient
to warrant abstention. The particularism and lack of formulaic ex-
planation, typical of an opinion based upon equitable discretion, has
led to Burford's ambiguity and to its great malleability in the hands
of the federal courts, from the lowest to the highest level. 17
112. Id. at 320.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 325, 327.
115. Id. at 325-27.
116. Id. at 327-33 (discussing how federal court interference in the evolving oil allocation regu-
latory scheme in Texas caused needless reworking of statutes and regulations).
117. See infra part III (discussing how federal courts have interpreted Burford). As will be
discussed later, in attempting to define Burford, courts have used a wide variety of combinations
of these factors. See infra notes 233-49 and accompanying text. Each such formula can lay claim,
with varying degrees of plausibility, to justification in the original Burford opinion. For example,
the Burford opinion offers justification for the widely held view among federal courts that federal
court scrutiny of a state "administrative" agency's decision is a necessary element of this form of
abstention. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. The emphasis many courts place on the
"importance" or "transcendent" nature of the state issue also finds great support as a key factor
favoring Burford abstention. Additionally, courts often emphasize another Burford abstention ra-
tionale: that the appropriateness of such abstention depends on whether the exercise of federal
court jurisdiction will disrupt or interrupt the state administrative policy-making process. See in-
fra note 235 and accompanying text. Some courts, subsequent to Burford, have found significant,
or even necessary, the presence of a specialized state court in which judicial review of a state
agency's decision has been concentrated. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
The Burford opinion's focus on the great complexity of the Texas regulatory system, and the
consequent possibility of disruptive federal court mistakes, provides a basis for those courts which
place great weight, when analyzing whether to abstain, on the lack of clarity of state law. Finally,
Burford's statement that Congress had left regulation of oil and gas production to the states may
have served as the source, however unjustifiably, of the notion possessed by some lower federal
courts that the peculiarly local nature of certain matters, by itself, weighs heavily, if not deci-
sively, in favor of Burford abstention. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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Each of the factors stressed in the Burford opinion, however, has
had an effect on future formulations of Burford abstention by the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Two examples of absten-
tion prerequisites espoused by some lower federal courts that
originated in the factors delineated in Burford are the presence of
peculiarly "local" issues' 18 and the existence of a specialized state
court created to review state agency action.'1 9 These requirements
for Burford abstention, among others that trace their origins to the
Court's opinion, are discussed and appraised in various sections
below.
III. BURFORD'S APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITH THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Burford seems incompatible with the generally recognized consti-
tutional principle that federal courts have no discretion to decline
jurisdiction conferred by statute.12 It also seems inconsistent with
some specific inferences drawn from statutes and case law that the
exercise of federal question jurisdiction is especially important.12 1
While posing some difficulties, these apparent inconsistencies might
be seen as easily dissolved by resort to familiar equitable
principles. 22
Two other problems are more difficult. First, reconciling Burford
with the regime of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 3 requires an
understanding of parallel developments in federal judicial review of
federal administrative agencies. Second, an understanding of federal
administrative law is crucial to any convincing attempt to explain
Burford's exception to the general rule that state judicial remedies
need not be exhausted before seeking federal equitable relief against
state administrative action.' 24
As discussed in detail below, Burford's radical adjustment of the
Erie regime provided Pullman abstention with a sibling.' 2 5 Bur-
118. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 235, 240 and accompanying text.
120. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); infra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text (dealing with Cohens's mandatory jurisdiction principle).
121. See infra note 571 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
123. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 150-63 and accompany-
ing text.
124. See infra part II.C.2.a.
125. See infra part III.
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ford's truly exceptional requirement that state judicial remedies be
"exhausted" before a federal suit, when coupled with rules of claim
preclusion, paradoxically made the federal suit forever unavailable.
In 1943, Burford was the only truly complete major form of absten-
tion. It was the only formally recognized abstention doctrine which
resulted in the permanent exclusion from the federal courts of a
case over which they had statutory jurisdiction. 126
A. How Equitable Discretion Overrode the Usual Rule That
Federal Courts Must Exercise Jurisdiction Conferred by Statute
In Cohens v. Virginia,2 ' Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[w]e
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would be treason to the constitution."' 28 These well-known state-
ments have been interpreted to mean that federal courts are not
generally free to decline to hear cases within their statutory jurisdic-
tion.'2 9 In light of this principle of mandatory jurisdiction, Burford's
permanent exclusion of some diversity and federal question suits
from federal court jurisdiction requires justification.
Although the mandatory jurisdiction principle was firmly estab-
lished, longstanding doctrines of self-prescribed judicial restraint of-
fered the courts leeway to decline a variety of suits within their ju-
risdiction. 30 Burford was decided two years after the Pullman case,
where the Court first used the word abstention to describe a situa-
tion where a court declined to exercise jurisdiction, although in cir-
cumstances different from those of Burford.3' Despite the appear-
ance that the Court was now in the business of creating separate
and definable doctrines of abstention, it is not fully accurate to char-
acterize either Burford or Pullman in that way.
The two forms of abstention expressed in Pullman and Burford
can just as easily be seen as different applications of a common prin-
126. Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 439-40 (11th Cir. 1982) (characterizing Bur-
ford as "perhaps the most potent device" in the area of federal abstention).
127. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
128. Id. at 404.
129. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59
(1989); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988); Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
130. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547-61 (1985)
(reviewing various judicially created doctrines of abstention or restraint).
131. For a description of the Pullman doctrine, see supra part I.A.
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ciple. The Court characterized both the Pullman and Burford doc-
trines as members of an old family of highly diverse principles of
equitable restraint."' 2 Pullman abstention, the precursor of the
Younger variety, 133 and other forms of equitable discretion are listed
in Burford as exemplifying the proposition that
[e]quity's discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction may be applied
when judicial restraint seems required by considerations of general welfare.
"Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accus-
tomed to go when only private interests are involved."'"
Equitable discretion, then, seems at least a plausible reason for
departing from the usual rule of mandatory jurisdiction. But when
Burford is judged against newer, post-Erie"8" principles, some mys-
tery remains as to the rationale behind that form of abstention.
B. Burford as an Exception to Entrenched Principles of Judicial
Federalism Exemplified by Erie v. Tompkins
Most cases in which Burford abstention has been ordered or seri-
ously considered have been direct challenges to state administrative
action. 136 Many of these cases involved challenges to state action
132. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33 & n.29 (1943).
133. For a description of the Younger doctrine, see supra part I.C.
134. Burford, 319 U.S. at 333 n.29 (quoting Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 552
(1937)). Burford cites Pullman, Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941), Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387 (1941), and Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), as cases which
recognized equitable discretion to refuse interference with state criminal proceedings. Burford,
319 U.S. at 333 n.29. These cases are also cited in Younger v. Harris, which crystallizes their
underlying rationale into a more firm and distinct abstention doctrine. 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
135. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
136. See, e.g., Bath Memorial Hosp. v. Maine Health Care Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d 1007,
1013-15 (1st Cir. 1988) (challenging the state's Medicare reimbursement scheme); Meredith v.
Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228, 231-32 (4th Cir. 1987) (challenging the County Planning Officer's
denial of a zoning permit); Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir.
1986) (challenging the Superintendent of Insurance's refusal to pay alleged obligations under a
reinsurance agreement); Friends of Children, Inc. v. Matava, 766 F.2d 35, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1985)
(challenging an order by the state's Department of Social Services); Robert-Gay Energy Enters.,
Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 753 F.2d 857, 859-62 (10th Cir. 1985) (challenging the Commis-
sion's denial of an application for bonus allowable on an oil well); Aluminum Co. v. Utilities
Comm'n, 713 F.2d 1024, 1028-30 (4th Cir. 1983) (challenging a Utilities Commission order al-
leging an interference with federal law); Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d
993, 997-98 (1st Cir. 1983) (challenging actions of the Puerto Rico Planning Board, the Director
of Highway Authority, and the Secretary of the Department of Transoortation); Levy v. Lewis,
635 F.2d 960, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1980) (alleging that the Superintendent of Insurance violated
ERISA by terminating employee retirement benefits); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228,
230-34 (1st Cir. 1979) (challenging rates set by the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance);
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brought under federal law, particularly the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 13 7  The apparent
irony is that decades before Burford, at roughly the turn of the cen-
tury, the Supreme Court had performed argumentative contortions,
in Ex parte Young,138 to include such suits within the jurisdiction of
the federal district courts.1 3 9
The contortions were necessary because the Eleventh Amendment
was read as barring suits against a state both by its own citizens and
by citizens of another state. 40 Suits to enjoin state officers from
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Rivera de Vicenty, 573 F.2d 86, 89-97 (Ist Cir. 1978) (chal-
lenging an order of the State Insurance Fund of Puerto Rico); Holmes v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 266-68 (2d Cir. 1968) (challenging, under civil rights laws, the procedures
used by the Housing Authority in the admission of tenants to public housing projects).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Bath Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d at 1013; Mere-
dith, 828 F.2d at 231; Robert-Gay Energy Enters., 753 F.2d at 859; Aluminum Co., 713 F.2d at
1025; Holmes, 398 F.2d at 264.
138. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
139. The contortions took the form of creating a fiction that a state officer, enforcing state law
alleged to violate federal law, does not represent the state and so is not immune, under the Elev-
enth Amendment, from injunctive and other coercive orders issued by federal trial courts. Id. at
159-60.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). The present-day
scope of the Eleventh Amendment is complex. Despite the Eleventh Amendment's explicit limita-
tion of immunity to states sued in federal court by citizens of other states, the Court seems to
have used the Amendment as a basis for its creation of much broader immunity. In 1890, the
Supreme Court determined that the Eleventh Amendment (or possibly a related immunity doc-
trine) extended to prohibit suits against a state by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
21 (1890). The law determining precisely what is a suit against a state prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment (or by the Hans doctrine if it is, in fact, a different doctrine) is extremely compli-
cated. For a comprehensive review of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, see BA-
TOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1159-1221.
Federal suits against local governments and officials are not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890). Suits against state officials
sued in their individual capacities are also not covered. BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1195.
However, any suit against a state as a name party is covered, Id. at 1191. Whether suits against
state officials in their official capacities are covered depends upon the nature of the claim and the
nature of the relief sought. If the relief seeks recovery from the state treasury for a past wrong,
the suit is deemed one against the state, although an officer is nominally the only defendant.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). If the relief sought against a state officer in his
official capacity is a mandatory or negative order compelling the officer to comply with law in the
future, the nature of the suit depends upon the source of the law alleged to have been violated.
Such a suit is permitted to secure compliance with federal law. Id. at 663-67; see also Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60 (1908). If, however, the basis of the claim is state law, it is deemed
a suit against the state and barred. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
106 (1984). Finally, even if the suit is one deemed to be against the state, it still may be main-
tained in federal court if the state very clearly waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity or if the
suit is one under federal law which expressly overrides the immunity. See generally BATOR ET AL..
supra note 2, at 1213-21 (discussing waiver and congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity).
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functioning in their official capacities are, from any realistic point of
view, suits against states. In Ex parte Young, the Court created a
fiction to the contrary, laying a frame.work for suits challenging
state action on federal grounds. Under the framework, state officers
acting in violation of the Federal Constitution are to be viewed as
stripped of their authority under state law, so that suits against
them seeking prospective relief are not viewed as suits against the
state barred by the Eleventh Amendment.141
The only way a state can act directly upon the world is through
its officers. Hence, the Young Court's analysis lacks real plausibility,
particularly when it leads to the conclusion that a suit to stop a state
officer from complying with the clear command of her legislature is
not a suit against the state.1" 2 Nevertheless, the Court applied the
fiction in such cases, and its doing so was seen as necessary to mean-
ingful enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment against the
states." Without the Young decision, enforcement of the Four-
teenth Amendment in federal court would have been extremely lim-
ited. Certainly state officers would have been subject to none of the
rights injunctions (structural and otherwise) which are now familiar
parts of the American legal landscape. 4
Burford seems odd when viewed against the background of this
great effort to include suits challenging state action within the juris-
diction of the federal district courts. This is particularly true in light
of the fact that suits in equity were primarily, if not exclusively, the
sort of suit for which Young carved out its exception to the Eleventh
Amendment.' 48 Why, after great efforts to include suits in equity,
did the Court allow their exclusion in a significant subset? Burford
was decided at a revolutionary moment in both federalism and ad-
ministrative law. As one of a series of sharp breaks with its prede-
141. Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
142. Id. at 174-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (stating that
the "prospective relief authorized by Young 'has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the
Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those whom they were
designed to protect'" (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 615, 66'4 (1974))); BATOR ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 1182 (suggesting that a contrary holding in Ex parte Young would have left
constitutional rights with inadequate protection).
144. Certainly, even without Ex parte Young, the Fourteenth Amendment could have been
used as a defense to state proceedings, as it is today. It also could have formed the incorporated
predicate of damage suits by plaintiffs against state officers in their individual capacities, as it
does today.
145. See Young, 209 U.S. at 161-68 (justifying its decision on the basis that the suit was one in
equity, thus triggering the Court's broad equitable discretion).
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cessor, the New Deal Court read the Commerce Clause as giving
Congress broad powers to regulate any matter affecting the national
economy in any significant way. 1 6 Perhaps as part of an attempt to
underscore the continued vibrancy of state government, the Court
expressed intensified respect for the rights of states to govern in the
shrinking domain which was left to them.147 Congress could regu-
late, but absent some basis in a federal statute or other textual
source, federal courts generally were not to be law-makers. 4 8 The
background assumption was that state law governed issues left fully
open by Congress and the Constitution. 4 9
Five years before Burford, the Supreme Court underscored the
importance of state court control over the content of state law in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.' According to the Erie doctrine,
federal courts are required to do everything reasonably within their
power to decide state substantive issues in the way that they antici-
pate the state's highest court would decide them.151 It is worth not-
ing that such state law issues can arise both in a diversity suit and
in a. federal question suit.1 52
While anticipating state court interpretation had been more or
less required of federal courts in a wide variety of cases decided
before Erie,'58 that case ushered in an era of heightened sensitivity
146. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (holding that under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate the individual farmer growing wheat for his
own consumption) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-43 (1937) (hold-
ing that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate against unfair labor practices
of a steel manufacturer) with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298-302 (1936) (treating
manufacturing activities as not a part of interstate commerce and, therefore, not subject to regula-
tion under the Commerce Clause).
147. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (reading Erie as placing greater responsibility
on the federal courts for correctly applying state law as to issues not governed by federal law).
148. Emphasis is on the word "generally." While Erie stated that there was no general federal
common law, a specialized federal common law survived to deal with issues strongly implicating
federal interests. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964) (stating that a "not insignificant" part of Justice Story's
"general law" already existed under the scope of federal common law and that many other parts
could be brought under its reach if "Congress thinks it desirable").
149. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4514, at 217-18 (1982) (discussing federal common law after
Erie).
150. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
151. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943); see also infra notes
159-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Meredith decision).
152. BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 858 n.2.
153. Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 204-05 (1957); see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 149,
§ 4502, at nn.7-19 (examining the difference between "local" and "general" law).
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to state control over the content of state law.' 54 During the term in
which Burford was decided, Justice Stone, writing for the majority
in Meredith v. Winter Haven,'55 rejected abstention in the equitable
suit before the Court.' 56 The Meredith opinion demonstrates the
Erie regime's increased concern with federal courts accurately de-
termining state law regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the suit:
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . did not free the federal courts from the duty
of deciding questions of state law in diversity cases. Instead it placed on
them a greater responsibility for determining and applying state laws in all -
cases within their jurisdiction in which federal law does not govern.' 7
Considering solely a state's interest, however, one might have pre-
dicted that this increased emphasis on state control over state law
interpretation would have lead to widespread approval of abstention
whenever state law was unclear. 1 8
Despite its concern with proper federal court interpretation of
state law, Meredith rejected abstention as a means to this end. In-
deed, of the post-Erie cases, it was Meredith which most clearly
established that declining or staying jurisdiction in a federal case, in
order to obtain a state court ruling, was not a permissible measure
to assure state control of the content of state law.' 59 Although ab-
stention was a completely foolproof way of assuring such control, 60
the mandatory jurisdiction principle reflected countervailing consid-
erations favoring the exercise of federal jurisdiction.' 6' Exercising
jurisdiction over cases like Meredith involving state law, in turn, re-
quired federal court fortune-telling as to how state courts would in-
terpret and define state law.' 62
154. See Kurland, supra note 153, at 204-05; 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 149, § 4503, at
21.
155. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
156. Id. at 236-38. The plaintiffs in Meredith were municipal bondholders seeking equitable
relief, asserting that a state statute prohibited the city from calling in the bonds without paying
interest on the deferred-interest coupons. Id. at 229-30.
157. Id. at 237 (emphasis added). Note that Chief Justice Stone was one of the dissenters in
Burford. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 348 (1943) (Stone, J., joining in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
158. See Kurland, supra note 153, at 213-14 (suggesting a number of solutions to problems
created by Erie, including abstention and, most radically, abolition of diversity jurisdiction).
159. Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234, 236-37; see Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Fo-
rum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908, 924 (1947).
160. See Kurland, supra note 153, at 213-14.
161. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory jurisdiction
principle).
162. Meredith. 320 U.S. at 234.
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The contrast in outcomes further sharpens because Meredith, like
Burford, was a suit in equity. 163 If equitable restraint could have
been grounded merely on a policy of avoiding federal court guesses
as to the meaning of unclear state law, abstention would have been
required in Meredith as well as in Burford. How was Burford ex-
ceptional? What sort of exception did it establish to the Erie-Mere-
dith doctrine? I believe it was the perception of administrative law
as an unusual species of law which shaped Burford.
C. Burford's Origins in the Developing Body of Federal
Administrative Law
While a state's interest in avoiding federal court errors as to the
meaning of state law was generally insufficient to justify abstention,
it sufficed in Burford. What tipped the scales, I believe, was the
administrative nature of the state law involved in that case.
The usual legal guesswork, under what I will call the Erie-Mere-
dith doctrine, was of a familiar sort. While the questions of state
law were often difficult, both state and federal judges were seen as
belonging to something resembling a fraternity of law and equity. 164
Theoretically, text and precedent, not policy, drove the resolution of
legal issues until the force of those sources of law was expended. 65
A federal judge knew what state cases, statutes, and constitutional
materials a state judge would find relevant in determining state law.
He understood the hierarchy of precedent as seen by state judges,
and he "knew how to read a case" and how to interpret a statute at
least as well as his state counterpart. 66
The one ability of state judges that a federal judge could not
mimic, however, was the ex cathedra infallibility of the states high-
est court, sitting as a body, in determining the meaning of state law.
But this disparity could be remedied only at the price of requiring
the federal courts to decline all cases involving unsettled issues of
state law, a price the Erie-Meredith doctrine established as gener-
163. Id. at 228.
164. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 17-23 (1960) (discussing steadying
factors in our federal appellate courts).
165. See infra notes 414-23 and accompanying text (indicating that, at the time of the Burford
decision, judges were generally viewed as finding law rather than making it). See generally Hu-
BERT L. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961) (arguing that a system of legal materials -
rules, principles, and policies - is only marginally open-textured and indeterminate).
166. CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR., A TRIAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 22 (1952).
"Most of the time [state law] is readily discoverable." Id.
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ally too high. In sum, given the general ability of federal judges to
deal with state sources, the Supreme Court presumably believed
that the inevitable federal court "mistakes" as to the meaning of
state law were a small price to pay, in order to avoid dismantling
congressionally compelled federal question and diversity jurisdiction
in any case turning on unsettled state law.
These background assumptions, however, were not so obviously
true with respect to the sort of state law involved in Burford: law
developed and applied in administrative actions or in some very spe-
cialized varieties of state court "review" of such actions. Well
before Burford's time, administrative law possessed an air of unfa-
miliarity, if not mystery. 167 Those apparently platonic legal forms,
the "legislative," "executive," and "judicial," in fact were always
less than sharply distinct.1"8 During the formation of New Deal ad-
ministrative law, these theoretically separated powers began to run
together in truly perplexing ways.16 9 I believe that this intensifying
disorientation contributed to the Burford Court's unwillingness to
categorize the alternative Texas forum as legislative or judicial,
stating instead that "[i]n describing the relation of the Texas court
to the Commission, no useful purpose will be served by attempting
to label the court's position as legislative or judicial . "1.70
Burford was written during this formative period of modern fed-
167. See Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv 614, 615
(1927) ("But administrative law is hardly yet given de jure recognition by the English-speaking
bar although the term has now established itself in the vocabulary of the United States Supreme
Court. Until very recently even scholars treated it as an exotic.").
168. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-11 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Holmes:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white ....
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and
executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments.
Id.
169. As for the possession of legislative power by the executive branch, compare Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (early New Deal, pre-Court-packing plan case striking down
§ 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the president) with Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (late New Deal case
holding that the Emergency Price Control Act's delegation of price-fixing authority to the Execu-
tive branch was constitutional). As for the distinction between legislation and adjudication, see
infra notes 212-29 and accompanying text (discussing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947)). It is my contention that, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., we see the old distinction between
legislation and adjudication, never completely firm, melt further before our eyes.
170. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1943) (citations omitted).
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eral judicial review of administrative action."' It presented the
Court with difficulties similar to those posed by federal review of
federal agencies, but here those difficulties were transposed onto the
independently difficult domain of federalism. 72 The problem for
federal administrative law at the time was determining the level of
deference federal courts should give to decisions of various sorts
made by federal administrative agencies. 7 8 The solution initially
was to defer greatly, indeed nearly completely, to federal agencies'
decisions of fact and of so called "mixed questions of law and
fact."17 4
In the context of judicial federalism, this issue was viewed, ini-
tially, as one of determining how much federal courts should defer
to state administrative agencies on decisions within their domain.1 78
171. During this period, the "historical building blocks" of federal court review of federal
agency interpretations of law were put into place. WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 379-80 (8th ed. 1987). It was also during this period that the semi-
nal case on federal judicial review of federal agencies' conclusions of fact was decided. See Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-90 (1951) (requiring court affirmance of
agency findings if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole).
172. The problems posed by elaborating on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and
determining the existence and scope of remaining federal specialized common law are two closely
related examples. Friendly, supra note 148, at 407-09.
173. See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
174. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (holding that where
the question is one of application of a broad statutory term, the agency's determination must be
accepted if it has "warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in the law").
175. See Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 583-84, modified, 311
U.S. 614 (1940). In contrast with Burford, Rowan expresses no explicit concern with the effect of
federal litigation on state schemes for judicial review of agency action. See id.
It is possible, however, to read Rowan as concerned with that factor sub silentio. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to read Rowan as requiring a very limited Burford-style abstention two years
before Burford was decided. The abstention recognized in Rowan was narrow. It allowed federal
courts to refuse to hear administratively complex state law claims which were pendent to federal
claims entertained solely on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See Railroad Comm'n v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 614, 614-15, modifying 310 U.S. 573 (1940). Rowan, how-
ever, did not authorize federal trial courts to avoid resolution of (I) federal questions themselves
turning on complex state administrative law or (2) diversity cases in which such state administra-
tive issues arose. Only state claims before the court as pendent to federal claims were covered by
Rowan. The Rowan Court's amendment of its original opinion makes it clear that it was not
authorizing abstention as to nonpendent state claims. Id. It was with Burford that abstention as to
federal question claims and claims made between diverse parties became the proper subject for an
administrative variety of abstention. In Burford, which required abstention, both diversity and
federal question jurisdiction were present. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317 (1943).
Hence, it permitted the two varieties of abstention not approved in Rowan.
Thus, Rowan was a very limited Burford precursor, which also resembled a limited version of
today's Pennhurst doctrine. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103-
06 (1984). Pennhurst prohibits federal suits seeking relief against state government on state law
claims. See infra notes 341-49 and accompanying text. Rowan reached the subset of such claims
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Finally, in Burford itself, the issue became whether to suspend the
usual rule of federalism, non-abstention under Erie-Meredith, so
that an administratively expert state court might have the last word
on issues of state policy originally resolved in an agency."7 6 Here
federalism, as usually practiced, clashed with the states' interest in
having the federal courts extend respect to expert state administra-
tive processes equal to that accorded their federal counterparts.
This Article next reviews the principles developed for federal re-
view of federal agency determinations, and then examines the diffi-
culties involved in applying these principles to federal court review
of the decisions of state administrative agencies. 177
1. Federal Review of Federal Agency Determinations
Between 1941 and 1951, the Supreme Court decided the cases
constituting the "historical building blocks" of the system of judicial
review of decisions made by federal administrative agencies. 178
Three of these cases were decided in 1944, within a year of Bur-
ford. 17  These decisions struggle to define the appropriate judicial
deference to agency determinations of law and fact. They indicate
concerning pendent state claims which might disrupt state administrative processes.
It is important to stress that, as to the federal due process issue presented in Rowan, the Court
did not suggest that the lower federal courts have no jurisdiction, but rather that they should defer
greatly to the state agency's determination of fairness in determining that question. See Rowan,
311 U.S. at 615. In other words, I understand the modification of the original Rowan opinion as
intended to clarify the proposition that state agency determinations may powerfully influence, but
cannot completely determine, the outcome of a federal suit claiming a violation of due process.
176. In Burford, the state agency's decision was made before the federal suit was brought.
Burford, 319 U.S. at 316-17. On the surface, the issues of state law before the federal court were
issues of Texas statutory and case law that would have been justiciable in a Texas court. Hence,
on the surface, a federal court sitting in diversity would have been required to determine these
issues under the Erie line of cases. However, Burford focused on the availability of relief in a
specialized state court. The Court treated this Texas court as a special part of the administrative
process to which the federal courts should defer much as they would to a state agency itself. Id. at
325-26, 333-34.
177. See infra part II.C.1 (federal agency decisions); part I1.C.2 (state agency decisions).
178. The "building blocks" characterization is found in GELLHORN ET AL.. supra note 171, at
379-80. These cases all deal expressly, or by inference, with the appropriateness of judicial defer-
ence to administrative decisions which go beyond pure issues of fact to involve questions of law.
With the exception of Packard, the third of the six cases listed below, all clearly state or strongly
suggest judicial deference as to some matters of statutory construction. The cases are: O'Leary v.
Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
485 (1947); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322
U.S. 607 (1944); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402 (1941).
179. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322
U.S. 607 (1944); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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that at the time of Burford, the Court perceived a hazy, somehow
"mixed" domain existing between pure fact-finding and pure statu-
tory interpretation. 180 Several decades of judicial opinions and schol-
arship demonstrate the difficulties with the ends of this supposed
continuum and with its "mixed question" middle. 8'
Some very recent and impressive scholarship makes a strong case
that the law and fact categories are manipulable to the point of near
incoherence. 82 At the time Burford was decided, however, the
Court took this middle "mixed question" ground very seriously,
treating it as an area set aside for agency, as opposed to judicial,
preeminence. 83 Agency preeminence was accepted by the Court
and was not an issue. Instead, the live issues concerned the bounda-
ries of this preeminence, the degree of court deference within it, and
the theoretical justification for that deference. 84 The mixed ques-
tion cases each involved review of a federal agency determination of
whether a specific set of facts was covered by a statutory term.' 8
180. See, e.g., Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 130-31 (noting that statutory interpretation is
wholly within the province of the court but that the court's review is more limited when the issue
is one of a specific application of a broad statutory term); Gray, 314 U.S. at 411-13 (acknowledg-
ing that the dispute involved an issue other than pure fact-finding, but stating nonetheless that the
agency conclusion regarding the scope of the term "producer" in the Bituminous Coal Code war-
ranted deference).
181. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-50 (abr. student ed.
1965) (discussing cases ranging in date from 1941-64 and scholarship ranging in date from 1899-
1944). Jaffe states:
The device of characterizing a question as one of fact or As "mixed" permits a court
to pretend that it must affirm the administrative action if it is "supported by evi-
dence" or is "reasonable." But if the question is analyzed and faced as one of law the
court cannot thus avoid its responsibility.
Id. at 547-48.
182. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 96-105 (1990); see also JAFFE, supra
note 181, at 546-50 (indicating that there had long been skepticism about the existence of clear-
cut categories).
183. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947) (finding that the
agency possessed discretion to determine the meaning of a labor statute as applied to a specific
fact situation); Addison v. Holly Hill Food Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 604, 614, 619 (1944) (noting
that the Administrator, not the Court, had broad, but not complete, authority to define the term
"area of production"); Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 130 (noting that Congress delegated the
primary authority for defining "employee" to the NLRB); Gray. 314 U.S. at 412-13 (acknowledg-
ing that the determination of whether an exemption from the requirements of the Bituminous
Coal Code was warranted belonged solely to the agency implementing the statute).
184. See Packard Motor Car Co., 330 U.S. at 491-92; see also Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 611-18
(identifying limits on an agency's discretion to apply statutory terms).
185. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 505-06 (1951) (deferring to an
agency determination of whether injuries incurred in attempting to rescue persons not within the
employer's service constituted "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment," for purposes of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act); Hearst
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In the well-known case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,18
the question was whether certain "newsboys," who sold newspapers
on the streets and who had a complicated factual and contractual
relationship with the publisher, were employees within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act.'87 In determining the proper
standard of review to apply, the Court categorized agency decisions
as involving either pure issues of fact, pure issues of statutory inter-
pretation, or "mixed" issues. 88 The latter, the sort of issue before
the Court in Hearst Publications, involved the application of broad
statutory terms to specific fact situations.'89 The Court concluded
that nearly complete deference was due agency conclusions of fact,
.but that broad issues of statutory interpretation were for the courts
to resolve, giving due weight to the agency's conclusions.' 90 The
Court also recognized, however, a middle ground in which the
agency's limited interpretations of law were to be given great
deference:
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term
in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must deter-
mine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited. . . . [The agency's
decision on such a matter] is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record
and reasonable basis in law."'
The scope of this middle domain proved difficult to ascertain, pro-
ducing many judicial and scholarly explanations for deference to
what, at a minimum, amounted to an agency's interpretation of stat-
Publications, 322 U.S. at 113, 120-21 (deferring to an agency determination of whether newsboys
were "employees" for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act); Gray, 314 U.S. at 411
(deferring to an agency determination of whether a company was a "producer" of coal and thus
qualified for an exemption under the Bituminous Coal Code).
186. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
187. Id. at 111-21.
188. Id. at 130-31.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citations omitted). The Court prefaced its declaration by observing:
In making that body's determinations as to the facts in these matters conclusive, if
supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily the decision whether the
evidence establishes the material facts. Hence in reviewing the Board's ultimate con-
clusions, it is not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the
Board's, when the latter have support in the record. Undoubtedly questions of statu-
tory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings,
are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of [the
agency].
Id. (citations omitted).
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utes defining its own powers. 92 During the period following Hearst
Publications, the Court itself never adopted a clear explanation of
this category and its special treatment. There is a great deal of con-
fusion in the Supreme Court opinions of this period as to whether
judicial deference to agency determinations of "mixed questions"
was truly based on the inseparable nature of their legal and factual
components or was based on policies having nothing to do with
inseparability.'93
The prevalent view today, exemplified by Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,'"4 is that the legislature's
use of broad statutory terms can best be viewed as a delegation to
the agency to decide the details of its definition within reasonable
limits. 95 Some Burford-era Supreme Court opinions suggest a rudi-
mentary acceptance of the delegations theory as justification for def-
erence to "mixed question" determinations, 96 a position supported
by the most advanced scholarship of the time.19 7
192. For a scholarly explanation of judicial deference to agencies' interpretation of their statu-
tory mandates, see Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 473-76 (1950); JAFFE, supra note 181, at 548-50.
193. Hearst Publications suggests that Congress delegated to the NLRB some of the power
necessary to definitively interpret the statutory term "employee." See NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (finding that it was not necessary for the Court to make a
"completely definitive limitation around the term 'employee' because that task had been assigned
to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act"). In O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,
Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), the Court deferred to an agency's application of the term "scope of
employment," calling it a question of fact but recognizing that that characterization was an over-
simplification. Id. at 507-08. The opinion in O'Leary, however, never suggested that its theory was
based on congressional delegation of some definitive power to interpret the statutory term. Indeed,
Justice Frankfurter's opinion seems, in Jaffe's words, to "pretend" conveniently that the issue is
one of fact. See JAFFE, supra note 181, at 547-48.
194. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
195. Id. at 842-45 (holding that a reviewing court should first look to see if Congress has
provided a definition of a particular statutory term, and if it finds that it has not, it must only
decide whether the agency's construction of the statute is permissible). The Court seems to have
occasionally taken this position regarding "mixed questions" as early as 1944. See supra notes
176-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Hearst Publications Court's treatment of court
deference to agency determinations of "mixed questions"). Indeed, on one early occasion, the
Court seems to have deferred to generalized agency statutory interpretations. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
196. For cases and scholarly commentary contemporaneous with Burford and accepting the
delegation view or something approximating it, see Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 130 ("It is
not necessary in this case [for us] to make a completely definitive limitation around the [statu-
tory] term 'employee.' That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to
administer the Act."); O'Leary, 340 U.S. at 507-08; Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941)
(using the word "delegate").
197. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 144 (1938) ("The interesting
problem as to the future of judicial review over administrative action is the extent to which judges
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Indeed, the 1947 SEC v. Chenery Corp. decision,198 discussed be-
low, indicates that within four years of Burford, the Court officially
accepted the view that agencies could be empowered to definitively
determine, within reasonable limits, the meaning of the very statutes
which granted them authority.1 99 Authority to make such determi-
nation transparently involves a delegation of the power to resolve
pure issues of statutory law. Regardless of stated rationale, however,
there are two key points. First, when Burford was decided, the
Court was in the process of creating a body of rules of review re-
quiring great deference to agency decisions of "mixed questions."
Second, these decisions are best understood as reflecting a sense, if
not a fully conscious understanding, that the agency possessed some
limited delegated power to make law via statutory interpretation in
adjudications. 00
2. Transposing Federal Administrative Review Jurisprudence
onto the Domain of Federal/State Relations
It is my contention that, in applying the rules developed for re-
view of federal agencies' decisions to decisions made by state admin-
istrative processes, the Burford Court saw itself as confronted with
a choice between two less than perfect alternatives. One alternative
involved denying the states the full benefits of administrative
processes which were permitted the federal government. The other
alternative forever denied a federal forum to at least some plaintiffs
over whose claims federal judicial jurisdiction would normally lie. 0 1
will withdraw, not from reviewing findings of fact, but conclusions of law."); Nathanson, supra
note 192, at 473-76, 484-92 (explicating connecting deference to resolutions of pure issues of
statutory interpretation to a delegation theory).
198. 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see infra notes 212-31 and accompanying text.
199. 332 U.S. at 207-09. The SEC reached the apparently generalized conclusion that the
words of a federal statute permitting it to approve only fair and equitable reorganizations did not
allow it to approve reorganizations in which corporate insiders participated as buyers. Id. at 207-
08. This "interpretation," unlike the interpretation in Hearst Publications, apparently had impli-
cations for many future parties as well. What makes Chenery interesting is that the Court made
clear that the agency decision made new law. In other words, it was not an interpretation at all
but the exercise of delegated authority permitted but not necessarily required by the words "fair
and equitable."
200. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 512-13 (indicating that the Court's implicit acceptance of Chevron-like deference extends as
far back as Burford's era).
201. Burford made it reasonably clear that at no stage was the lower federal court to review
the action of the Commission or the specialized state court, stating:
[If lower federal courts abstain,] judicial review of the Commission's decisions in the
state courts is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the interpretation of state law,
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In order to understand why the Supreme Court saw the choice in
these terms, two matters must be explored. The first matter con-
cerns developments in claim preclusion which prohibited an ab-
staining federal court from rehearing a case once a state court (as
opposed to a state agency) had decided it. The second is the in-
creased confusion generated by post-New Deal separation of powers
cases calling into question the distinctions between courts and ad-
ministrative agencies.
a. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway and state/federal claim
preclusion
In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway,2 °2 the Court required
that federal suits challenging legislative or administrative action be
postponed until the completion of the legislative or administrative
process.203 While this rule has been eroded somewhat, 20 another as-
pect of Prentis remains vital to an understanding of Burford. In
Prentis the Court made it clear that although state administrative
remedies must be exhausted before a federal suit could be main-
tained, the same was not true of state judicial remedies.20 5 The
Court's reasoning was clear; requiring a party to exhaust state judi-
cial remedies before bringing a federal suit was a contradictory re-
quirement; presumably there could never be a federal suit after ex-
haustion of judicial remedies because claim preclusion would bar
dangerous to the success of state policies, are almost certain to result from the inter-
vention of the lower federal courts. On the other hand, if the state procedure is fol-
lowed from the Commission to the State Supreme Court, ultimate review of the fed-
eral questions is fully preserved here.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
202. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
203. Id. at 226-30. See generally BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1347-50 (discussing the ex-
haustion requirement with regard to state nonjudicial remedies and particularly to administrative
remedies).
204. This federal common law rule, often described as one requiring exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies, has been largely cast aside by cases viewing § 1983 actions as overriding it. Patsy
v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1982); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668,
671-72 (1963). A more limited in scope (deference only to important judicial-style administrative
proceedings) doctrine resembling an exhaustion requirement has been restored in the form of a
variety of Younger abstention. Younger originally prohibited federal court interference with cer-
tain important judicial proceedings brought by a state in state court. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 41-42 (1971) (shielding state criminal proceedings from a federal injunction); Judice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327, 333-34 (1977) (shielding important state civil proceedings from a federal injunc-
tion). Younger has been extended to judicial-style administrative proceedings brought by the state.
See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626-29 (1986).
205. Prentis, 211 U.S. at 228.
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relitigation of a case adjudicated by the state courts.20 6 Precluding
such suits was, however, not an acceptable alternative. It would
decimate diversity jurisdiction. More significantly, it would under-
mine the Court's achievement that same term in Ex parte Young." 7
its acrobatically flexible reading of the Eleventh Amendment, which
allowed federal courts to use injunctions to keep the states within
the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment.0 8
On the surface, it seems surprising that the administrative (i.e.,
nonjudicial) remedy that the Prentis Court required the railroad to
exhaust before bringing federal suit was an appeal from the decision
of an agency to the Virginia Supreme Court.2 9 Justice Holmes,
writing for the U.S. Supreme Court in Prentis, noted that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court was not asked to perform its usual judicial
function but instead, to substitute its policy judgment for the
agency's as to the most desirable content of a rule regulating rail-
road rates:
But we think it . . .plain that the proceedings drawn in question here are
legislative in their nature, and none the less so that they have taken place
with a body which at another moment, or in its principal or dominant as-
pect, is a court ....
Proceedings legislative in nature are not proceedings in a court [to which
claim preclusion would attach] ...no matter what may be the general or
dominant character of the body in which they may take place."' 0
This Court pronouncement is in stark contrast with its refusal,
nearly four decades later in Burford, to determine the nature of the
body (nominally a court) to which review of all Texas Railroad
Commission decisions had been entrusted:
.In describing the relation of the Texas court to the Commission, no useful
purpose will be served by attempting to label the court's position as legisla-
tive, . . . or judicial . . . suffice it to say that the Texas courts are working
partners with the Railroad Commission in the business of creating a regula-
tory system for the oil industry."'
206. Id. at 226-27.
207. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
208. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Ex parte Young decision).
209. Prentis, 211 U.S. at 228-30.
210. Id. at 226. The Prentis Court further stated, "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and
enforces liability as they stand on present or past facts . . . .Legislation on the other hand looks
to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter
.Id.
211. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1943) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
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Why did the Burford Court conclude that "no useful purpose
would be served by attempting to label the state court as legislative
or judicial?" That is precisely the task the Supreme Court under-
took in the pre-New Deal Prentis case: it made a determination of
whether a body which was normally and nominally a court had
functioned instead as a policy-making agency. Why not in Burford?
I believe the answer lies, at least in part, with developments in
federal administrative law which left the federal courts confused
about the nature of adjudication and hence, less sure about the
meaning of "court" versus agency. This confusion, described imme-
diately below, was more pronounced as to state courts, which unlike
federal courts, are not defined in the U.S. Constitution.
b. Uncertainty about which state institutions are "courts" pro-
tected from federal court "review" by claim preclusion
In some of the cases dealing with mixed questions of law and fact,
federal agencies adjudicating disputes were seen as exercising a new
sort of power. They were beginning to be viewed as possessing dele-
gated policy-making authority to define many statutory terms as
they applied them.2 12 The Court's 1947 opinion, SEC v. Chenery
Corp.,'1 3 most clearly shows both the somewhat tentative acceptance
of the newer view and just how haltingly the Court abandoned the
old framework in which judicial bodies were seen as law-finders, not
law-makers. In Chenery, the Court affirmed the SEC's application
of a statutory standard requiring that reorganization plans for pub-
lic utility holding companies be "fair and equitable."2 4 The SEC
had condemned one such plan solely because management had pur-
chased a large amount of stock of the precursor company during the
period of its reorganization and, under the plan of reorganization,
such stock was to be treated on a parity with such shares held by
others.2 5
This interpretation of "fair and equitable" rested on a policy deci-
sion made by the agency, not the finding of some preexisting mean-
212. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944); supra notes 183-93 and
accompanying text (indicating that Burford-era federal courts deferred to federal agency determi-
nations of "mixed questions" of law and fact).
213. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In fact, Chenery seems to have taken deference beyond the "mixed
question" realm into that of pure legal interpretations. See supra notes 198-200 and accompany-
ing text.
214. 332 U.S. at 197-99, 209.
215. Id. at 197.
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ing."' The Court, however, was obviously uncomfortable with the
agency's creating, in an adjudication, a new rule which adversely
affected property acquired before the rule was announced. 17 This
discomfort gives the opinion its wonderful, almost schizoid quality.
It sometimes speaks as if the agency were acting in the classically
judicial manner of applying preexisting law but, at others times, it
speaks as if the agency had attempted to make new law. 18 The
Court ultimately acknowledged that the SEC made new law, and
approved the agency's decision for reasons that are highly relevant
to Burford:
The scope of our review 6f an administrative order wherein a new princi-
ple is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to
ordinary administrative action. . . . Our duty is at an end when it becomes
evident that the Commission's action is based upon substantial evidence and
is consistent with the authority granted by Congress." '
Recall the Burford Court's statement: "In describing the relation
of the Texas court to the Commission, no useful purpose will be
served by attempting to label the court's position as legislative...
or judicial.1 2 1 I believe that Chenery's statements about law-mak-
ing in the context of judicial-style proceedings cast a clarifying light
on the nearly contemporaneous Burford Court's unwillingness to de-
termine the status of the Texas court. If federal agencies, not lim-
ited by Article III's strict constraints on the scope of federal court
21power, could make new law in the process of adjudicating a case,
any purely functional distinctions between courts and agencies had
become highly attenuated.
Surely a federal agency having the characteristics of either the
Texas Railroad Commission or the Travis County Court would not
be a full-fledged federal court, for it would not meet the tenure,
216. Id. at 199. Ultimately the Court described its determination as based upon a new principle
arrived at, for the first time, in the proceedings before the agency. Id. at 207.
217. See id. at 202-03.
218. See id. at 212-14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
219. Chenery. 322 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted). The Court continued:
The Commission's conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the
product of administrative experience [and] appreciation of the complexities of the
problem . . . .Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it is an allowa-
ble judgment which we cannot disturb.
Id. at 209.
220. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1943) (citations omitted).
221. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
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salary, and perhaps other requirements of Article 111.222 But Article
III does not define, even for federal purposes, which state institu-
tions are "courts." Consequently, I believe the U.S. Supreme Court
was uncomfortable in disputing Texas's characterization of the
Travis County District Court as a state "court," whose judgment
presumably was entitled to preclusive effect in later federal lawsuits.
What federal law principle could the Supreme Court use to distin-
guish state courts from state agencies? Certainly law-making versus
law-applying no longer provided a sure litmus test.
Later in this Article, I explore whether the Supreme Court made
a mistake in declining to adopt a Prentis-style approach in Bur-
ford.22 13 There the question will be whether, for purposes of federal
abstention, the Court should recharacterize as "administrative"
some processes denominated "judicial" by a state. For now I em-
phasize that Burford rejected this approach.224
Once a Prentis-style analysis was rejected in Burford,225 the
choice facing the Court was difficult indeed. The federal district
court could review the decision of the Railroad Commission without
benefit of the input of the specialized Texas Court. The problem
with this approach was that it would effectively deprive Texas of the
use of the expert state institution to which final policy-making au-
thority had been delegated.126 Thus federal courts would interrupt
state policy-making processes under circumstances in which federal
agencies would be protected from judicial intervention by the gen-
eral requirement that policy-making end before the commencement
of judicial review.
Aside from the affront to federalism that would have been in-
volved in the exercise of federal jurisdiction in Burford, there was a
potential separation of powers problem under Article III of the Con-
stitution as well. Burford assumes that the specialized Texas court
might have made law and policy in a way going beyond that in-
volved in ordinary statutory interpretation. Consequently, Article III
might well have prohibited a federal district court from attempting
222. Article III provides that federal judges shall have lifetime tenure and receive compensa-
tion, which may not be decreased during their time in office. Id. art. III, § 1. Additionally, Article
III courts are required to refuse nonjudicial-style business. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
261 U.S. 428, 442-45 (1923).
223. See infra notes 581-97 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (comparing Prentis with Burford).
225. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1943).
226. Id. at 327.
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to replicate the state court's result, since doing so would have re-
quired a court of the United States to function as a legislative
organ.
In Burford, the federalism and separation of powers difficulties
just discussed made the exercise of federal trial jurisdiction seem an
unacceptable alternative. Consequently, the Supreme Court chose a
second alternative: the creation of Burford abstention. A third alter-
native in fact existed. The Court could have made an exception to
the usual issue and claim preclusion rules, thereby allowing the par-
ties to return to federal court for purposes of relitigating any federal
issues resolved by the state court. Such adjustment to the usual
rules could have been justified as necessary to honoring Congress's
will in granting jurisdiction. It would have made Burford abstention
a "postponement" as opposed to a relinquishment of federal juris-
diction. Such a compensatory adjustment was made roughly twenty
years after Burford, but only for cases involving Pullman absten-
tion, a limitation never justified by the Court.218
The original Burford doctrine, as previously described, is the
product of these very specialized concerns and was limited to corre-
spondingly specialized circumstances involving the substantial possi-
bility of federal court interference with a state court which was
serving as part of the state's administrative process.2 9 Below we see
how Burford has broadened, both in Supreme Court dictum and in
action in the lower federal courts.
IV. THE BURFORD DOCTRINE TODAY
The few Supreme Court decisions dealing with Burford absten-
tion present a clouded picture. Consequently, that doctrine has re-
ceived its real shape in the nearly one thousand lower federal court
cases referring to or discussing it.230 That shape has varied greatly
227. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-44 (1923).
228. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 (1964).
Perhaps the Burford Court was prescient; the shuttling back and forth in Pullman cases has been
widely criticized as very expensive. See id. at 425 (Douglas, J., concurring); BATOR ET AL., supra
note 2, at 1363-64.
229. Burford, 319 U.S. at 333-34.
230. As of March 22, 1993, a Lexis search revealed 959 opinions making reference to Burford.
When I began the research for this Article in the summer of 1990, I read all of the approximately
270 Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals cases mentioning Burford in any way. Of
these, approximately one hundred seemed potentially interesting in that they either contained a
holding as to the scope of Burford abstention or dictum which seriously attempted to define it. I
have updated this Article to include any interesting appellate court cases decided in the interim.
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among the circuits. Subsection A, immediately below, presents the
broad outlines of Burford abstention's variation in the lower federal
courts. Subsection B introduces the Supreme Court cases, particu-
larly the recent decision in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans,231 laying the groundwork for Section VI of
this Article, which explores, descriptively and critically, various as-
pects of the Burford doctrine as it operates today.
A. Burford's Shape in the Lower Federal Courts
As seen by the lower federal courts, the requirements for Burford
abstention have run the extremes from the demanding to the lax.
Most opinions discussing the doctrine acknowledge the Supreme
Court's clearly stated policy that such abstention is to occur only in
extraordinary circumstances. 3 2 Despite this, some courts of appeals
have affirmed federal district court decisions to abstain in cases not
involving state administrative agencies, based upon the presence of
complex and unclear state law. 233 At the other end of the continuum
is the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which narrowly limits
the doctrine to cases closely resembling the facts of the original Bur-
ford case. 3 In that circuit, Burford abstention applies only to cases
231. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
232. For general statements of this policy, see County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360
U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959) (acknowledging that the doctrine is an extraordinary and narrow excep-
tion to mandatory jurisdiction); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (allowing abstention only in "exceptional circumstances"). For cases which
both make such statements and consider the application of Burford abstention, see Gordon v.
Luksch, 887 F.2d 496, 497 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (dismissing Burford in a footnote); Grimes v.
Crown Life Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1988); Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501, 503
(2d Cir. 1985); Robert-Gay Energy Enters., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 753 F.2d 857, 859-60
(10th Cir. 1985); West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1984); Heritage
Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982); Ramos v. Lam, 639 F.2d
559, 564 (10th Cir. 1980); Hanna v. Toner, 630 F.2d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 1980); Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1978); Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th
Cir. 1974); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237, 242 (3d
Cir. 1972); Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 256 (3d Cir. 1969).
233. See, e.g., United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.) (citing
Thibodaux in affirming the district court's abstention in a diversity case and advising the parties
to seek state declaratory relief on the meaning of exculpatory clauses in insurance contracts), cert.
denied sub nom., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); Williams v.
Hott Shoppes, Inc. 293 F.2d 834, 841-84 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (stating that conflict with a state
administrative agency is not sine qua non for application of Burford - conflict with Virginia's
legislative policy of racial segregation was sufficient); Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701, 703-
04 (1st Cir. 1953) (citing Burford and other unclear law as reasons for abstaining as to pendent
state law issues involving the city's alleged impairment of public school teachers' contracts).
234. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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in which appeals from a state administrative agency have been con-
centrated in a specialized state court and in which exertion of fed-
eral jurisdiction before such state court has spoken might disrupt
the formation of state policy. 35
In between these ends of the continuum, courts have stressed vari-
ous permutations of a wide variety of factors when analyzing
whether to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. 3 6 Most courts have
continued to apply Burford to cases in which scrutiny of state ad-
ministrative agency action is sought, often suggesting that Burford
has no application beyond such a context . 3 However, some courts
seem to use "administrative" in an extremely broad, almost mean-
ingless, sense. A few others seem to dispense entirely with a re-
235. See Tucker v. First Md. Say. & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991); Kirkbride v.
Continental Casualty Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1991); Privitera v. California Bd. of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance, 926 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1991).
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, other circuits stress the presence of a specialized reviewing court as
an important, but not controlling, factor in abstention analysis. See Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Pub.
Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1348 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 813 (1990); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 233 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade
Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897, 903 (6th Cir. 1983).
236. See Bilden v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1990); Nucor, 891
F.2d at 1348 (refusing to abstain on Burford grounds where there was no challenge to a regula-
tory commission and no centralized state judicial review of agency decisionmaking); Hanlin
Group, Inc. v. Power Auth., 703 F. Supp. 305, 308-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that the applica-
tion of Burford depends on "many factors [with] no one criterion being dispositive"), affid mem.,
923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990). For a case describing a special formula, see Silverman v. Barry, 727
F.2d 1121, 1124 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which stresses the sensitivity of state policy as the tradi-
tional reason for federal court abstention.
237. See, e.g., Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F.2d 591, 601 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing
to apply Burford abstention where there was no challenge to a state administrative order); Mere-
dith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Burford abstention is
appropriate only where administrative determinations subject to adequate judicial review are pre-
sent); Robert-Gay Energy Enters., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 753 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir.
1985) (concluding that Burford abstention is appropriate where there is adequate state court re-
view of an administrative order); Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc.,
720 F.2d 897, 903 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that Burford abstention is justified only where
review of an administrative order would disrupt a complex regulatory scheme); First Am. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 474 F.2d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1973) (concluding that Burford abstention is
appropriate where there is adequate state court review of an administrative order); Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177, 185 (1st Cir. 1949) (concluding that Burford absten-
tion is not warranted where the federal court is not required to determine state policy governing
administrative agencies); see also Taffett v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847, 854 (1lth Cir. 1991)
(concluding that Burford abstention is not appropriate where a federal court would not be passing
judgment upon an agency decision), vacated, 958 F.2d 1514 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
657 (1992); Nucor, 891 F.2d at 1349 (concluding that Burford abstention is not warranted where
the challenge is not to a decision of an independent regulatory agency).
238. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 868 F.2d 459 (Ist Cir. 1989). In Bel-
lotti, the court was willing to find Burford applicable even though the state "agency" in question
was the state judiciary, reasoning that "[tihe core concern here is a federal court's responsibility
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quirement that a case appropriate for Burford abstention have any
connection with state "administrative" processes.239
Many of the cases retaining some requirement of an "administra-
tive" element nevertheless omit Burford's arguably supplemental re-
quirement that the doctrine apply only where review has been con-
centrated in a special, expert, and potentially policy-making
court.240 Other cases retaining an administrative decision component
require, in addition, that the local law and policy before the federal
court have an unclear meaning.4 1 Some stress the peculiarly "local"
nature of state law issues before the federal court.2 42 Zoning24 3 and
to avoid usurping a state's authority to supervise its own administrative body, in this case the state
judiciary as it implements regulations of minors' abortions." Id. at 464; see also DuBroff v.
DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 561-62 (5th Cir. 1987) (ordering Burford abstention in an ex-wife's suit
against her former husband alleging violations of RICO and federal securities laws on the basis
that "there is perhaps no state administrative scheme in which federal court intrusions are less
appropriate than domestic relations law"); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191,
1194-95 (1st Cir. 1979) (ordering abstention in an antitrust suit brought by a class of licensed
physicians against Blue Shield, where the only administrative connection was the contract between
the physicians and Blue Shield, which was subject to approval of the state insurance commis-
sioner); Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 1977) (ordering
Burford-Thibodaux abstention in a consumer suit against an insurer for fraud out of concern that
"recognizing a cause of action for the recovery of past insurance premiums would affect the state's
ratemaking machinery and policies").
239. See, e.g., West v. City of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1983) (involving the
question of whether. an administrative order, not directly challenged, prevailed over a village char-
ter); Pineman v. Oechslin, 637 F.2d 601, 602 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving state employees who al-
leged that a Connecticut statute governing state employee benefits violated the Contracts Clause
of the United States Constitution); Smith v. Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 758-61 (2d
Cir. 1980) (relying on Thibodaux to abstain in a diversity action brought by a beneficiary to
recover on an insurance policy); Brown v. First Nat'l City Bank, 503 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1974)
(stating that a challenge to New York's banking statute was a proper case for Burford abstention,
although no agency determination or administrative scheme was involved); United Servs. Life Ins.
Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir.) (relying on Thibodaux to abstain in a challenge
involving unclear state law, but no agency), cert. denied sub nom., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
240. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1192 n.17 (4th Cir. 1988); Browning-
Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore City, 774 F.2d 77, 80 (4th Cir. 1985). But see Educational Servs. v.
Maryland State Bd. for Higher Educ., 710 F.2d 170, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1983) (describing the
provision of specialized state court review as "the salient feature of Burford" and suggesting that
it was a requirement for Burford abstention).
241. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 5 (Ist Cir. 1984) (finding that Burford abstention
did not apply where the certification process resulted in an unambiguous statement of the relevant
state law); see also Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897,
903, 905-06 (6th Cir. 1983) (stressing the disruptive effects of an "erroneous federal court deci-
sion as to state law"); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Power Auth., 703 F. Supp. 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(citing Burford in support of the decision to abstain and stressing that "when a statutory standard
lends itself to variation in its application, litigation regarding such statute should not be enter-
tained in a federal forum"), afld mem., 923 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1990).
242. See Browning-Ferris, 774 F.2d at 79; J-R Distrib., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 486
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insurance regulation"' are often involved in such cases.
Despite the wide variation of the Burford doctrine in the lower
federal courts, there is broad agreement that its use is inappropriate
in certain circumstances. First, a federal statutory preemption at-
tack against a state regulatory scheme is an unlikely candidate for
Burford abstention. 24 Indeed, some circuits appear to have adopted
a per se rule prohibiting abstention under these circumstances.24
Second, many cases suggest that federal courts should require a
greater showing of need for Burford abstention in suits in which
federal rights are asserted, as opposed to typical diversity suits.24 7
Some cases also suggest that a plaintiff's claimed denial of a non-
n.6 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491
(1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 233 (1st Cir. 1979); Simmons v. Jones, 478
F.2d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 1973), modified, 519 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Construction
Aggregates v. Rivera de Vicenty, 573 F.2d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1978) (describing the Thibodaux line
of cases as involving subjects of "intensely local concern"). The court in Construction Aggregates
saw the Thibodaux line as related to Burford. Id. at 91-92. This view is supported by later Su-
preme Court cases that included Burford and Thibodaux together in a larger category. Still later,
however, the Court's decision in New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350 (1989), confused matters. See infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1987); Cecos Int'l
Inc. v. Jorling, 706 F. Supp. 1006, 1019-20 (N.D.N.Y 1989); Glen-Gery Corp. v. Lower Heidel-
berg Township, 608 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-07 (E.D. Pa. 1985). But see J-R Distrib., Inc. v.
Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to approve abstention in a zoning dispute, in
part because there was no local law involved), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Brockett v. Spo-
kane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Redner v. City of Tampa, 723 F. Supp. 1448, 1452-53 (M.D.
Fla. 1989) (approving abstention on several grounds, but refusing abstention on Burford grounds,
in a zoning dispute because there was no state-wide zoning regulatory scheme).
244. See, e.g., Martin Ins. Agency v. Prudential Reins. Co., 910 F.2d 249, 254-55 (5th Cir.
1990); Grimes v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 699, 703-04 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1096 (1989); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d
1033 (3d Cir. 1988); Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988); Law Enforce-
ment Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1077 (1987);
Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1980).
245. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989);
American Petrofina Co. v. Nance, 859 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir. 1988); Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co.
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (3d Cir. 1986); Middle South En-
ergy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404, 417 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1102 (1986); Baggett v. Department of Professional Regulation, 717 F.2d 521, 524 (11 th
Cir. 1983); Knudsen v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1982); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206, 212 n.1 (9th Cir 1980). But'
see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 713 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1983)
(declining to adopt a per se preemption rule), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
246. See, e.g., American Petrofina Co. v. Nance, 840 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir.), modified, 856
F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1988).
247. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21
(1976); Taffet v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847, 853 (1 1th Cir. 1991), vacated, 958 F.2d 1514 (1 1th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 657 (1992); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting, Co., 907
F.2d 1295, 1308-09 (2d Cir. 1990).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:859
economic constitutional right weighs heavily or perhaps decisively
against application of Burford.4 Some such rights may enjoy more
protection from abstention than others. For example, at least one
court has suggested that Burford abstention is never an appropriate
response to a federal suit raising substantial questions about the va-
lidity of state action under the First Amendment.2 49
Despite statements that a federal district court possesses great
discretion in determining whether to abstain under Burford,2 5 fed-
eral appellate courts do reverse abstention decisions of trial courts,
both decisions to abstain and decisions not to abstain a.2 5  Typically,
reversals come when lower courts make mistakes about the basic
shape of the doctrine as recognized in their particular circuit.2 52
248. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 1983)
(noting that "[clases involving questions of civil rights are the least likely candidates for absten-
tion"); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D.P.R. 1991) (stating that absten-
tion is "'particularly inappropriate in civil rights cases' " (quoting Association of Relatives &
Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 102 (D.P.R.
1990))).
249. Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 534 (3d Cir 1988); see also Rip-
plinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a] case involving a first
amendment challenge to a state statute is unlikely to implicate purely local issues that the state
courts may be especially competent to deal with"); J-R Distrib., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482,
487 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that "abstention is generally inappropriate when first amendment
rights are at stake"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S.
491 (1985).
250. See, e.g., Friends of Children, Inc. v. Matava, 766 F.2d 35, 37 (lst Cir. 1985) (stating
that the "decision about whether to abstain, although circumscribed, remains primarily up to the
district court").
251. For cases where the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision to abstain, see
Tucker v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991); Property & Casualty Ins.
Ltd. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1991); Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v.
Rivera-Vazquez, 931 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1991); Taffet v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847 (11th Cir.
1991), vacated, 958 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 657 (1992); Rindley v. Gal-
lagher, 929 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1991); University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923
F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991).
For cases where the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision not to abstain, see Lac
D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1988);
Kelly Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney,
328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom.. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
252. See, e.g., Tucker v. First Md. Say. & Loan, 942 F.2d 1401, 1405 (listing the three factors
required to be present for Burford abstention to apply in the Ninth Circuit). The decision by the
district court as to whether a particular case meets the traditional abstention requirements is a
matter of law, reviewed de novo by the court of appeals. Peat Marwick, 923 F.2d at 270; see also
Kirkbride v. Continental Casualty Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that "the
district court must exercise its discretion within the narrow and specific limits prescribed by the
[Burford] abstention doctrine" but reversing the district court's decision to abstain for lack of one
of the elements necessary to Burford abstention in the Ninth Circuit); 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 149, § 4507, at 106-12 (asserting that the determination of state law is a legal question and
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When a federal district court uses the general Burford formula pre-
scribed by its circuit, the court of appeals generally defers to its
decision. 53 Such deference often occurs when a district court has
concluded, in the context of a state regulatory matrix, that there is
or is not an undue risk of disrupting the regulatory scheme. 2", Pre-
sumably, the local federal courts are best situated to make discrete
distinctions about the content of traditional state law. Accordingly,
appellate courts perceive the district courts as especially competent
to ascertain the risk of error and consequent disruption when state
law takes particularly complex and locally odd forms, especially the
forms of administrative law. 55
Lower federal courts almost unanimously take the position that
Burford abstention results' in a dismissal of the case, which normally
will preclude its later relitigation in the federal courts.25 6 Burford
generally has been contrasted with Pullman in this respect.2 57
Under Pullman abstention, the federal case is stayed pending reso-
lution of state issues in state court.258 As discussed previously, in
Pullman cases, the normal rules of claim preclusion have been sus-
that while the considered opinion of a district judge who is experienced in the law of a particular
state may command respect of an appellate court, a party is nevertheless entitled to meaningful
review of that decision).
253. Once the court of appeals determines that the requirements for Burford have been met,
the district court's decision is given deference and reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See Kirk-
bride, 933 F.2d at 733-34; Peat Marwick, 923 F.2d at 270.
254. The Supreme Court has taken a complex and arguably vacillating position on the degree
of deference a superior federal court should display toward an inferior federal court's determina-
tion of state law. Compare Salve Regina College v. Russell, II S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991) (con-
cluding that a court of appeals should review a district court's determination of state law de novo)
with Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346 (1976) (stating that the Supreme Court may accept the
appellate court and district court's interpretation of state law "even if an examination of the state-
law issue without [guidance from the district and appellate courts] might have justified a different
conclusion") and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) (stating that
"special weight" should be given to the district court's interpretation of state law).
255. See supra note 253.
256. See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 922 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993);
Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1195 n.18 (4th Cir. 1988); Griffin Hosp. v. Commission on
Hosps. & Health Care, 782 F.2d 24, 25 n.l (2d Cir. 1986); Bob's Home Serv., Inc. v. Warren
County, 755 F.2d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1985); Robert-Gay Energy Enters., Inc. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 753 F.2d 857, 862 n.5 (10th Cir. 1985); Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource
Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897, 906 (6th Cir. 1983); Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715
F.2d 522, 526 (11th Cir. 1983); Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California, 601 F.2d 1087, 1090
(9th Cir. 1979); Baltimore Bank for Coops. v. Farmers Cheese Coop., 583 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir.
1978); Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Rivera de Vincenty, 573 F.2d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 1978).
257. See American Bank & Trust, 982 F.2d at 922 n.5; Griffin Hosp., 782 F.2d at 25 n.1;
Isthmus Landowners Ass'n, 601 F.2d at 1090; Construction Aggregates, 573 F.2d at 89-90.
258. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S 496, 501-02 (1941); see also BATOR ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 1375-78 (discussing procedural consequences of abstention).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
pended to allow return to the federal court for litigation of federal
legal issues involved in the case.259 Generally no such flexibility has
been shown in cases involving Burford abstention. These cases are
usually dismissed in favor of litigation in the state courts, which is
in turn preclusive of later federal actions as to the same claims or
210issues. It is possible, however, that the Court recently has recog-
nized a subset of Burford abstention having procedural conse-
quences identical to those under Pullman abstention.2 1
B. An Initial Look at the Supreme Court Cases, Particularly
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans
While references to Burford are found in many Supreme Court
opinions, only three later opinions deal with the Burford doctrine in
any significant detail. However, two of these opinions, Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co. (1951)262 and
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
(1976),63 along with Burford itself (1943), provide little guidance
as to the scope and reach of Burford abstention. 64 A third post-
Burford case, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans (1989)265 clarifies some aspects of Burford, but adds to the
uncertainty in other ways. While some of this certainty has survived
last term's Ankenbrandt266 case, some has been lost.267 Immediately
below, these main Supreme Court cases dealing with Burford ab-
stention are described.
After Burford, the Supreme Court next invoked that case to jus-
tify abstention eight years later in Alabama Public Service Com-
mission v. Southern Railway Co.268 In that case, the state commis-
259. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 56-59 (discussing procedural consequences of Burford abstention and
claim preclusion).
261. See infra notes 595-97 and accompanying text (discussing Burford-type abstention with
Pullman-type consequences).
262. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
263. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
264. For a discussion of other murky cases sometimes associated with Burford abstention, see
REDISH, supra note 7, at 243-49 (discussing Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593
(1968); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954)).
265. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
266. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992).
267. See infra notes 302-04, 595, and accompanying text (discussing Ankenbrandt's suggestion
that some varieties of Burford abstention may not be limited to administrative cases and may not
require outright dismissal of the federal case).
268. 341 U.S. 341, 345, 350 (1951).
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sion denied the railroad's petition to discontinue a line of service on
grounds of unprofitability. 26 9 The railroad immediately sued for an
injunction in federal court, despite the existence of an alternative
judicial remedy in state court that the U.S. Supreme Court viewed
as adequate.27 0 Normally the availability of an adequate remedy in
state court is not sufficient to warrant abstention.2 7 Citing Burford,
however, the Supreme Court reversed the three-judge district court's
decision to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that the case before it
was exceptional and required abstention.,
Alabama Public Service may be the origin of the notion, dis-
cussed later in this Article, that Burford applies only or especially to
cases involving matters having some peculiarly local essence. 27 ' The
Court stressed the states' "primary authority" over interstate rail
operations .27 Additionally, as in Burford, the Court found it signifi-
cant that the decision was made by an administrative agency, review
of whose orders was concentrated in a court having "supervisory
powers. "275 Those words suggest that the Alabama court proceeding
to which the district court was required to defer could have involved
the making of legislative-style policy judgments.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result of Alabama Public
Service, based on his view of the substantive merits of the case.27
He vigorously disagreed, however, with the Court's decision to re-
quire abstention, so as not to reach the merits.2  He maintained
that the federal trial court could hear the railroad's case without
going beyond ordinary judicial activities and even without making
interpretations of difficult issues of state law. 78 In Justice Frank-
furter's view, there was no good reason to depart from the Erie-
Meredith rule, which requires a federal court to guess the meaning
of state law. 279 Burford abstention had grown far too broad, accord-
ing to Justice Frankfurter, and seemed no longer connected with the
269. Id. at 342-43.
270. Id. at 343.
271. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
272. Alabama Pub. Serv., 341 U.S. at 345, 350-51.
273. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text and infra notes 517-25 and accompanying
text.
274. Alabama Pub. Serv., 341 U.S. at 345.
275. Id. at 348.
276. Id. at 351-55 (Frankfurter, J., and Jackson, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 355-62.
278. Id. at 356, 360-61.
279. Id. at 355 n.2, 356-57, 361.
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possibility of actual disruption of state policy-making. With alarm,
in Alabama Public Service, he observed that "if [this decision]
means anything beyond disposing of the particular litigation it
means that hereafter no federal court should entertain a suit against
any action of a state agency."28
After Alabama Public Service, the remaining noteworthy discus-
sions of Burford in Supreme Court opinions occurred twenty-five
years later in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,8 ' four years ago in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans,8 and finally last term in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards.283 Because New Orleans attempts a comprehensive for-
mulaic description of Burford abstention, while Ankenbrandt does
not, the former will serve as the focus of the discussion of all three
cases.
The plaintiffs in New Orleans attacked a ratemaking decision of
the New Orleans City Council in federal district court on the
ground that it was preempted by a decision of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission.284 The district court refused the case on a
number of grounds, Burford abstention included.285 On review, the
court of appeals conceded that the case below involved no unclear
state law.286 Presumably, this was true because the state administra-
tive action under attack was complete and its nature so clear that
the only substantial question in the case was the federal question:
whether state action of that sort was preempted. 87
Despite this, the court of appeals approved the trial court's ab-
stention under Burford, explaining that the case involved a complex
regulatory scheme of "paramount local concern and a matter which
demands local administrative expertise. 288 The lower courts' results
and opinions in New Orleans typify the mysterious approach to Bur-
280. Id. at 362.
281. 424 U.S. 800, 814-17 (1976).
282. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
283. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
284. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 355.
285. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 798 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that abstention was also appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)), revd, 491 U.S. 350 (1989); see supra part .C (discussing Younger abstention).
286. New Orleans, 798 F.2d at 861-62.
287. Id. In addition to the preemption claim, New Orleans also refused to apply Burford to a
separate argument for relief on the ground that no disruption of state regulatory processes could
reasonably be expected to occur in the process of federal adjudication. Id.
288. Id. at 862.
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ford's administrative law requirement displayed in some circuits. In
these cases, the origins of a controversy in the state administrative
process go far toward justifying Burford abstention without any in-
dication that a federal court decision poses any real threat to that
process.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that
Burford abstention was unwarranted:
Unlike a claim that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has
failed to take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state-law factors,
federal adjudication of this sort of pre-emption claim would not disrupt the
State's attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an "essentially local
problem."'89
This portion of New Orleans clarifies the nature of the requisite con-
nection between state administrative law and a case appropriate for
Burford abstention. The Court stated that Burford abstention is
warranted only if the state administrative law material is "entangled
in a skein" of the federal suit.2 90 This most likely means that remote
or talismanic connections between a federal case and a state's ad-
ministrative process will no longer justify abstention under Burford.
In short, a Burford case is one that cannot be resolved by the fed-
eral court without running the unacceptable risk of error as to mat-
ters of state law which have been entrusted by the state legislature
to an expert administrative body.
This view explains why Burford abstention was ruled out in the
New Orleans case itself.29' In New Orleans, the appropriate expert
state agency had already determined state policy beyond peradven-
ture, and the only issue before the federal court was the significance
of the clear state action under federal law.292 Under this view, New
Orleans largely restores Burford to its original province - concern
with federal court usurpations and disruptions of state law and pol-
icy-making. In this respect, New Orleans already seems to have had
a real and desirable effect on the shape of lower federal court cases
289. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 362 (quoting Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.,
341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951)).
290. Id. at 361. The Court noted that the case did not involve a contention that the federal
claims were "in any way entangled in the skein of state law" that would require untangling before
the federal case could be resolved. Id. (quoting McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674
(1963)).
291. Id. at 364.
292. Id. at 363. The New Orleans CityCouncil had already reached its final decision; the only
issue before the Court was whether the order was facially preempted by the Federal Power Act, a
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission allocative decree. Id.
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grappling with Burford 93
Justice Scalia's opinion for the New Orleans Court seems restora-
tive in a number of other ways as well, though this restoration may
not be as desirable. The restorative features are suggested by the
general formula which the Court offered as a "distillation" of the
requirements for Burford abstention. Essentially, the Court identi-
fied two distinct circumstances under which Burford abstention
would be appropriate:
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court
sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of
state administrative agencies: (1) when there are "difficult questions of state
law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose impor-
tance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exer-
cise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be
disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a
matter of substantial public concern. ' .94
The "restorative" formula seems to limit Burford abstention to
suits seeking equitable relief. Suits in equity were the original prov-
ince of all varieties of abstention, including the Burford variety. Re-
storing the original equitable relief limitation provides a rationale
(equitable discretion) for harmonizing abstention with the arguably
mandatory nature of the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts. This rationale may appeal to Justice Scalia, a separation
of powers purist.2 95 Perhaps it even augurs repudiation of the exten-
sion of other abstention doctrines, particularly Pullman, to cases at
law.
More strikingly, the New Orleans Court seemed to change the
basic scope of Burford abstention. Describing that doctrine as
designed to avoid "interference with the proceedings or orders of
state administrative agencies," '296 the Court appeared to limit its use
293. See, e.g, Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1504-05, 1507 (8th Cir. 1992);
University of Md. v. Peat Marwick & Main Co., 923 F.2d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 1991); see also
CHEMERINSKY. supra note 4, at 111-12.
294. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)) (emphasis added).
295. Scalia, supra note 200, at 514-15 ("Now there is no one more fond of our system of
separation of powers than I am."); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Art. 11, Section 1, Cl. I of the Constitution provides 'The executive power shall
be vested in a President of the United States.' . . . This does not mean some of the executive
power, but all of the executive power.").
296. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361 (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976), which did not mention the presence of administrative agencies
as a requirement for this variety of abstention) (emphasis added).
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to cases involving such entities. This is surprising, because the very
words used in New Orleans to define one category of "Burford" ab-
stention appear in the earlier Colorado River opinion, where they
are exemplified by citation to a case involving no administrative
agency at all. 97 That case, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux,2 98 was a state eminent domain proceeding which, absent
federal court involvement, would have proceeded entirely in state
courts, not in state administrative bodies.299 No language in Colo-
rado River requires the involvement of state administrative agencies
to justify Burford abstention.300 Later, in New Orleans, where such
a requirement was imposed, all references to the non-administrative
Thibodaux case were dropped as support for the Court's formula-
tion of the doctrine301
The New Orleans formula appears to be a serious attempt at a
comprehensive statement of the doctrine, and yet just last term the
Supreme Court offered dictum suggesting some movement back to-
ward Colorado River's earlier broader view that Burford abstention
extends to some purely judicial state proceedings.302 In Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, the Court said that it was "not inconceivable" that
Burford abstention would be applicable in certain cases involving
state domestic relations law.303 Such proceedings typically occur in
state courts and not agencies.30 4 It is possible that this reading of
Ankenbrandt is the considered view of a majority of Justices. It
seems more likely that it is one more in a series of not-so-careful
statements. New Orleans statements seem more comprehensive and
297. Compare New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361 (stating that Burford abstention is appropriate
where there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar" (citing Colorado River 424
U.S. at 814)) with Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City
of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959)).
298. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
299. Id. at 30 (approving a federal district court's stay of its proceedings to allow the Louisiana
courts to interpret a statute, the construction of which was necessary to resolve the eminent do-
main dispute); see also Kaiser Steel Corp v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (permitting
abstention in a nonadministrative case to leave sensitive issues of state water rights law to the
state courts). Only the dissenters in Kaiser Steel explicitly considered Thibodaux or Burford. Id.
594-95.
300. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
301. See New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361.
302. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992).
303. The Court stated, in-dictum, that "it is not inconceivable" that Burford could apply to
require federal court deference to state determinations of "elements of a domestic relationship"
presumably yet to be made in pending divorce, alimony, or custody proceedings. Id.
304. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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carefully crafted and they accord with the general view of Burford
abstention as "administrative abstention." For these reasons, I pro-
ceed below on the assumption (except where the contrary is made
clear) that Burford applies only to cases involving state administra-
tive agencies. In one section below, I criticize such a limitation, ex-
pressing hope that Ankenbrandt's cryptic statements portend the
end of Burford's senseless limitation to administrative cases.305
Aside from the possible return to earlier understandings, as sug-
gested by New Orleans's interpretation of Burford, mystery remains
as to the scope of the doctrine. One such mystery is the meaning of
the two-part general formula originating in Colorado River and of-
fered by Justice Scalia for the New Orleans Court as a distillation
of "the principle now commonly referred to as the 'Burford doc-
trine.' "306 The Court sees Burford abstention as a distinct doctrine
in a list including Pullman, Younger, and Colorado River as other
s eparate and distinct abstention doctrines. Unlike the other doc-
trines, though, the Burford doctrine itself includes two somewhat
distinct categories. 0 7 But the words of the New Orleans formula do
not adequately convey what these two categories are and how they
differ.
There are two possible ways of proceeding with this inquiry into
the meaning of the Burford doctrine. The first focuses initially on
the words defining the two Burford categories and only then on the
universe of other doctrines of judicial federalism in which they oper-
ate. The second, my choice, is to reverse the order. It is easier to
search for the meaning of such an abstract formula after achieving
a better understanding of the doctrinal world in which it functions.
For what follows we need only a working definition of Burford
abstention. As mentioned above, I proceed on the assumption that
Burford abstention is appropriate only in cases turning on difficult
issues of state law entrusted by state legislatures to administrative
agencies. My criticism of this likely restriction is discussed in an-
other section below.30 8
Immediately below, using this rough-cut, working notion of Bur-
ford abstention, I attempt to determine Burford abstention's scope
305. See infra part IV.B.1.
306. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989).
307. See supra part VII (discussing the two-part Burford formula as expressed in New
Orleans).
308. See infra part VIBI.
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of practical application. In particular, the focus is on its place in the
constellation of doctrines of judicial federalism, including other ab-
stention doctrines. Once this grounding is established, I return to
the language of Burford to argue against its limitation to an admin-
istrative law sphere, and to examine the differences between Bur-
ford's two categories.
V. How NEW ORLEANS NARROWS THE PRACTICAL SCOPE OF
THE BURFORD DOCTRINE FROM THE INSIDE WHILE OTHER
DOCTRINES NARROW IT FROM THE OUTSIDE
The limiting effects of New Orleans's reformulation of Burford
abstention and the expansion of other doctrines of federal judicial
restraint most likely leave Burford with a significantly narrowed
field of operation, particularly in federal question cases. As de-
scribed in the previous section, New Orleans required more than a
remote connection between a troubling issue of state administrative
law and a federal case. 09 On this view, Burford abstention is appro-
priate only for cases in which a difficult issue of state law is "entan-
gled" in the merits of the federal suit. °10 Even where this require-
ment is met, however, Burford will not make a real difference if
other doctrines of judicial federalism more clearly preclude resolu-
tion on the merits. Below I explore both sorts of limits on the practi-
cal scope of Burford. I proceed on the assumption, supported by
language in New Orleans, that Burford is limited to cases actually
or potentially involving state administrative action, although I criti-
cize that limitation in a later section.31'
A. Some Basic Distinctions Among Cases in Which Burford
Abstention Might Operate: Review Pattern Cases Versus Primary
Jurisdiction Cases
After New Orleans narrowed Burford abstention to cases in
which disruption of an administrative scheme might occur, there ap-
pear to be two patterns of cases in which the doctrine is most likely
to apply.
In the first pattern, a federal district court is confronted with
state administrative agency action and the need to determine its va-
309. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
311. See infra part VI.B.1.
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lidity under an unclear state law. 1 2 The function of a federal court
in undertaking this task resembles its function in reviewing the deci-
sion of a federal agency under federal law. Therefore, this pattern
will be referred to as the "review pattern." It is not confined to suits
involving governmental entities as parties but extends to suits be-
tween private parties where rights turn on the validity or invalidity
of state administrative action.
The second pattern in which a federal suit threatens to disrupt a
state administrative agency's regulatory efforts occurs when two cir-
cumstances converge: (1) there is no administrative action to be re-
viewed, but (2) the federal court concludes that receiving state
agency input will help it decide a case in a way not harmful to im-
portant state regulatory interests. This pattern will be referred to as
the "primary jurisdiction pattern" because of its resemblance to a
doctrine developed to permit federal courts to defer to federal agen-
cies in similar circumstances. 13
Aside from these two patterns, no other pattern is likely to war-
rant deference." By definition, almost any other case is one in
which the federal court reasonably concludes that there is no need
to give weight to a state agency's views in order to resolve the mat-
ter before it.
The review pattern is easy to identify and analyze. The focus is on
the validity of some action the agency did or did not take. For a
variety of reasons, the main focus below is on these review cases.
First, Burford itself, and many of the federal cases approving Bur-
ford abstention, involved challenges to completed agency action.
312. 1 intend the statement to encompass both an agency decision to take action and an agency
decision not to take action.
313. For a brief discussion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, see Taffet v. Southern Co., 930
F.2d 847, 854 (11th Cir. 1991); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295,
1309-11 (2d Cir. 1990).
314. A third pattern - where an agency has finally addressed the issue now relevant to a
federal proceeding by promulgating a rule or issuing an order - could possibly be viewed as a
candidate for Burford abstention. In this pattern, the federal court is asked only to interpret or
enforce an agency action, the validity of which is not challenged. By hypothesis, no review is
involved, and there is no longer a need to defer to the agency's primary jurisdiction because it has
already exercised it. Where the cognate state proceeding which will interpret or apply the agency's
order or rule will be confined to a specialized state court, Burford concerns about the appropriate-
ness of a federal suit seem justified. I will call this the specialized application pattern. Because I
believe that the application pattern is of little importance, I deal with it in this footnote.
This is, however, a problematic Burford category. If action of a state agency is not under review
(review cases), and if further input from the agency is not required (primary jurisdiction cases),
federal review almost certainly does not threaten disruption of the state regulatory processes.
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Second, the very few federal courts which address the doctrine of
"primary jurisdiction" in the context of state administrative action
treat it as a separate doctrine, distinct from Burford abstention. 15
Third, the very sort of case the New Orleans Court described as a
candidate for Burford abstention involved state agency action al-
leged to have been in violation of state law. 311 In fact, the New Orle-
ans Court itself used the word "review" in its formula defining the
second type of Burford abstention.317 As a result, the importance of
the primary jurisdiction pattern seems relatively limited.
The issue addressed throughout the sections below is the likeli-
hood that the need to consider Burford abstention will be mooted by
some clearer doctrine of judicial federalism. In a later portion of
this Article, I assume that some such suits successfully run the
gauntlet of other doctrines, and I ask how such suits pose the risk of
disruption necessary to trigger Burford.
B. How Other Doctrines of Judicial Federalism Reduce
Burford's Significance in Federal Cases in Which the Validity of
State Agency Action Is Reviewed
This section discusses review pattern cases to see how frequently
doctrines of judicial federalism which are clearer than Burford ab-
stention will filter potential Burford cases out of the jurisdiction of
federal courts. Section 1 is general, examining the limits common to
federal question cases and to diversity cases. Section 2 deals specifi-
cally with federal question cases, while section 3 deals specifically
with diversity cases.
1. Alternatives to Burford Abstention Which Are Common to Fed-
eral Question and Diversity Cases
Both in the early and late stages of any state law matter involving
315. See Taffet, 930 F.2d at 854; Long Island Lighting, 907 F.2d at 1309-11.
316, New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989). The
Court stated:
Unlike a claim that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has failed to
take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state-law factors, federal adjudica-
tion of [the petitioner's] pre-emption claim would not disrupt the State's attempt to
ensure uniformity in the treatment of an "essentially local problem."
Id. (citing Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern R.R., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951)). For an
indication that the "relevant factors" analysis refers to arbitrary and capricious review of agency
action, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
317. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361.
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administrative action, doctrines of federalism other than Burford
are likely to provide more certain and justifiable grounds for federal
court deference to state decisionmaking bodies. This is true whether
the federal suit is grounded on diversity or federal question jurisdic-
tion. If state administrative action threatens but has not yet started,
someone asserting a federal law objection to the anticipated action
is likely to be barred from a federal suit by the doctrine of
ripeness.318
If the state administrative proceedings have started but have not
yet concluded, many federal cases otherwise raising Burford issues
will generally be dismissable on grounds of ripeness and some on
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies."1 9 This is true
not only for diversity suits under state law but for many federal
suits as well. Civil rights suits under section 1983 are an important
subset of federal question suits. 20 While section 1983 suits under
the federal civil rights laws are generally exempt from exhaustion
requirements,32 there is a significant limit to this exemption. Recent
case law extending Younger abstention makes it clear that such an
exemption from exhaustion requirements does not cover defendants
in some state judicial-style administrative proceedings who bring
section 1983 suits to preempt the state proceedings. 22 Defendants in
318. See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 66-67, 67 n.21 (lst Cir. 1991)
(avoiding consideration of Burford by finding the claim unripe); Felmeister v. Office of Attorney
Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535-38 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding Burford inapplicable but dismissing on ripe-
ness grounds where it was not clear that the plaintiffs' conduct was likely to run afoul of the ethics
rules they sought to challenge).
319. See, e.g., Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675, 686 (1943) (reversing
the district court's grant of a permanent injunction against the Illinois Commerce Commission
and state officials from increasing passenger railway fares where appellee-plaintiff failed to first
pursue the available administrative remedy).
320. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(providing for a civil action for state deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured "by
the Constitution and laws"). Civil rights suits are a major subset of the federal question caseload
of the lower federal courts. Of the 98,747 private civil cases litigated under that jurisdictional
grant in 1986, 40,199 (including 20,071 prisoners' rights cases) were civil rights cases. BATOR ET
AL., supra note 2, at 51. A good many, but not all of these, were § 1983 actions. Id. at 1242; see
also PETER W. LOW ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 16 (1988)
("[l1n 1981, nearly 32,000 suits were brought under the civil rights acts (chiefly 1983 actions)
321. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-12, 516 (1982) (relying on the legisla-
tive history of § 1983 and concluding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not
be a prerequisite to a § 1983 civil rights action).
322. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986)
(holding that the Younger rule prohibiting the injunction of state criminal proceedings other than
to prevent "great and immediate irreparable injury" applies equally to other types of state pro-
ceedings, including state administrative proceedings which are judicial in nature (i.e., proceedings
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these state regulatory proceedings are among the parties having the
greatest incentive to bring a federal suit subject to Burford, and
they will normally be required to present defenses to the state
agency before federal trial courts are open to them. In such cases, a
form of the administrative remedy exhaustion requirement, styled as
Younger abstention, will continue to act as a bar to federal suits, at
least temporarily mooting the issue of Burford's application.323
Just as early federal court involvement is more plausibly covered
by doctrines other than Burford abstention, the same is also true of
late federal court involvement. After the conclusion of state court
proceedings reviewing state administrative action, federal law issue
and claim preclusion comes into play.324 In most states, once a court
has ruled, its decision is accorded res judicata effect until properly
overturned. 2 5 If this is true under the law of the state whose courts
rendered the judgment, federal courts must accord that judgment
preclusive effect. 2 6 Consequently, if a state court has ruled on a
of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission) so long as the plaintiff has a "full and fair" opportunity to
litigate constitutional claims).
323. In these cases, Younger will require postponement of Burford abstention at least until
after the administrative proceedings have concluded. After that, the administrative proceedings
may or may not preclude a federal legal claim, but determinations of fact made in them are likely
to be binding in a later federal court proceeding. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794-
99 (1986), rejects federal court claim preclusion as to the specific state agency determination
before it but suggests that such preclusion may be appropriate in somewhat different circum-
stances. It also requires that the federal courts below give preclusive effect to issues of fact deter-
mined by the state agency, indicating that such issue preclusion is appropriate in a wide variety of
cases coming from the state courts. Id.
324. As for statutory preclusion, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), which requires the lower federal
courts to give preclusive effect to state court determinations. For an explanation of § 1738, see
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980), which held that Congress, under § 1738, "has specifi-
cally required all federal courts to give preclusion effect to state-court judgments whenever the
courts of the state from which the judgments emerged would do so. For a discussion of federal
common law claim preclusion not grounded on § 1738, see University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S.
788, 794-95 (1986), where the Court noted that courts frequently fashion federal common law
rules of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute.
325. Smith v. Malouf, 597 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (Miss. 1992) (collecting the cases and stating
that "[tihe various states have ruled with virtual unanimity that a judgment is 'final' for res
judicata and collateral estoppel purposes even though pending on appeal").
326. With a few exceptions, the preclusive effect owed a state judgment by a federal court will'
be identical to that owed by the courts of the state from which the judgment issued. See Kremer
v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479-85 (1982) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). See
generally 18 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4469, at 659-60 (1981) (dis-
cussing federal courts honoring the res judicata effects of state court judgments).
For a case using res judicata to moot consideration of Burford abstention, see Evans v. Dale,
896 F.2d 975, 977-79 (5th Cir. 1990) (using the doctrine of res judicata instead of Burford ab-
stention to reject all claims to which it was applicable and considering and rejecting Burford only
as to claims to which res judicata had no application - those involving exclusive federal
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case involving a Burford issue, issue or claim preclusion may well
bar a federal lawsuit.
To the extent a lower state court's decision is not sufficiently
preclusive under state law to trigger federal preclusion, another doc-
trine, Rooker-Feldman,3 27 will almost certainly bar the federal
suit.3 28 Briefly, Rooker is the product of the view that the lower
federal courts are parallel to the state courts and cannot exercise the
functional equivalent of appellate review over state court
decisions.329
Finally, once the state's highest court has reviewed a lower court's
case or the time for its doing so has expired, any lower federal court
review of a potential Burford case, without question, will be barred
by claim preclusion.330
The prime candidates for Burford abstention are cases in between
those not yet ripe and those in which a federal action is barred by
preclusion or by Rooker-Feldman. These are predominately cases of
completed state agency action either actually or potentially under
review in the state courts.331 As for these cases, whether based on
jurisdiction).
327. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) (holding
that unlike the United States Supreme Court, federal district courts have no jurisdiction to review
final judgments of a state's highest court arising out of judicial proceedings, even if it is alleged
that the state action was unconstitutional); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415
(1923) (holding that once a state court decision has been affirmed by its highest state court, only
the United States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a federal law challenge to this
decision).
328. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415. These cases have been described
as the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1987).
329. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is founded on the following reasoning. First, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1988), which gives the Supreme Court appellate review of certain state court decisions, is
the only federal statute explicitly providing for federal review of state court decisions. Second,
Congress intended to foreclose all other forms of federal court review of state court decisions,
whether presented forthrightly as attempts at review or in the guise of suits for injunctions and
other relief. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416. Presumably, the second
inference is aided by the sensitivity of the issue of federal review of state judicial decisions. After
the framing of the Constitution, many states argued that that document did not permit federal
review of state court decisions. BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 516.
One could argue that federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1988) is a dis-
guised form of federal review of state court judgments, but if so, like § 1257, it is one permitted
by statute.
330. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 326, § 4469, at 659-60 (discussing federal courts hon-
oring the res judicata effect of state court judgments).
331. See, e.g., Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 791 F.2d I111,
1114 (3d Cir. 1986) (involving a suit for relief from a final order of an agency filed almost simul-
taneously in Pennsylvania state and federal district courts); Gregg v. Winchester, 173 F.2d 512,
515 (9th Cir. 1949) (requiring a federal district court to abstain from enjoining enforcement of a
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diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment
will often provide a clearer ground for refusing a case than will
Burford."a2
Current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment covers a sig-
nificant portion of the territory to which the Burford doctrine ap-
plied.3 Suits against a state (as distinguished from local govern-
mental entities 34 ) to recover damages for past wrongs are almost
always flatly forbidden by Eleventh Amendment "sovereign immu-
nity. 3  Such a suit is so clearly inappropriate under current law
that there is no need for consideration of the applicability of the
discretionary and difficult Burford doctrine.
Not all suits aimed at state action seek damages from the state
treasury.336 Some, such as Burford, seek coercive relief against state
officers in their official capacities to compel future compliance with
federal or state law, or both.337 Until early in the last decade, these
suits were not viewed as suits against the state for Eleventh Amend-
ment purposes, even though their purpose and effect were to thwart
state policy.33 8 The Supreme Court's conclusion was that such suits
were not suits against the state, because officers violating the law
were to be seen as stripped of their authority to represent the
zoning variance permit where a "practically ... duplicate" action was pending in state court).
332. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
333. In fact, it is a strong possibility that Burford itself would today be dismissed on the dual
grounds that the federal question presented was insubstantial and that the remaining suit imper-
missibly sought federal court relief against the state on state law grounds. See infra notes 350-53
and accompanying text.
334. For cases holding that local government is unprotected by the Eleventh Amendment, see
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); see also BATOR Er AL.. supra note 2, at 1172. On at least one
occasion, the Court seems to have suggested the possibility that this doctrine may be extended to
cover suits brought against local governmental entities. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123-24 & n.34 (1984); BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1172 & n.19.
335. BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1172 n.12.
336. A common example is the category of suits to enjoin state officials from enforcing uncon-
stitutional state policy. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (determining, in an appeal
from a habeas corpus decision, the validity of a federal court's injunction against a state officer's
enforcing state law).
337. See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1983)
(involving an action to compel the state to take specific actions to rectify violations of constitu-
tional rights of mentally retarded residents of state institution); Simmons v. Jones, 478 F.2d 321,
322 (5th Cir. 1973) (involving an action to compel the jury commissioners to perform their official
duties in accordance with state law); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 783 (3d Cir. 1972)
(involving a suit for an injunction against a state judge's order vacating an ex parte appearance of
appellants' counsel); Hill v. Victoria County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 441 F.2d 416, 416 (5th Cir.
1971) (involving an action to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes).
338. Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
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state.339 This reasoning was the constitutional legal fiction the Court
created in Ex parte Young to permit federal court enforcement of
Fourteenth Amendment rights.340
Between the decision of Ex parte Young in 1908 and the Pen-
nhurst case in 1984,1" the Court employed that fiction to allow
suits against state officers both under federal law and under state
law. 42 In other words, state officers violating either state law or fed-
eral law or both were viewed as not representing the state.3 4 Before
hearing any state claim, the federal trial court, of course, had to be
satisfied that it had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to hear state claims
was present in all diversity cases and in those federal question cases
where a state claim could be heard under pendent jurisdiction be-
cause of its close relationship to a federal claim pending before the
court.3 '5
Pennhurst put an end to the use of the Ex parte Young fiction to
enforce claims under state law against state officers in their official
capacities.3 46  The Pennhurst majority recognized that Ex parte
Young was a fiction3 4' and held that such a fiction could be justified
only as a means of enforcing important federal rights.34 8 Hence-
forth, suits against state officers to enforce state law would be ac-
knowledged to be suits against the state. This is true not only where
339. Id. at 159-60.
340. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3524, at 151-54 (2d ed. 1984).
341. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
342. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683-92 (1982)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit to obtain property against state officers
who had no claim to the property under state law).
343. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 130-39
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing prior decisions which might be considered as establishing that
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against state officials when they were alleged to be
acting contrary to state law).
344. Federal trial courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may exercise jurisdiction only if
specifically authorized by the Constitution and by a federal statute. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 449 (1850) (stating that because Congress was vested with constitutional power to
create the lower federal courts, Congress has the authority to control their jurisdiction)..
345. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) ("Pendent jurisdiction...
exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under [federal law]'.... The state and federal claims
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."). Formerly the creation of judicial decisions
such as Gibbs, the pendent jurisdiction doctrine has now been codified under the broader umbrella
of "supplemental jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 11 1990).
346. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 107. See generally John P. Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 129 (1987) (analyzing Pennhurst to determine the scope
of its holding).
347. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106.
348. Id. at 104-06.
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the state claim is a pendent claim in a federal question suit, but in a
diversity suit as well. 49 Consequently, such claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
Today it is likely that Burford itself would be dismissed under
Pennhurst, and not its namesake doctrine. There was some sugges-
tion that the federal challenge in Burford lacked any real support in
federal law.3 50 Thus, it might have been dismissable for want of a
substantial federal question."' At the time, this alone would not
have warranted dismissal of the entire case, because it also was
grounded in diversity jurisdiction and sought an injunction against
the Texas Railroad Commission's action on the additional ground of
violation of state law."' The Eleventh Amendment, at that time, did
not bar such relief; today it does. Consequently, today, a court wish-
ing to dismiss the suit might be tempted to find the federal ground
insubstantial, since that would leave no independent claim for relief
which could be heard by a federal court.353
While the Eleventh Amendment may occasionally bar a diversity
suit which otherwise would have been a candidate for Burford, this
is unlikely to happen often. A state is not a state citizen for purposes
-of diversity, so a suit against the state as a named defendant would
also fail for want of subject matter jurisdiction.3 5' A suit against a
state officer in her official capacity seeking either damages or an
injunction on state law grounds would almost certainly be seen as a
suit against the state for purposes of determining the existence of
355diversity.
349. Id. at 120-21 (stating that the Eleventh Amendment "is an independent limitation on all
exercises of Article III judicial power" (emphasis added)).
350. The Court was not very receptive to constitutional claims of the sort asserted in Burford.
See Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570, 575 (1941) ("Nothing in the
Constitution warrants a rejection of [the Texas Railroad Commission's] expert conclusions [as to
the proration order in question]."); see also Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310
U.S. 573, 580-81 (1940) (reaching a similar conclusion as to the constitutionality of the Texas
Railroad Commission's actions in a later case), modified, 311 U.S. 614 (1940).
351. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933) ("[J]urisdiction, as
distinguished from merits, is wanting where the claim set forth in the pleading is plainly
unsubstantial.").
352. Burford v, Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317, 332 (1943); see supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text (indicating a dual jurisdictional basis).
353. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966) (holding that if the federal
claim is dismissed prior to trial, the state claim should be dismissed as well). For a discussion of
pendent claim jurisdiction, see BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1046-47. Recently, the Gibbs doc-
trine has been codified. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
354. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v: Alabama 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
355. Northeast Fed. Credit Union v. Neves, 837 F.2d 531, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that
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There is, however, a category of cases in which the Eleventh
Amendment can block a diversity suit which might otherwise be de-
clined on Burford grounds. Suits against a local governmental entity
have not typically been seen as barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
so they will survive for consideration under Burford.35
Finally, in addition to the other doctrines or techniques of federal
judicial restraint discussed above, certification of pivotal state law
issues to the state courts occasionally might offer a clearly prefera-
ble alternative to Burford abstention. 51
2. A Particular Focus on Alternatives to Burford Abstention in
Cases Grounded on Federal Question Jurisdiction
By "federal question cases" I mean to include not only cases actu-
ally grounded on such a jurisdictional basis, but also those brought
solely as diversity cases, although qualifying for federal question ju-
risdiction as well. If such a federal question case slips through the
doctrines common to diversity and federal question jurisdiction,
which are likely to screen out a case, there are other doctrines spe-
cially affecting federal question cases which may foreclose applica-
tion of Burford.
The number of ways in which an issue of state law can arise in
connection with a claim for relief under federal law is limited. First,
because federal question jurisdiction will not lie unless the plaintiff's
claims against a government official (e.g., the state tax assessor) concerning actions performed in
her representative role are considered actions against the state, for purposes of "imperilling" di-
versity jurisdiction).
356. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1172. There is,
however, some indication that the Court may broaden the scope of the Eleventh Amendment to
cover such suits. Id. at 1172 n.19.
357. The general view has been that certification-style abstention, as encouraged in Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974), has no application to circumstances warranting
Burford abstention. 17A WRIGHT ET AL.. supra note 37, § 4248, at 158-59. This view seems
clearly justifiable as to "category 2" Burford abstention, which is not defined in terms of the
possibility of mistake as to pure and significant issues of state law, but rather in terms of the
potential for warping state law by a series of smaller scale errors. See infra part VI.B (dealing
with category 2 Burford abstention). "Category I" Burford abstention, however, is defined in
terms of the possibility of federal court error as to important state law issues. At least occasionally
in such cases, certification should be available as an alternative approach. See infra part VIL.A
(dealing with category I Burford abstention). For a general discussion of certification and its
frequent unavailability to federal district courts, see BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1381-83.
Where state courts, as they frequently do, refuse certification from federal district (as opposed to
appellate) courts, certification is unlikely to offer a substitute for Burford abstention of either sort.
Id. at 1381.
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own case is in some sense based on federal law, a plaintiff's federal
case will not normally raise state law issues of any sort.3 58 Second,
state law claims may be pendent to the federal claim. Third, on rare
occasions, state law "incorporated" in federal law may be instru-
mental in defining a federal law claim or a defense to such a
claim.359 Immediately below I discuss doctrinal alternatives to Bur-
ford abstention in connection with each of the three ways that a
state issue may surface in a suit grounded on federal question
jurisdiction.
a. Pendent state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction
This category can be dispatched quickly after our discussion of
Pennhurst above.360 To the extent that an unclear issue of state law
is raised in a pendent claim seeking relief against a statewide
agency, it cannot be heard by a federal court, so there is no serious
question of Burford abstention. If, however, relief is sought against
local government or its agencies, consideration of Burford absten-
tion is not mooted by the Eleventh Amendment. 61
b. Federal law attacks on state administrative action
One principal way a question of the meaning of state law can
arise in a federal case is in the context of an attack on a state stat-
ute or some other product of state action in which it is necessary to
fix the meaning of the object of attack in order to determine
whether it violates federal law. It is frequently said that Burford
358. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (stating that a suit
"arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of
his cause of action shows that it is based upon [such] . . . . It is not enough that the plaintiff
alleges some anticipated defense" raising a constitutional question). I use the word "normally"
because a federal law defining a cause of action occasionally will "incorporate" state law, making
it an instrumental part of a plaintiff's case. Cf Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328
U.S. 204, 206-07 (1946) (reading a federal statute as incorporating by reference some rules of
state property law). For a more direct example, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1983) (recog-
nizing that state law can generate liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); Perry v. Sinder-
man, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (recognizing that due process often protects interests created and de-
fined by state law).
359. State law cannot override valid federal law, but occasionally federal law incorporates state
law as determinative of federal rights to some degree. When this is true, a defendant may dispute
a state issue in defending the federal claim. For a discussion of this pattern, see infra part V.B.2.c.
360. See supra notes 341-53 and accompanying text.
361. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); BATOR -ET AL., supra note 2, at 1172.
19931
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
abstention is less favored in suits under federal law, 62 particularly
in cases asserting personal constitutional rights against state ac-
tion. 63 There is some indication that First Amendment cases have
been designated as particularly inappropriate candidates.3 6 Conse-
quently, cases of this sort begin with a greater likelihood that Bur-
ford will not be the doctrine of choice.
Beyond this general reluctance to use Burford in this category of
cases, the availability of other forms of restraint further decreases
the importance of Burford. Younger abstention screens out one sig-
nificant segment of cases attacking state action under federal law so
clearly that these cases are not even serious candidates for Burford
abstention. Clearly covered by Younger are federal suits to enjoin
certain judicial proceedings brought by the state in its own courts to
further "important" state interests. 65 These protected state pro-
ceedings should include some brought in state court to enforce state
administrative orders. 366 Beyond this, Younger has recently been ex-
tended to protect certain judicial-style administrative proceedings
against federal court injunctions - once again, those commenced
by the state to vindicate important interests.3 67 Although the re-
quirement of "importance" leaves the application of Younger un-
clear in marginal cases, as time passes, areas of clarity will continue
to emerge. To the extent a candidate for Burford abstention falls
into an area clearly covered by Younger, that doctrine is the one of
choice because of its relative clarity.
For cases making it past Younger - primarily cases involving
nonjudicial-style administrative action or insufficiently important ju-
dicial-style action - Pullman abstention has a broad potential to
render Burford otiose.3 68 In considering Pullman, it is important to
distinguish broad scale facial attacks on state law from attacks on
state law as applied and on other forms of state action.
362. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
365. See supra part I.C.
366. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
367. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627-28
(1986) (extending application of the Younger principle to state administrative proceedings against
a private school for alleged gender discrimination in violation of state law).
368. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (holding that abstention
is appropriate where it is in the public interest to "avoid needless friction with state policies that
may result from tentative decisions" and "premature constitutional adjudication"); supra part
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An attack on state law as unconstitutional on its face is a less
likely candidate for Burford abstention for precisely the reason that
that doctrine failed in the New Orleans case. In New Orleans, it was
unnecessary to resolve a difficult question about the meaning of un-
clear state law in order to resolve the claim that such law was pre-
empted. The meaning of state law was clear; the only serious ques-
tion was whether it was preempted by federal law."6 9 By its very
nature, a facial attack on state law often will succeed only where no
reasonably imaginable limiting construction is likely to save it.37 0
The key is that determination of facial invalidity often turns not on
pinning down the precise meaning of state law, but on federal stan-
dards of vagueness or overbreadth. For that very reason, Burford is
less likely to be applicable in such cases.
Other doctrines often will apply to the more usual nonfacial at-
tacks - attacks on state law as applied. It is precisely where the
presence of unclear state law militates in favor of Burford absten-
tion that Pullman abstention often becomes available as an alterna-
tive ground.371 This is so precisely because unclear state law is an
element of both sorts of abstention.
However, there may be cases where unclear state law is attacked
on federal grounds but in which Pullman does not operate. This is
true because it is difficult to calibrate the possibly different degrees
of uncertainty as to state law required respectively by the Pullman
and Burford doctrines. In particular cases, courts may require a
lesser degree for Burford or even be willing to rebuttably presume
lack of clarity where administrative law is involved. 72 Hence, while
Pullman should screen out a significant number of cases, a need to
determine Burford's applicability may often survive a determination
of Pullman's inapplicability.
What sorts of unclear issues of state law are likely to be involved
in such surviving cases? If Burford is limited to an administrative
realm, normally the issue would be the validity of state administra-
369. See supra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
370. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 752-53
(7th ed. 1991).
371. For a case favoring Pullman abstention, see Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of
Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1979). Similarly, the following case, while recogniz-
ing the appropriateness of both Burford and Pullman abstention, seems to favor the latter by
requiring that the federal trial court follow essentially Pullman-style procedures so as to retain the
case on its docket while the state questions are pursued in state court: West v. Village of Morris-
ville, 728 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1984).
372. See infra part VII.B.
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tive action attacked under state law. Justice Scalia nearly says as
much in New Orleans in suggesting Burford's applicability to cases
where a state agency "misapplied its lawful authority" or considered
improper factors.373 Indeed, Burford itself raised such issues. Pen-
nhurst, however, places a federal judge, asked to strike down state
administrative action under federal law in a surprisingly difficult po-
sition. Certainly the Eleventh Amendment does not forbid this sort
of federal law attack, and yet the judge confronts a dilemma. If the
state administrative action was clearly correct under state law, then
the need to determine its validity under federal law will not warrant
Burford abstention. But our concern is precisely with state adminis-
trative action which might be based on a misconstruction of state
law or its arbitrary and capricious application.
It is in this context that Pennhurst creates an odd situation. If the
federal judge could deploy a conclusive presumption that state ad-
ministrative action was correct under state law, she could simply
measure that action as it occurred against the Federal Constitution.
If this were the protocol, Burford abstention would not be an issue
because there would be no need to guess state law. There are, how-
ever, strong reasons for not deploying such a presumption. It would
be unfair to accord preclusive effect to a federal court judgment
based on a presumption of correctness which neither correlates
highly with correctness in fact nor is rebuttable.
On the other hand, a problem with Pennhurst arises if the federal
judge actually determines the validity of state administrative action
under state law. If she determines that a state agency has violated
state law, what should she do? Assuming the challenged action has
been taken by an agency of the state and not of local government,
the Eleventh Amendment as interpreted in Pennhurst prohibits her
from striking it down under state law.374 Can she decline to strike it
down under federal law because of her assessment that it violates
state law? She cannot do that in a way which assures that the deter-
mination of state law invalidity will bind the parties in a later state
court action. Doing so would violate the Eleventh Amendment as
construed in Pennhurst.75 Since this is true, dismissing the federal
claim on the merits is unjust to the plaintiff because the agency ac-
tion may survive any challenge in state court. Given these premises,
373. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989).
374. See supra notes 341-49 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 341-49 and accompanying text.
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not necessarily to my liking, abstention of some sort is the only an-
swer. In this light, Burford may be seen as particularly useful in
solving a portion of a problem posed by current Eleventh Amend-
ment law.
c. State law incorporated in federal law
Occasionally federal law is designed so that some of its meaning
is derived from state law. Under these circumstances, Burford ab-
stention may be warranted to determine the content of the state law
incorporated in the federal measures. This is true under a variety of
federal statutes.3 76 For example, the antitrust laws make available
an exemption for certain private activities required by state law. In
some federal antitrust cases, Burford abstention has been ordered to
determine whether state law required the conduct in question. 77
This sort of statutory incorporation case is of particular interest be-
cause it usually involves no constitutional question. Hence, Pullman
abstention is usually unavailable to obviate the need for a considera-
tion of Burford.
The incorporation pattern can occur, however, in constitutional
cases as well. The Contracts Clause, 78 within limits defined by fed-
eral law, defers to the law of the appropriate state to determine
whether a "contract" has come into existence so as to be entitled to
federal constitutional protection.37 9 Likewise, numerous cases under
the Fourteenth Amendment defer to state law to some degree in
order to determine whether an asserted "property" interest entitled
to constitutional protection actually has come into existence. 8 ' One
376. See, e.g., Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897,
901, 903-06 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying the Burford doctrine to avoid determination of whether all
necessary state environmental permits had been issued, an issue made relevant by the fact that the
Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act made its operation dependent upon whether all
state permits had been granted); Brown v. First Nat'l City Bank, 503 F.2d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir.
1974) (stating that abstention was permissible but not required where federal banking law, under
which the suit was brought, had no independent provisions and merely incorporated state law);
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc, 592 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (1st Cir. 1979) (ordering abstention
on Burford-Thibodaux grounds so that state courts could determine whether the activities in
question were required by state law and thus exempt from federal antitrust law).
377. See, e.g., Kartell, 592 F.2d at 1193-95 (ordering abstention to avoid the need to determine
state law incorporated in federal antitrust law).
378. The Contracts Clause states in part: "No State shall ... pass any . . .Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
379. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).
380. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78. (1972) (looking to the specific
nature of university employment contracts under state law to determine if an untenured teacher
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pattern involving state administrative law involves the assertion,
often true, that where life, liberty, or property is affected, federal
due process requires a state to comply with its own laws and admin-
istrative regulations."' Thus, it is possible for the meaning of a state
administrative regulation to be a crucial element in a federal due
process case. In such a case of constitutional incorporation, the Pull-
man doctrine may screen out some Burford candidates because both
forms depend upon lack of clarity of state law. 82
In many "incorporation" cases reasonably considered under the
Burford doctrine, the state law issue will be one of the interpreta-
tion, and not the validity, of state administrative action. These cases
are considered in Section C below, where it is suggested that they
would be considered as "primary jurisdiction" cases and not true
Burford cases.
3. A Particular Focus on Alternatives to Burford Abstention in
Review Cases Grounded on Diversity Jurisdiction
For purposes of the analysis below, the meaning of "diversity"
suits is limited to those which can be maintained in federal court
only on the basis of diverse citizenship. Excluded are suits actually
founded on diversity jurisdiction but asserting a federal claim,
thereby making federal question jurisdiction an alternative but
uninvoked ground. Courts have not expressed the same disfavor for
Burford abstention in such suits as they have in those asserting a
federal cause of action.3 83 Still there are other roadblocks, besides
the Burford abstention doctrine, which are likely to exclude such a
case. If the suit is against the state itself, not only will the Eleventh
Amendment bar relief, but so will lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, because the state is not a citizen for purposes of ordinary diver-
had a property interest in continued employment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602
(1972) (holding that a junior college professor must be given the opportunity to prove the legiti-
macy of his claim of a property interest in continued employment under the unwritten "rules and
understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials").
381. See Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp 1369, 1372, 1381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (presenting a due
process claim grounded in a state-defined right to shelter).
382. Unclear state law is an element of the Pullman doctrine. See supra notes 46, 51, and
accompanying text. Burford as well depends on unclear state law. This is explicit in the Court's
definition of the first category of Burford abstention. See infra part VILA. The requirement of
unclear state law is implicit in the second Burford category. See infra part VI1.B. A federal court
applying clear state law could not disrupt "state policy formation" in any sense of those words.
See infra part VIL.B.
383. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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sity of citizenship jurisdiction."8 4 Likewise, suits against state of-
ficers and administrative officials will ordinarily be viewed as suits
against the states for purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion.3 85 Some local government entities, however, can be diverse par-
ties.3 88 Even in such cases, other doctrines occasionally may be the
ground of choice.
The analysis of subcategories of review cases now ends. The Arti-
cle turns to the other pattern, primary jurisdiction.
C. How Other Doctrines of Judicial Federalism Reduce
Burford's Significance in Primary Jurisdiction Pattern Cases
By definition, in all of the review cases discussed above, the ques-
tion has been the state law validity of something the agency has
done or not done. There is another category of cases which might be
counted among those covered by the Burford doctrine - those simi-
lar to cases in which federal courts defer to federal agencies on the
basis of an agency's "primary jurisdiction."
384. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
385. Today it should be rare for a state regulatory agency, in is regulatory capacity, to be
viewed as a state citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Ordinarily such agencies are not
independent of the state in any meaningful sense, but are arms of the state used for governance.
Cases in which state agencies qualify as citizens have a different flavor. The court in Coastal
Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals, 695 F.2d 1314, 1318 (1lth Cir.1983) stated:
The district court used a multifactor analysis in holding that the Trustees are suffi-
ciently separate and independent from the state so as to confer "citizen" status upon
them. These factors have been approved by this circuit and are as follows: (1)
whether the agency can be sued in its own name; (2) whether the agency can implead
and be impleaded in any competent court; (3) whether the agency can contract in its
own name; (4) whether the agency can acquire, hold title to, and dispose of property
in its own name; and (5) whether the agency can be considered a "body corporate"
having the rights, powers and immunities incident to corporations.
Id. At the time of Burford, I suspect, that this position was less clear, hence the dual diversity/
federal question basis of a suit involving the Texas Railroad Commission. It is also possible that
the diversity recognized in that case existed solely between Burford and Sun Oil Co. and that
jurisdiction over the Commission was based on federal question jurisdiction alone or on some
implicit acceptance of the Commission as properly before the trial court as a nondiverse "pendent
party." The materials I have located provide no resolution as to what was the well-thought out
basis for diversity jurisdiction in Burford, if there was one at all.
Local government, and presumably their agencies, are citizens of the states in which they are
located except in the truly unusual circumstances in which they have no almost no independent
policy-making role. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973).
386. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (distinguishing diver-
sity cases involving the enforcement of the power of eminent domain from "ordinary" diversity
cases). See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3602, at 369 n.14 (1984),
§ 3602, at 72-73 (Supp. 1992).
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In cases confronting the primary jurisdiction of federal agencies,
federal courts and those agencies share power to make decisions in-
volving a regulatory scheme.387 Occasionally, although not explicitly
required by statute, a federal court will stay its proceedings in order
to obtain a federal agency ruling on a regulatory issue confronting
it.388 Federal courts do this when they conclude that obtaining uni-
formity or bringing agency expertise to bear on the issue is likely to
produce benefits worth the costs.389 Often the benefit invoked is uni-
formity in application of the agency's enabling act. An example of
this involves a court with the authority to award damages to a con-
sumer allegedly charged a price in excess of a tariff written by an
agency. Assume the court finds the tariff ambiguous as applied to
the particular case before it.3 90 In such situations, courts have
stayed their proceeding in order to obtain a ruling on that issue."'
Note again that, unlike the review pattern cases discussed exten-
sively above, there is no claim that an agency has acted
improperly. 92
If there is no allegation that a state agency has behaved unlaw-
fully in some relevant way, the most likely significant "entangle-
ment" of a federal case with state regulatory law involves precisely
the circumstances of primary jurisdiction cases. In other words, such
entanglement arguably occurs where a freestanding court action
nevertheless involves issues having an impact on a regulatory
scheme and where appropriate input from an agency would be help-
ful to insure that the scheme is not frustrated.
Is federal judicial restraint appropriate when it is aimed at secur-
ing input from a state administrative agency? If so, should it be
seen as an instance of Burford abstention? Few federal courts have
addressed these issues. 93 Those which have addressed it treat pri-
387. See 4 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22:1 (2d ed. 1983); JAFFE.
supra note 181, at 119-23.
388. See 4 DAVIS, supra note 387, § 22:2; JAFFE, supra note 181, at 119-23.
389. See 4 DAvIs, supra note 387, § 22:4, at 89; see also JAFFE, supra note 181, at 124 (ex-
plaining primary jurisdiction in terms of statutory purpose, of which expertise and uniformity are
only portions of a broader analysis).
390. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (analyzing and apply-
ing the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
391. See Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 76; GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 171, at 1138-39.
392. There is one other feature of the primary jurisdiction pattern which is worth noting. A
court's decision to defer to the primary jurisdiction of an agency is a highly particularized one
depending on the nature of the issue of regulatory law and the context in which it is set. RICHARD
J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 210 (1985).
393. Two federal circuit court cases make clear their view on the relationship of the two doc-
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mary jurisdiction as a separate doctrine that overlaps with Burford
but which should be analyzed separately. 94 There are reasons for
this, stemming from obvious differences between such a case and the
more usual case implicating Burford.395 First, in these primary ju-
risdiction pattern cases, there has been no agency action. Hence
there is a concern that a state administrative agency itself (and not
just a specialized state reviewing court) will be deprived of a chance
to address an issue of vital importance to an area it superintends. 9 6
Second, a consequence of this is that finality or ripeness, in any
traditional sense, is not available as a preferred ground of disposi-
tion. There is no relevant administrative proceeding whose conclu-
sion is necessary to having a ripe case. Third, federal courts rarely
dismiss their proceedings when deferring to the primary jurisdiction
of federal agencies under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Nor-
mally, they hold them on their dockets pending receipt of the input
sought from the agency. 97 Traditionally, the result of Burford ab-
stention has been outright dismissal of the case.3 98
For these reasons, one might argue that a federal court which
defers jurisdiction while seeking state agency input would be apt to
characterize its action in primary jurisdiction terms instead of Bur-
ford abstention terms. Still, there are arguments for characterizing
some of these cases as variant forms of Burford. By hypothesis, a
court deferring to the primary jurisdiction of an agency has jurisdic-
tion: it merely exercises a form of restraint. Likewise, abstention is
trines. Not only does each treat the two doctrines as separate, but both conclude that Burford
abstention, and not the primary jurisdiction doctrine, can warrant federal restraint to protect state
agencies. The two cases are: Taffet v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847, 852-54 (11th Cir. 1991);
County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1308-11 (2d Cir. 1990).
394. See Taffet, 930 F.2d at 854; Long Island Lighting, 907 F.2d at 1309-11.
395. Both Taffet and Long Island Lighting conclude that primary jurisdiction does not apply to
cases involving federal courts and state agencies, for the reason that the doctrine is based largely
on a presumed congressional intent favoring uniformity of interpretation as to matters entrusted to
federal agencies. Taffet, 930 F.2d at 854; Long Island Lighting, 907 F.2d at 1310. My claim,
however, is not that the primary jurisdiction doctrine, in its classical form, applies to require
federal court deference to state agencies. It is rather that one should consider whether Burford as
applied in some circumstances, is analogous to the federal primary jurisdiction doctrine.
396. In review pattern cases, by contrast, the state agency will have already made that judg-
ment and any interference will be with state courts (possibly expert courts) but not the original
agency itself. This follows from my definition of such cases. See supra note 312 and accompany-
ing text.
397. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 171, at 1138.
398. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. But see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S.
Ct. 2206, 2216 n.8 (1992) (suggesting that retention of a case may be warranted in some
circumstances).
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the word generally used to characterize a federal court's abjuring,
based on grounds of federalism, jurisdiction which it does possess.
While a choice between the labels "abstention" and "primary juris-
diction" seems of little importance in a diversity case, speaking in
terms of abstention seems particularly appropriate in federal ques-
tion cases.
In a diversity case, there may be some possibility that the state
law action supplanted would be one in which a state court would
defer to the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.3 99 The
force favoring abstention is a state's interest in not having a regula-
tory scheme disrupted. If it is clear that state courts would find no
need for agency input, then no state interest is frustrated by exercise
of diversity jurisdiction.
If the federal court is certain that such deference either would
occur or would not occur, it should generally attempt to anticipate
the probable state outcome.40 For example, a state might not recog-
nize the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, in which case the federal
court should decide without agency input as would its state court
counterpart. Or the state courts might recognize the doctrine and
have ruled it clearly applicable or inapplicable in a virtually indis-
tinguishable case. For this purpose, it does not matter whether the
state law action supplanted would or would not have been in a spe-
cialized state court. The issue is whether the state courts would ini-
tially abjure their statutory jurisdiction in favor of an initial agency
399. For a discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in state courts, sometimes termed
the prior resort doctrine, see 2 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 562-71 (1965).
400. The court is, of course, not bound to abstain. Cases such as Railway Co. v. Whitton's
Administrator, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871), make clear that a federal court is not obligated to
honor state laws which would deprive it of jurisdiction in favor of specified state courts. If the
state court's doctrine of primary jurisdiction seems unnecessarily broad, the federal court can
refuse to apply it, concluding that the federal interest in exercising diversity jurisdiction outweighs
the state rule. Occasionally, however, it will be appropriate for the federal courts to abjure juris-
diction in favor of specialized state courts if the balance of state and federal interests so dictates.
The original Burford doctrine, requiring deference to state courts for review of certain administra-
tive action, provides one example. In cases not reviewing state administrative action, federal court
deference to state agencies themselves will also be warranted in circumstances analogous to the
federal primary jurisdiction doctrine. While the practice of state courts to defer or not defer to
state agencies should be strongly persuasive as to federal court deference, it cannot be dispositive.
Occasionally, it may be true that while a state's primary jurisdiction rule is abstractly reasonable,
it does not protect sufficiently important state administrative interests against sufficiently likely
disruption to warrant abstention. As the text above makes clear, I believe that less deference is
warranted when a federal rights plaintiff seeks a federal forum. At bottom, I can explain this only
as based on my belief that the federal question jurisdictional grant is much more important in
today's world than the diversity grant.
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determination. Where the answer is unclear, the federal court must
do its best to balance the factors - delay versus expertise - as
would a state court in a close case.
Federal question cases are similar in some ways, different in
others. The initial inquiry should be similar. The federal court
should determine whether a state court, hearing a similar state law
claim, would defer to an administrative agency's primary jurisdic-
tion. If the answer is no, then there is no state interest in an initial
agency decision which warrants ousting holders of federal rights
from federal courts. If the answer is yes, the calculus is not the
same as for diversity cases. The court must itself weigh the reasons
suggesting that state courts would defer against the importance of
providing a federal forum in the case in question. The latter step
must be done from the perspective of federal law. This makes it
clear that, especially in federal question cases, the federal court is
itself independently balancing state and federal interests in ways
characteristic of abstention decisions on federalism grounds. 0 1
While there have been few true primary jurisdiction pattern Bur-
ford cases, should a case meet the requirements outlined above, it is
unlikely to be rendered useless by any of the doctrines which may
make Burford practically meaningless in cases falling within the re-
view pattern. The key to this difference is that no agency action is
challenged in primary jurisdiction cases. Therefore, lack of ripeness
or finality of agency action can provide no alternative ground to
Burford. Because no order is sought striking down state action, the
Eleventh Amendment likewise provides no alternative ground. The
same is true of Younger abstention. Younger, as applied to adminis-
trative judicial style proceedings, requires an administrative pro-
ceeding which, by hypothesis, does not exist within the primary ju-
risdiction pattern. Again, by hypothesis, there is no administrative
decision or state court affirmance of such a decision which may be
protected from federal review by claim or issue preclusion or by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pullman might be seen as possibly appli-
cable where the product of deference might be the avoidance of a
constitutional decision, but Pullman requires deference to state judi-
cial constructions. To the extent a federal court stays proceedings on
grounds that further agency input is desirable, state primary juris-
diction doctrine is the most forthright explanation.
401. See supra note 400 (indicating limitations on federal court deference to state laws which
would limit federal jurisdiction).
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D. Summary of the Effect of Other Doctrines on Burford
Abstention
Once New Orleans rejected Burford abstention for cases in which
there was no need to resolve a troublesome issue of state law, a sig-
nificant number of potential Burford cases were eliminated. These
were cases, like New Orleans itself, in which any connection of com-
plicated state regulatory law to the merits of the federal suit was
remote at best.
The doctrines of ripeness and claim preclusion, operating at oppo-
site ends of state processes, eliminate a large number of potential
Burford cases. Federal law attacks on state action are the main cat-
egory of the remaining nondiversity cases. The ranks of these cases
are further thinned out by other doctrines of restraint. What is left
is a much narrowed group of cases in which a federal court; asked
to strike down state agency action on federal grounds, is unsure of
the desirability of doing so, given the possible invalidity of the
agency action under state law.
To a large extent the remainder consists of diversity cases. These
are limited by virtue of the fact that a federal court cannot grant
relief under state law against a statewide agency. Thus what re-
mains, even of these, are: (1) suits against agencies of local govern-
ment and (2) suits between private parties somehow dependent upon
state administrative action which must be appraised for legality or
at least construed in order to resolve the merits.
VI. THE ADMINISTRATIVE/NONADMINISTRATIVE DISTINCTION
UNDER THE MICROSCOPE
This section discusses the meaning and justifiability of the appar-
ent limitation of Burford abstention to cases involving state admin-
istrative law. In Section A, I attempt to pii down the probable
meaning of "administrative" as used by the Court to define the Bur-
ford doctrine. In Section B, I argue that such a limitation of Bur-
ford abstention to a solely administrative realm is not justified today
if one adopts the perspective that courts and agencies have become
less distinguishable than they were when Burford was decided. In
Section C, I return to the more conventional perspective from which
the law and policy-making roles of courts and agencies are seen as
differing greatly. I explore whether limiting Burford to administra-
tive cases was justifiable, even when based on that more conven-
tional assumption prevailing at the time it was decided.
[Vol. 42:859
1993] FEDERAL ABSTENTION AND STATE LAW
A. What Is Meant by "Administrative Agencies" in the New
Orleans Formulation?
While at least some doubts are raised by the recent Ankenbrandt
case,402 the-weight of the case law and the language of New Orleans
seem to limit Burford abstention to cases involving state administra-
tive agencies." 3 A threshold issue is what "administrative" means in
the New Orleans Court's formulation. In a narrow sense, it might
simply mean that some officer, other than (1) a judge on a court or
(2) a member of a legislature, is carrying out official duties.
I exclude classical judicial and legislative officers because includ-
ing them would lead to a bizarre and uselessly broad definition. 4
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)40 5 affirms this as
the traditional way of classifying organs of government. The APA
defines "'agency" as "each authority of the Government of the
United States" but excludes both Congress and the federal courts in
its definition of agency.4 06 Consequently the definition includes both
executive branch and independent agency officers exercising author-
ity under federal law.4 07 It is unlikely that Justice Scalia, a master
of federal administrative law, would use the word administrative in
such a peculiar way as to include courts and legislatures. States gen-
erally define agency in a way roughly similar to the Federal APA's
definition, excluding courts and legislatures.4 08 Thus, the meaning of
402. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992); see supra notes 14-15 and ac-
companying text.
403. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)
(describing Burford as aimed at avoiding "interfere[nce] with the proceedings or orders of state
administrative agencies"); BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1364 (noting that Burford abstention is
often called "administrative abstention").
404. The defining feature of administrative agencies, whether of the executive branch or inde-
pendent, is that they pursue legislatively defined programs. In some broad sense, they execute
statutes as ultimately and definitively interpreted by courts. The fact that in doing so, agencies
both make law and adjudicate in subordinate ways may seem to blur the very distinction stressed
here. But from a conventional perspective, the distinction between agencies on the one hand and
legislatures and courts on the other remains basic. This is demonstrated by the ingenious efforts
which have been required to constitutionally legitimate legislative and judicial activities by admin-
istrative agencies. If executive branch agencies were viewed as possessing all the powers of Con-
gress and the judiciary, a large portion of the Supreme Court's separation of powers cases would
have been more easily decided.
405. Administrative Procedure Act, 80 Stat. 331 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (1988)).
406. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
407. Analogously, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which suggests that "officers of the
United States" are persons performing a "significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a
public law." Id. at 140-41.
408. See MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1981), 15 U.L.A. 1 (1990) [here-
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state "administrative action," for purposes of the Burford doctrine,
is likely to be no broader than the APA's definition of agency. Is it
narrower? What precisely are the "authorities" of the state govern-
ment (other than courts and legislatures) which qualify? If the an-
swer is that all such authorities are included, then it is no surprise
that such abstention applies "only" in an administrative realm.
Under that assumption, virtually any case challenging actions by
state officials is an administrative case.
In fact, in New Orleans, Justice Scalia must have used "adminis-
trative" in a sense even narrower than the broadest it may possess
under the Federal APA. It is unlikely that the Court's statements
limiting Burford to cases implicating administrative action meant to
use it in such a weak sense that it is present in the lion's share of
cases against state executive action cognizable in federal court
under Ex parte Young.4 °9 Presumably the limitation was meant to
add something substantial to the definition of a relatively circum-
scribed abstention doctrine.
There is a narrower sense of "administrative" with more exacting
criteria which seems more likely to be what the Court has in mind.
According to this view, an action is administrative if it is taken by a
body other than the legislature or a court and involves the use of
delegated power to make state law and policy in some significant
way, although within limits set by the state legislature.41 This, of
course, was the preoccupation of the original Burford decision -
the avoidance of federal court intervention in the process of the
making of state policy. 411
inafter 1981 MODEL ACT]; MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1961), 15 U.L.A.
137 (1990) [hereinafter 1961 MODEL ACT]. Both the 1981 Act and the 1961 Act exclude courts
and legislatures from their definition of "agency." See 1981 MODEL ACT § 1-102(1); 1961
MODEL ACT § 1(1). The 1961 Act has been adopted by twenty-nine states including New York,
Illinois, and Michigan. 1961 MODEL ACT. Three states have adopted the 1981 Act. 1981 MODEL
ACT, at 10 (Supp. 1992) (including Arizona, which has adopted portions of both).
409. 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908); see supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing
Young).
410. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 4, 140-41 (defining an "officer of the United States" as a person
performing a significant governmental duty pursuant to a public law).
411. The clearest statement of this concern with federal court meddling in state policy forma-
tion appears in Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Burford. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315, 335 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that where federal courts "sit in review" of the state
administrative agency, they "in effect actively participate in the fashioning of the state's domestic
policy").
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B. Is Limiting Burford to Administrative Law Cases Justifiable?
Assuming that I have captured what Justice Scalia's opinion
means by administrative, is it justifiable to limit application of the
broader Burford category to cases involving state administrative law
in that sense? There are two perspectives on this question. The first
is a more traditional one, from which the roles of courts and agen-
cies are seen as very different. The second is less traditional, in
which courts and agencies are seen as functioning in very similar
ways. It recognizes that courts, as well as legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies, make law and policy.
Below, in Section III.C, I first deal with the latter, presenting my
view that differences between courts and agencies can no longer sat-
isfactorily justify a form of abstention limited to cases involving
state administrative agencies. Then, in Subsection 2, I demonstrate
how someone not accepting my position might plausibly, if not en-
tirely satisfactorily, justify the traditional limitation: If the state
court dealing with agency action is specialized, it can function as
part of an agency process which needs to be exhausted before resort-
ing to federal court. These are the circumstances of the Burford
case itself. However, even if the state court is not specialized, ab-
stention might be viewed as justifiable. A specialized court's review
of agency action requires it to deploy administrative "scope of re-
view" law, which arguably is not as ascertainable as most law fed-
eral courts are required to determine under Erie-Meredith.
1. The Limitation as Seen from a Modern Perspective Stressing
the Similarities of Courts' and Agencies' Powers to Make Law
Is the traditional perspective, differentiating between law-making
and law-finding, supportable today? Is the distinction between ex-
amples of administrative law and policy-making, on the one hand,
and some standard judicial decisionmaking, on the other, now too
diminished to be useful in determining whether a court should ab-
stain.? In short, should federal courts defer to some purely judicial
state court processes just as much as to processes involving adminis-
trative agencies?
Our view of both judicial and administrative decisionmaking has
changed greatly since Burford was decided. At that time, courts
were just beginning to recognize that agencies make law in a way
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resembling legislation. 12 This was seen as true not only when agen-
cies engaged in rulemaking, but also when they enforced statutory
terms in an adjudication. 1
At that time, however, judges generally continued to view and
present themselves as functionally different from administrative of-
ficers, even those officers who acted judicially. Judges generally
presented themselves as finding the law when they interpreted stat-
utes and as doing something less freewheeling than pure legislating
when they extended case law doctrine. This was true despite the
recognition that administrative officers, even when adjudicating
cases, make law resembling legislation. 4" As late as 1949, Jerome
Frank described this as the conventional, if erroneous, view of what
judges do:
Law is a complete body of rules existing from time immemorial . . . un-
changeable except to the extent that legislatures have changed the rules by
enacted statutes. Legislatures are expressly empowered thus to change the
law. But judges are not to make or change the law but to apply it.4 16
Now of course this is a complicated story. Intelligent judges were
never completely unaware of the large discretion provided them by
vague statutory and common law formulations. Still, the sort of ju-
dicial law-making recognized by Benjamin Cardozo in his path-
breaking 1921 book was limited to a modest filling of small gaps in
the law.41 6 Even this limited recognition caused an uproar. 17
412. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text (discussing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947)).
414. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text (discussing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947)).
415. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32 (1949).
416. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921). Cardozo
notes:
Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and the [judge's]
.... Each is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits for
the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in
the law. How far he may go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices
cannot be staked out for him on a chart. He must learn it himself as he gains the
sense of fitness and proportion that comes with years of habitude in the practice of an
art. Even within the gaps, restrictions not easy to define, but felt, . . . hedge and
circumscribe his action. They are established by the traditions of the centuries, by the
example of other judges, his predecessors and his colleagues, by the collective judg-
ment of the profession, and by the duty of adherence to the pervading spirit of the
law.
Id. at 113-14.
417. GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 76-77 (1977).
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In the 1930s and early 1940s, the Realists challenged the prevail-
ing view, insisting that judges made law in the broadest possible
sense. 18 The Realist view, however, had certainly not gained official
or general acceptance by the time of Erie and Burford. Perhaps
there is some element of caricature in Frank's statements, quoted
immediately above, that the prevailing view was that of judges as
law-finders. 1 9 Still, in 1949, he strongly insisted that it prevailed. 2 0
One year after Frank's statement, Karl Llewellyn made a similar
point when he concluded that in the period from 1880 to 1910,
courts adopted the stance of pure law-finders.4 21 He noted that since
1920, an older style, which had considered the legislative wisdom of
a decision, was working its way back into judicial process, but he
found that the language of opinions "moves still dominantly" in the
style which views law as a closed system. 22 Even as late as 1960, an
eminent scholar concluded that the older Blackstonian pose of
judges as law-finders, not law-makers, remained a problem for
American jurisprudence.423
But by Burford's time, the seeds of change were already sown by
Holmes,424 Cardozo, and the Realists.42 5 In the law review issue in
which Llewellyn published the statements described above, Charles
Curtis presented a view of statutory interpretation as an exercise of
law-making authority which was delegated to the courts by the leg-
islature.4 26 The next decade brought the Warren Court and a much
greater recognition, in federal constitutional cases and in others, of
418. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERI-
CAN JUDGES 268-75 (1976). See in particular page 274 describing Jerome Frank, a leading Real-
ist, as endorsing creative law making by judges. Id. at 274.
419. FRA)NK, supra note 415, at 32.
420. Id. at 32-33.
421. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Can-
nons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950).
422. Id.
423. See Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1960).
424. "It is at this moment [publication of OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE PATH OF LAW (1897)] that
the idea that law was discovered and not made was dealt its most powerful blow in American
thought." MORTON J. HORWITZ. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 (1991).
As the text above makes clear, the blow took decades to dispatch its victim. See also Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (finding that "judges do and
must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially").
425. CARDOZO, supra note 416, at 113-15.
426. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 425-37
(1950) (explaining that in determining the meaning of words in legal documents, the "question
before the court is not whether [the addressee] gave the words the right meaning, but whether or
not the words authorized the meaning he gave them").
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the fact of judicial law-making. 2 Indeed, in the last several de-
cades, attacks on and defenses of judicial law-making have been a
preoccupation of American jurisprudence. 28
Today "[nlo serious scholar treats the lawmaking power of judges
as anything but an established fact. ' 429 Beyond recognition of the
courts' power to make substantive law within reasonable limits de-
fined by statute and constitution, much judicial action is increas-
ingly recognized to resemble administrative decisionmaking (both
rulemaking and adjudication) in other ways as well. The new public
law litigation, whether or not it involves "administrative agencies"
in any strong sense of those words, is no longer "bipolar" and ori-
ented toward discrete occurrences in the past:4 0
[11n actively shaping and monitoring the decree, mediating between the par-
ties, developing his own sources of expertise and information, the trial judge
has passed beyond even the role of legislator and has become a policy plan-
ner and manager.'
80
Such litigation is often what Professor Lon Fuller termed
polycentric, involving, as did the administrative action in Burford, a
spider web of relationships between diverse parties and even nonpar-
ties whose interests must be considered. 32 Such suits often require
expertise, in the form of expert witnesses and court-appointed ex-
perts, and they often require managerial creativity in the fashioning
of relief and ongoing supervision of compliance and adjustment of
the court's order to meet changed circumstances.
The distance between agency law-making and some forms of
427. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-10 (1975) (recognizing the Court's power to make rules -
such as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule - to supplement and effectuate those explicitly
traceable to the text of the Constitution).
428. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 17-23 (1990).
429. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 21 (1990); see also Fallon & Melt-
zer, supra note 25, at 1759-60 (concluding that the prevailing modern view recognizes judicial
law-making).
430. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter The Role of the Judge] (discussing the transition from tradi-
tional adjudication-style decisionmaking to a process that increasingly resembles administrative
decisionmaking). My citation is to the whole article, but see pages 1300-02 in particular. See also
Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Public Law Litigation].
431. The Role of the Judge, supra note 430, at 1302.
432. See id.; Public Law Litigation, supra note 430, at 4-6; see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978) (explaining the notion of
polycentric problems and discussing the appropriation of adjudication as a means of solving
them).
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purely judicial decisionmaking narrowed as each end approached
the other. While law-making by state and federal courts became
more clearly recognized, both in the traditional case law and in stat-
utory contexts, earlier claims for agency expertise began to seem
extravagant. 3 As a consequence, it seems necessary to recognize
that some state cases which do not involve agency action can make
equally forceful claims for Burford-style abstention. Some
nonadministrative law - some "regular" law of the sort tradition-
ally covered by the Erie-Meredith doctrine - can present the same
problems of federal interference with policy-making and complexity
that were generally limited to cases involving administrative agen-
cies when Burford was decided.
These facts suggest that the Court in Colorado River acknowl-
edged something important when it recognized a kinship between
Burford and Thibodaux, a case approving abstention despite the
lack of state administrative agency involvement. In the latter, the
federal court was permitted to abstain in order to allow state courts
to determine sensitive issues of state eminent domain policy. 34
Thibodaux may or may not be an extremely limited precedent. Up
until Colorado River, the Supreme Court opinions discussing that
form of abstention were consistent with its narrow limitation to
cases involving state eminent domain. Colorado River suggested
three things. First, it suggested that Thibodaux was closely related
to Burford and perhaps even part of the Burford doctrine.4 3 5 Sec-
ond, the Colorado River statements, considered in context, called
into question a widely held view that Thibodaux abstention is appli-
cable only to diversity cases.4 36 Third, by offering the formula that
Thibodaux applies where state issues transcend the result in a par-
ticular case, 3 7 it suggested that Thibodaux is not limited to emi-
nent domain issues but rather has application to a variety of cases
involving diverse subject matters. A number of post-Colorado River
cases using Thibodaux as a precedent read it to apply generally to
cases where statutory law is so unformed and sensitive that its elab-
433. EDLEY, supra note 182, at 48-52.
434. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1959).
435. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15
(1976).
436. Burford abstention is less favored in federal question cases but nevertheless has been
viewed as applicable to some of them. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
437. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
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oration is an important act of governance.3 8
As a result, one could make the argument that Burford absten-
tion reflects broader concerns, not properly confined to the adminis-
trative realm, that any substantial risk of federal court mistake re-
garding certain sensitive matters of state law may be too great to
tolerate. Indeed one could argue that the first category of Burford
abstention should be seen as a subset of a broadened Thibodaux
category, in which abstention is permissible if there is an unclear
and particularly sensitive matter of state public law that must be
determined in the process of the federal litigation. Cases involving
state agencies would form an important part of such a category, but
they would hardly exhaust it.
Kelly Services, Inc. v. Johnson4 39 is an example of a case invoking
Burford, or Thibodaux-Burford, outside the context of threats to
state administrative law-making."4 In Kelly, state agencies affected
by a general state regulatory statute actually argued against absten-
tion and in favor of having the federal court construe a broad stat-
ute which applied to them.441 The issue was one of construction of a
general statute regulating employment agencies, a statute not within
the area of specialized expertise of any of the agencies it affected. 441
In fact, none of the agencies involved in the litigation asserted a
primary authority to impart a definitive interpretation to the statute.
Indeed, they first sought an opinion from the state attorney general
as to the meaning of the statute." 3 Nevertheless, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the trial court, ordering Burford abstention.444  The
court's grounds were that the state interest in this sort of consumer
protection was both great and traditional and that the particular
438. See infra notes 439-66 and accompanying text. The paradigmatic Erie case was a com-
mon law case, for example, torts or contract. Usually, from the state's perspective, it is nearly
inconsequential that federal decisions of particular cases have a preclusive effect on the parties.
The public consequences of erroneous individual federal court decisions of state law in suits be-
tween private parties would be quite limited. There will be no impact on future cases involving
different parties: the state does not have to accord stare decisis effect to a decision of state law by
a federal court.
As the volume of newer forms of litigation increases, problems mount. The res judicata effect of
federal public law litigation (e.g., a class action under a state constitutional provision, grounded on
an erroneous federal court interpretation of state law) could be enormously harmful.
439. 542 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976).
440. Id. at 32-33.
441. Id. at 32.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 33.
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issues "[had] not been subject to scrutiny by a state court."4 " The
court continued: "Thus it compels federal courts to stay their hand
lest they provoke needless conflict with the administration by a state
of its own affairs." 4" There was no suggestion that what was, at
best, a peripheral involvement of an administrative agency was cru-
cial to the outcome.
Two other cases offer examples of abstention outside a state ad-
ministrative law context on the ground that sensitive and uncertain
state law was involved. Both of these invoked Thibodaux more di-
rectly than Burford itself, although the latter was cited.447 However,
they did so in the period between 1976 and 1989, when the Supreme
Court's last statement on the matter, in Colorado River, clearly
connected the two forms of abstention.
Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co.4" was
an appeal to the Second Circuit in a diversity action.449 The plaintiff
sought a declaration of the validity of certain insurance contract
clauses under state statutory law.4 "5 There was no state agency deci-
sion involved, and the opinion does not advert to the possibility that
under state law there existed an agency having primary jurisdiction
to impart a presumptively correct interpretation to the state statute.
The district court in Smith abstained,"4  and the Second Circuit
affirmed that court on Burford-Thibodaux grounds.4"5  The Second
Circuit found abstention satisfied because of the confluence of two
factors - great uncertainty regarding state law and the importance
to the state of the issue which was governed by that law:453
Both the branches - unclear state law and broad impact on state policy -
must be satisfied; neither alone is sufficient. . . . [W]e have "no real idea"
how the Connecticut courts would decide this question.
Connecticut, which is home to four of the ten leading carriers of prop-
erty/casualty insurance, surely has as strong an interest in the doctrinal in-
445. Id. at 32.
446. Id.; see Rindley v. Gallagher, 719 F. Supp. 1076, 1080-81 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (abstaining
where, similar to Kelly Services, no agency was involved), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1552 (11 th Cir. 1991).
447. West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1984); Smith v. Metropolitan
Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1980).
448. 629 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1980).
449. Id. at 758.
450. Id.
451. Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 483 F. Supp. 673 (D. Conn.), affd, 629
F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1980).
452. Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1980).
453. Id. at 760-61.
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tegrity of its regulatory scheme as does Louisiana with respect to eminent
domain .... 4 1
While the Second Circuit was concerned about the doctrinal in-
tegrity of a complex regulatory scheme, that scheme, or at least the
portion at issue in Smith, was superintended by the courts and not
by a traditional administrative agency. " Smith seems wrong under
classical Burford formulations, but here we see the weakness of the
formulations themselves. The court's intuition - that it should not
get involved in defining part of the complex spider web of relation-
ships formed by Connecticut insurance law - seems just as plausi-
ble, although no administrative agency is involved.
In. 1984, we see the Second Circuit again in West v. Village of
Morrisville,4" assimilating Thibodaux to the Burford doctrine and
characterizing this sort of Burford case as one applying where
"there are 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial import whose importance transcends the re-
sult in the case . . . at bar.' ,4 This language, found in Colorado
River and New Orleans, was used to define a category of abstention
closely associated with Burford abstention in the former case and
explicitly described as Burford abstention in the latter.458
The force of West in favor of my argument is somewhat weak-
ened by virtue of the fact that Pullman abstention was an alterna-
tive ground 459 and by the fact that an order of an administrative
agency played a part.4 0 The court, however, was clear that Burford
was an appropriate ground and the question was not one of regula-
tory law in any standard sense. 61 It was rather a question of
whether a statewide agency's decision prevailed over a village char-
ter.482 This in turn involved questions of state constitutional law and
statutory interpretation, but again no regulatory policy in any tradi-
454.' Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
455. Id.
456. 728 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1984).
457. Id. at 135 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 814 (1976)).
458. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976);
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989); see supra
notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
459. See West, 728 F.2d at 134.
460. The case involved an order of the Vermont Public Service Board. Id. at 133.
461. See id. at 135 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).
462. Id. at 134.
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tional sense of the term.4 3 The West court noted, among other
things, its view that abstention is often justified where there are un-
clear issues of state organic law.4 " The court made no attempt to
force West into the set of regulatory cases."65
These and other cases similar to them suggest that the difficulty
in distinguishing meaningfully between the perils of intervention
into agency affairs and into sensitive policy-making by courts has
created pressures on the original Burford doctrine. The courts just
described have responded to such pressures by eliminating the re-
quirement of an administrative element or by diluting it almost out
of existence. The recent tentative statements by the Court in Anken-
brandt v. Richards466 may indicate movement toward this view,
which expands Burford abstention, or it may just be one more in a
series of confusing statements by the Court on abstention. On the
former reading, Ankenbrandt permits Burford-Thibodaux style def-
erence not just to state court proceedings involving administrative
agencies or to state court proceedings involving eminent domain, but
to any case in which the federal court is asked to make sensitive and
uncertain decisions of policy better made by the state judiciary.
This approach .seriously erodes the Erie-Meredith doctrine, by
virtue of the great discretion it would place in district courts to de-
termine sensitivity and lack of clarity of state law. It seems difficult
for the Court to develop clear guidelines as to what combination of
sensitivity and lack of clarity warrant abstention. Despite this prob-
lem it would be worthwhile to experiment with allowing federal dis-
trict courts to exercise much greater discretion, particularly in di-
versity cases, to decline jurisdiction because of the presence of
uncertain and very important issues of state policy. The Supreme
Court could monitor the experiment, adjusting the doctrine if fed-
eral district courts grossly abuse it in order to lighten their
caseloads. As discussed at length later in this Article, such broaden-
463. Id.
464. Id. at 135.
465. Id.; see also Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1193-95 (1st Cir. 1979)
(holding that Burford-Thibodaux abstention was necessary to allow the state courts to address
difficult policy questions concerning the state's statutorily created system of providing low cost
medical insurance).
466. 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992) (stating in dictum that it is "not inconceivable" that Bur-
ford could apply to require federal court deference to state determinations of "elements of a do-
mestic relationship" presumably yet to be made in pending divorce, alimony, or custody proceed-
ings). The type of proceedings discussed in Ankenbrandt presumably would take place in state
court and not in a state agency. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ing of the scope of Burford makes sense, but only if the results of its
application can be softened by allowing a return to federal court as
under Pullman abstention.461 In Thibodaux itself, the Court ap-
proved a stay rather than a dismissal of the trial court's proceed-
ings, 4 8 and, more recently, Ankenbrandt v. Richards suggests that
a Pullman approach may now be authorized in at least some Bur-
ford cases. '69
With respect to diversity cases, this approach is less drastic than
abolition of that variety of federal jurisdiction, an approach which
has been urged by many. 70 With respect to federal question cases,
the Burford doctrine already takes federal rights into account by
requiring greater justification in such cases.
2. A Conventional Perspective in Which Judicial Law-Making in
Statutory Interpretation Is Denied or Downplayed
Despite the possible encouragement offered by Ankenbrandt, I
doubt that the arguments made above will prevail any time soon.
For one thing, the New Orleans Court's statements limiting Burford
abstention to cases involving agencies seem more carefully consid-
ered. For another, there has been what one distinguished legal
scholar describes as a "recrudescence of formalism" on the Court.471
For example, Justice Scalia has said such striking things as
"[aidjudication deals with what the law was; rulemaking deals with
what the law will be."14 71 In the administrative sphere, this seems a
repudiation of the. foundational holding of SEC v. Chenery Corp.,4 73
that an administrative agency can make law in the process of adju-
dicating a case. 74 The Supreme Court as a whole continues to dis-
parage judicial law-making,7 5 and a recent case dealing with deter-
467. See infra notes 582-602 and accompanying text.
468. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 25-26, 30-31 (1959).
469. See Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2216 n.8 ("Moreover, should Burford abstention be rele-
vant in other circumstances, it may be appropriate for the court to retain jurisdiction to insure
prompt and just disposition of the matter upon the determination by the state court of the relevant
issue.").
470. See infra note 602 and accompanying text.
471. POSNER, supra note 428, at 21 n.3.
472. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 221 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). The
discussion is of administrative adjudication versus administrative rulemaking, but the point seems
the same. Id.
473. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
474. Id. at 202-03.
475. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 304 (1989) ("ITlhe Court's assertion of power to
disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full course of
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minations of state law under Erie indicates the movement back
toward a more mechanical view of judging, at least in that context:
"The very essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases of state law
are presumed to be communicable by the parties to a federal judge
no less than to a state judge."47
For these reasons, in what follows I assume that the arguments
made in the previous section are not the current Court's view. If I
am correct, then Thibodaux abstention, if it still exists, is a very
limited doctrine and Burford abstention applies only when a federal
court is asked to determine the meaning of some state law whose
development is entrusted to an administrative agency. Can this view
be justified based on unique characteristics of administrative law?
Under assumptions that law is generally discoverable by courts,
are administrative cases really different? Can we justify treating the
legal standards, applied in dealing with state administrative action,
as different from the usual questions of state law governed by the
Erie-Meredith doctrine? As I made clear in Section VI.B.1 above, I
do not believe that such a distinction is fully satisfactory. Still, I
conclude that such a distinction is not wholly irrational. Its plausi-
bility rests largely on the arguably peculiar nature of "scope of re-
view" law applied by a court reviewing decisions of administrative
agencies.
a. Federal court interpretations of state agency action not chal-
lenged as unlawful: primary jurisdiction
Sometimes a lawsuit within the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts will raise issues as to the meaning of state regulatory law
superintended by an agency, although there is no challenge to any
action taken by the agency. If the issue is whether the state agency
itself should be accorded a first opportunity to interpret some law
within its area of special responsibility, the issue is one of "primary
jurisdiction" as discussed in detail above.477
b. Federal court "review" of state agency action
But if the issue is whether the federal court should defer in favor
appellate review is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudi-
cation but in effect of legislation." (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)).
476. Salve Regina College v. Russell, Ill S. Ct. 1217, 1225 (1991).
477. See supra part V.C; supra notes 312-13, 387-401, and accompanying text.
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of a state court proceeding in which the state administrative action
will be reviewed, the matter has a different cast. Above we have
seen that Burford itself was a review pattern case. We have also
seen that while many such suits today are excluded from federal
jurisdiction by other doctrines, some will survive these pitfalls for
consideration under Burford. From a conventional perspective, does
a state law challenge to completed state agency action implicate the
concerns of Burford?
On the surface, at least, it would seem that after the state agency
has acted, the issues confronting a court would be conventional is-
sues of pure law, pure fact, and so-called mixed questions of law
and fact. Normally the fact that questions of this sort are difficult to
determine does not warrant abstention under the Erie-Meredith
doctrine. When such issues are controlling in a diversity suit or, less
typically, in a federal question suit, the federal court is required to
exercise jurisdiction, doing its best to anticipate the probable dispo-
sition of such state law issues in the state court system.
Burford is rather easy to justify in its original circumstances
where the state court which would hear the matter is an expert
court and viewed as part of the policy-making process.4 8 Under
such circumstances, the state court can be viewed as a higher level
of the agency whose potential remedy must be exhausted. Suppose,
however, that judicial review of an agency's action occurs in regular
state courts which cannot be classified as specialists in the agency's
regulatory scheme. Is there some justification for deferring to a reg-
ular state court's determination of questions of law, of fact, and of
so-called mixed questions under these circumstances? I believe that
there may be such justification, even from the conventional perspec-
tive of Burford's time, which saw courts as having very limited law-
making power. There is at least an argument to be made against
federal court review of state administrative action on the ground
that it involves issues of law unsuited to federal court guessing
under Erie.
i. Review of administrative action in general 79
Justice (then Professor) Scalia once said that much of the mate-
478. This seems to have been at least part of the rationale of the original Burford case itself.
See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
479. In these review pattern cases, either a federal or a state cause of action is asserted in
federal court under diversity or federal question jurisdiction. In other words, these are lawsuits in
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rial dealing with scope of review in an administrative law course
"could have been purloined from a long-vanished course called 'Po-
etry in the Law,'" meaning that scope of review standards convey
mood more than precise meaning. 80 Indeed, his suggestion was that
scope of review is better explained by reading the cases (agency by
agency, context by context) rather than by any formula."81 In a sim-
ilar vein, Professor Schotland said: "Different judges approach ad-
ministrative review with perhaps even more variety than they ap-
proach other areas of law because administrative law is such a
varied bag, involving so many different aspects of attitude and
value." '482
These views suggest the possibility that the state law which deter-
mines the scope of judicial review of administrative action is justifia-
bly seen as different from other state law under Erie-Meredith. In
such state law standard of review cases, the plausibility of the pre-
mise that state law is tolerably replicable by the federal courts may
have met its limits. Below I deal individually with the variety of
issues review of agency action entails to see whether the standards
of review deserve to be treated as ineffable.
ii. Pure issues of law
In this subsection, I assume that the basis on which abstention is
urged is the federal court's need to decide an unclear state law is-
sue, which can be characterized as a pure issue of law. By "pure
which the legitimacy of state administrative action is at issue in a judicial case or controversy.
Contrast cases where the very proceeding sought to be brought or removed to federal court is itself
seen as an administrative proceeding not appropriate for the federal courts. See BATOR ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 839 n.1.
Below, I explore a possibly reasoned basis for a reluctance to permit federal trials in which the
state law validity of state administrative action will be determined. The argument is that state
scope of review law is insufficiently determinate to support the traditional Erie-Meredith require-
ment that federal courts ascertain and apply state law. Contrast, with this at least plausible view,
a more formalistic position that a federal court cannot hear what might be characterized as an
appeal from a state administrative decision. From time to time, the Court has taken this position
despite the fact that the issues involved can also be cast quite comfortably in the form of a stan-
dard nisi prius proceeding. See. e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
This, however, is an indefensible rationale (or absence of rationale) only erratically endorsed by
the Court. Id. at 586, 583-86 (Black, J., and Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Madisonville Traction
Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905).
480. Antonin Scalia, Chairman's Message, Support Your Local Professor of Administrative
Law, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. No. 2 , at v, vii (1982).
481. Id. at vii.
482. Roy A. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action - Remarks Before the
D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 34 FED. BJ 54, 59 (1975).
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issue" I mean one the resolution of which has. reasonably clear and
strong implications for the decision of future cases.483 In this discus-
sion, pure issues are distinguished from so-called mixed questions of
law and fact. An example of a pure issue of law is whether tomatoes
are fruit within the meaning of a federal statute putting limits on
the importation of fruit.484 A decision on that issue has clear, pre-
sent implications for a large number of cases not currently before
the tribunal. An example of a mixed question of law and fact is
whether a complicated fact pattern, unlikely to be replicated ex-
actly, constitutes negligence. The answer to that question has un-
clear and weak implications for the decision of future cases."85
Attempting to anticipate a state court's reaction to a state
agency's generalized interpretation of a state statute may be a more
difficult matter than the usual guess required under Erie-Meredith.
In a case which does not involve an agency, there is a need for a
guess only about how a state court will react to ordinary state legal
materials (e.g., a statute or case law). Under the premises of the
Erie-Meredith doctrine, federal courts should be able to make such
a guess acceptably well. In the case involving review of an agency's
decision, however, the federal court must also deploy the difficult
body of state policy dealing with deference to agency interpretations
of regulatory statutes.
A state's policy of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation
of a statute it administers is unlikely to be set clearly by one guide-
line decision. Indeed, that policy may remain enigmatic even after a
series of decisions elaborating the formula. The federal experience is
illustrative. In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,48 6 the Supreme Court recast the theory of agency in-
terpretation of statutory terms. Its current view is that ambiguous
phrases in agency enabling acts generally should be seen as delega-
tions by Congress to the agency involved to make law - to impart
483. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM, L. REV. 229, 235-36 (1985).
484. A less readily intelligible but real world example of a pure issue of law is whether Con-
gress intended the words "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42
U.S.C. § 7502 (b)(6) (1988) to include only individual pollution-emitting devices or whether a
whole industrial plant having many such devices could be treated as a single source. This was the
issue confronting the Environmental Protection Agency, the lower federal courts, and the Supreme
Court in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 849 n.22
(1984).
485. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8-10 (1990); Monaghan, supra note 483, at 235-36,
486. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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meaning to those words within the rather loose limits of "reason. ' 487
There has been great disagreement among judges and scholars
about how Chevron is to be interpreted. 88 For example, it might be
seen as applying only to middle level technical questions and not at
all to issues of jurisdiction, of fundamental policy, or to those with
constitutional implications.4 89
Even under pre-Chevron federal law, it was difficult to predict
whether a federal court would disagree with a federal agency's in-
terpretation of its statutory mandate. The degree of deference due a
federal agency's interpretation of its enabling act was difficult to pin
down. Louis L. Jaffe, the most sophisticated modern commentator
on judicial review of agency action, thought that the most accurate
description was that each judge must simply determine if he believes
the agency clearly wrong. "90 Jaffe added five factors to help deter-
mine close cases. 9' Even with the guidance of these factors, the de-
cision of scope of review cases remained hard to predict.
Some states, in effect, have adopted a Chevron-style approach.
Other state systems for judicial review of agency action resemble
the federal system in existence before Chevron. Even as far back as
the Burford era, great deference was accorded agency interpreta-
tions of statutes on the basis of expertise, although the deference
was not always explicitly justified on grounds of presumptive delega-
487. See id. at 842-45.
488. For two very different judicial views of the meaning of Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, see the
majority opinion in Chevron and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 453-54 (1987).- For a variety of scholarly views as to the meaning of Chevron, see
Symposium, Judicial Tolerance of Statutory Misinterpretation: Are Agencies Right When They
Are Wrong?, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 243 (1988); Anthony, supra note 485; Robert A. Anthony, Which
Interpretations Should Get Judicial Deference? A Preliminary Inquiry, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 121
(1988); Eric M. Braun, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. v.
NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986 (1987); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Inter-
pretations of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Denise W.
DeFranco, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829 (1990);
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State. 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Panel, Kenneth W. Starr et al., Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353 (1988); Abner J. Mikva, How
Should Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV, 1 (1986); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provi-
sions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988).
489. Breyer, supra note 488, at 381; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 469 (1987).
490. JAFFE, supra note 181, at 575-76.
491. Id.
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tion.4 92 Today the states offer a wide variety of approaches:4 93
First there are those states that give extreme deference to agency actions.
The states in this category seem to have adopted, either explicitly or implic-
itly, a straight reading of Chevron, and afford great weight to agency deter-
minations. At the other end of the spectrum are those states that grant no
deference to agency action . . . . The third, and largest, group consists of
states that vary the level of deference to agency action with the type of
problem decided by the agency. A fourth group has no set rules as to the
scope of judicial review on questions of law. 4 "
The fifty states are entitled to reject Chevron, reviewing state
agency interpretations de novo, or, as they often seem to do, adopt
some doctrine of deference resembling Chevron in various ways. In
the end, even within one jurisdiction, the adoption of one position on
the continuum strikes a mood more than it provides a rule of deci-
sion communicable to other courts under Erie-Meredith. The ineffa-
bility of state views on scope of review makes it at least plausible to
view this troubling issue of statutory interpretation as sufficiently
different from the usual questions of state law facing district courts
to warrant abstention.
iii. Mixed questions of law and fact
There is understandable skepticism in the literature about the ac-
curacy of describing questions as mixed.4 95 Theoretically, the legal
and factual components of a mixed question can be disentangled.4 96
Despite this, there are good reasons for a court to defer greatly to
an agency's application of a statutory term to the highly specific
facts of a case. 97 In many such cases, the stakes are low since the
decision is confined to the meaning of a statute as applied to a situa-
492. See supra notes 193, 196, and accompanying text.
493. William A. McGrath et al., Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43
ADMIN. L. REv. 571, 763-73 (1991).
494. Id. at 763.
495. The device of characterizing a question as one of fact or as mixed permits a court to
pretend that it must affirm the administrative action if it is "supported by evidence" or is reasona-
ble. But if the question is analyzed and faced as one of law, the court cannot avoid its responsibil-
ity. JAFFE, supra note 181, at 547.
496. A. Martin Tollefson, Administrative Finality, 29 MicH. L. REV. 839, 843 (1931) (stating
generally the rules for courts to follow in deciding whether to review certain administrative deci-
sions); see also infra note 499 and accompanying text (noting especially the quotation).
497. Tollefson, supra note 496, at 843 (stating that the consequence of a different rule would
be to flood the courts with appeals to review decisions of the administrative bodies in every
instance).
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tion unlikely to be repeated. 8 I believe, however, that upon close
examination, review of this sort of administrative decision is ade-
quately covered by the analysis of review of pure issues of law dis-
cussed immediately above. As Tollefson states:
[T]he courts generally adhere to the rule that where there is a such a mixed
question [of law and fact] and the court can not so separate it as to show
clearly where the mistake of law is, the decision of the tribunal to which the
law has confided the matter is conclusive.49 9
Tollefson is right. Almost universally, when a reviewing court
overturns a determination which was presented as a mixed question
by the agency, the court identifies some generalized interpretation of
a statute that the agency has violated. Thus, in any case where a
federal court is asked to review a state agency's decision of a so-
called mixed question of law and fact, its doing so involves precisely
the problem discussed in the previous section. That is the problem of
determining whether the reviewing court can identify a pure issue of
law which requires reversing the agency's decision, given the factual
findings made by the latter.
If, however, Burford is viewed as extending beyond its original
circumstances to include cases I have termed primary jurisdiction
cases and perhaps some others involving no administrative agency at
all, then matters are different. In these cases, the federal court
would not be reviewing an agency decision but would be applying
state law as an original matter. State scope of review law is there-
fore not involved, and the difficulties involved in a federal court's
applying such law cannot serve as a justification for abstention. Jus-
tification for such a doctrine would have to be found in concern
about allowing a federal court itself originally to apply sensitive
state statutory standards to facts before them in ways which do not
always identify pure issues of law. Here a federal court's misappli-
cation of state standards could arguably warp the application of
state regulatory schemes in ways not apparent until the conclusion
of a long series of decisions. This seems to be a concern of the sort
addressed by Burford's second category, which applies in cases in-
volving no truly important legal issue, but where federal review in a
whole "series of cases" may disrupt "state efforts to establish a co-
herent policy. '500
498. Monaghan, supra note 483, at 235-36.
499. Tollefson, supra note 496, at 843 (footnote omitted).
500. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989).
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iv. Factual review
In the unusual situation in which the validity of state agency ac-
tion turns on the accuracy of determinations of pure fact, the fed-
eral courts seem capable of applying the greatly deferential review
accorded these determinations. Federal courts sitting in diversity are
constantly required to determine facts made relevant by state law,
and the federal standards for review of agency fact-finding resemble
the state standards.50 1
v. Arbitrary and capricious review
The New Orleans opinion suggests that cases in which federal
courts are asked to determine whether state agencies considered the
relevant factors are candidates for Burford abstention. 2 Indeed, it
is often said that a part of "arbitrary and capricious" review of
agency decisions is to make sure that the agency has considered
"the relevant factors. '0 3 I believe that statements such as these are
confusing, but correct, at least if properly clarified.
Assume that a particular statute either requires or prohibits an
agency's consideration of certain factors, specific to that statutory
scheme, in the process of reaching its decision. For example, a stat-
ute might require that the agency balance cost against safety, re-
quiring consideration of both "factors." Or it might require that a
degree of safety be achieved regardless of cost, thereby making cost
a prohibited "factor." An agency that ignores such a statutory com-
mand violates state statutory law, which is a sufficient reason for
overturning the action without resort to any separate doctrine.
There simply is no need to invent an arbitrary and capricious doc-
trine to condemn an agency decision which violates a statute as in-
terpreted by a court. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
lists an agency's exceeding its statutory mandate and its acting in
an arbitrary and capricious way as two separate defects of agency
action amenable to remedy by judicial review.50 4 Consequently, I
believe that if arbitrary and capricious relevant factors review adds
anything to a reviewing court's arsenal, it must authorize something
501. McGrath et al., supra note 493, at 749.
502. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989)
(Scalia, J.).
503. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
504. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (C) (1988).
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quite different from standard scrutiny for action which is ultra vires
an agency's enabling act. I believe that the factors referred to in
arbitrary and capricious analysis are factors of practical reasoning
and not direct statutory requirements.
For example, in the well-known air bag case, Motor Vehicle Man-
ufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,5 5 the Court overturned an agency's decision on the grounds
that certain factors were not explored.50 6 The problem was not that
the agency had misunderstood the general factors that its enabling
act required it to explore, which I will call "statutory factors." The
error, rather, was that, given the agency's correct view of those stat-
utory factors, it had ignored "factors" of another sort. These were
factors of practical reasoning which the Court expected any solid
analyst to explore in determining whether a result was warranted by
the statutory factors in light of the -factual record. 7
In State Farm, the agency had reasoned that a rule requiring au-
tomatic but detachable seat belts was properly rejected because the
safety cost-benefit standard required by the specific statute it ad-
ministered was not met.508 In so concluding, the agency had genera-
lized from data concerning how seldom those with standard seat
belts used them.509 The Court reversed the agency's decision, con-
cluding that the agency must consider the "human nature" factor it
called inertia (i.e., that those who failed to buckle up might also fail
to detach an automatic belt).5 10 One can hardly say that this factor
was contemplated by Congress when it wrote the National Highway
and Safety Transportation Act.511 Instead, the problem was the fail-
ure of the agency adequately to explore and reason through the ap-
propriate application of the statutory goals to a particular problem
and the materials relevant to its resolution.
An arguable gap in reasoning that one court finds egregious, an-
other may find forgivable, if defective at all. Bringing this analysis
back to Burford, it seems difficult for a federal court to predict how
a particular state court would deal with reasoning of the sort
presented in State Farm. Apparently, "[piresent state judicial for-
505. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
506. Id. at 46-51.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 38-39.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 54.
511. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
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mulations of the scope of review for agency policy decisions [under
the arbitrary and capricious test] reflect the incoherence and diver-
gence of federal case law." 512 The determination of arbitrariness
and capriciousness of this sort simply may not be the kind of conclu-
sion of state law found tolerably predictable under Erie-Meredith.
3. Summary
For the reasons discussed above, I believe that Burford abstention
can be reconciled at least respectably even with a traditional view of
the Erie-Meredith doctrine. Any case involving judicial review of a
pure issue of law or a mixed question decided by a state agency
involves state scope of review law which may not be tolerably deter-
minable by a federal court. Arbitrary and capricious review of a
state agency's reasoning about a complex problem is even more diffi-
cult to reduce to a formula.
VII. FURTHER DIFFICULTIES WITH BURFOR. THE Two
PROBLEMATIC NEW ORLEANS CATEGORIES
The New Orleans Court identified two species of what it called
Burford abstention:
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court
sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of
state administrative agencies:
(1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result in the case then at bar"; or
(2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a case
and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern."'1
13
The highly abstract language of this formula makes it difficult to
understand. As a result, this Article first explored other aspects of
Burford in an attempt to provide as much concrete context as
possible.
What follows is an attempt to determine the probable meaning of
each of the two categories and to explore difficulties with the picture
512. McGrath et al., supra note 493, at 778; see also id. at 773-87 (discussing review of ad-
ministrative agencies' policy decisions in both federal and state court contexts).
513. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (cit-
ing and quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976)).
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that emerges. Below, we see that the first category is intended to
resemble the form of abstention approved in the Thibodaux case. " 4
It is concerned with the possibility that a federal court will make an
error as to an especially sensitive. or important issue of state law.
My analysis of this category is not dependent upon which way one
resolves the matter debated in the previous section, rather it is writ-
ten to apply whether or not Burford abstention is limited to cases
involving state administrative agencies.
The second category is intended to deal with cases resembling the
Burford case itself. There is a significant question as to how it intel-
ligibly and justifiably differs from the first category. These problems
are discussed below. To the extent this category is intelligibly sepa-
rate, it is concerned not with avoiding any single important federal
misinterpretation of state law, but rather with the cumulative warp-
ing effect of a series of smaller scale errors on an important state
regulatory scheme. This category and my discussion of it more natu-
rally apply to cases involving state agencies, but conceivably they
could cover regulatory schemes superintended only by specialized
courts.
A. Category One: "Difficult Questions of State Law Bearing on
Policy Problems of Substantial Public Import Whose Importance
Transcends the Result in the Case Then at Bar . . .
The New Orleans formula is taken nearly verbatim from a
formula for Burford abstention offered by the majority opinion in
Colorado River.51 In that opinion, the Court referred to Thibodaux
as the case exemplifying this first of two Burford categories. 17 In
Thibodaux, the Supreme Court permitted a federal district judge to
abstain in an eminent domain proceeding on the ground that unclear
and sensitive issues of state law had to be resolved in order to decide
the case.5"8 As a consequence of this reference to Thibodaux, the
first Burford category seems almost certainly designed to cover
cases resembling Thibodaux." 9 In short, Burford abstention in this
514. See supra part I.E (discussing Thibodaux).
515. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361.
516. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
517. Id.
518. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959).
519. It was after presentation of the precursor of this formula that the Court in Colorado River
cited Thibodaux. See Colorado River. 424 U.S. at 814. But, after the recent New Orleans case,
this category most likely has narrowed to cover only those Thibodaux-style cases which arise out
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first category is concerned with the possibility that a federal court
will make an error regarding a particularly important issue of state
law.
What does the "substantial public import" portion of the formula
mean? Both lower courts520 and the Supreme Court occasionally
have described an issue warranting Burford abstention as "local" in
nature.52' Some of the issues so described have involved insurance
regulation522 and zoning.523 Perhaps the word "public" in "substan-
tial public import" is simply intended as a synonym of "local" as it
appeared in earlier statements of the Burford doctrine.
There are difficulties with interpreting "substantial public im-
port" as "local" if it means that, apart from its importance, an issue
must have some peculiarly local essence in order for it to warrant
Burford abstention. Any attempt to classify some -matters as truly
local in ways that insulate them from federal judicial review seems
less than promising. Analogous efforts at creating enclaves of state
power proved unworkable. These were the failed attempts to define
certain substantive area matters as so local or so essential to state
governance as to be insulated from federal legislation under the
Commerce Clause.52 4 State laws are always local in the sense that
of a state administrative processes. See supra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
520. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
521. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951).
522. See, e.g., Martin Ins. Agency v. Prudential Reins. Co., 910 F.2d 249, 254-55 (5th Cir.
1990); Grimes v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 699, 703-04 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1096 (1989); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d
1033 (3d Cir. 1988); Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988); Law Enforce-
ment Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1077 (1987);
Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1980).
523. See, e.g., Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1987); Glen-Gery
Corp. v. Lower Heidelberg Township, 608 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-08 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
524. Any attempt to classify some matters as truly local in ways that insulate them from fed-
eral judicial review seems suspect for reasons analogous to those which doomed similar attempts
to recognize local'enclaves under the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend X ("The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively or to the people."). In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), the Supreme Court interpreted the Tenth Amendment to create enclaves of state
governmental activities so central to a state's functioning as a state as to be immune from federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 840-52. Nine years later, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), overruled National League. Apparently post-
National League cases convinced the Garcia Court that it was impossible to develop a satisfactory
definition of what is and is not of sufficiently local essence to warrant protection. Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 537-47. This conclusion was facilitated by the availability of another means through which the
states could protect their prerogatives, specifically their representation in the political processes.
Id. at 556.
Certainly there may be differences between Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and judicial fed-
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they are produced by law-making organs of state government,
rather than those of the federal government. When such laws are at
issue in a federal question or diversity suit it is hard to claim that
one is more local than another. There is no intelligible essence of
"localness" for purposes of insulation from federal jurisdiction
under Article III.
Perhaps the absence of the word local in the New Orleans formu-
lation 2 5 signals an awareness of the difficulties described above.
Even so, Burford abstention, both as practiced and as defined by the
Supreme Court, apparently continues to require the recognition of
something resembling state enclaves from federal judicial power.
Most naturally, the first portion of the New Orleans formulation
applying to cases in which difficult questions of substantial public
import transcend the result in the case at bar - identifies cases in
which the importance of the issue to a state outstrips a party's and
eralism. The Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence seems to be based on its view of require-
ments of that amendment itself. Most varieties of judicial federalism discussed in this Article,
(i.e., the abstention doctrines) are prudential doctrines created and often adjusted by the Court
without need to overrule statutory or constitutional interpretation. But there are similarities as
well. One could see Burford abstention as unworkable and unnecessary in ways similar to the
regime under National League of Cities. First, Burford jurisprudence, which often plucks zoning
and insurance regulation out of a myriad of state interests equally worthy of protection, see supra
notes 243-44 and accompanying text, seems to see bright lines where there are none, as did the
now defunct Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. As with the Tenth Amendment, the states have
power here too, by way of congressional representation, to legislate Burford abstention, using
Congress's great powers to limit the jurisdiction of federal trial courts. See supra note 2 (discuss-
ing Congress's powers over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts). Post-Garcia Supreme
Court cases suggest a slight pendulum swing back toward National League's concern with protec-
tion of the state but recognize, nothing resembling enclaves defined in terms of federally untoucha-
ble areas of regulation. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2453-57 (1992) (holding
that the provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, requiring states to accept own-
ership of "waste" or to regulate in accordance with congressional instructions, is inconsistent with
the restriction on congressional power embodied in the Tenth Amendment); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
Ill S. Ct. 2395, 2402-03 (1991) (recognizing a presumption that federal legislation does not
intend to intrude on essential political functions and requiring a plain statement in order for Con-
gress to effect such a purpose). It seems likely, but not entirely clear, that Supreme Court appoint-
ments by President Clinton, at a minimum, will arrest any further swing of the pendulum back
toward the National League approach.
Pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence also presents a failed attempt to define substan-
tive categories free from regulation under the Commerce Clause. This line of cases prohibited
Congress from regulating mining, manufacturing, and horticulture among others on the theory
that they possessed a "local" essence no matter how much they affected interstate commerce. See,
e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895). This approach was rejected during
the New Deal. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1937).
525. While the word local appears in the Court's opinion, it does not appear in the formula
defining the doctrine. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361-62. In context, the use of the word local
seems to suggest concern with federal court difficulties in understanding complex and regionally
diverse regulatory systems and not mystical concerns with inviolable state sovereignty.
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the federal government's interests in the availability of a federal fo-
rum. Such an interpretation of New Orleans avoids resort ,to some
supposed transcendent principles defining "local." But it has the
substantial, though different, disadvantages of involving the federal
courts in assigning weights to a hierarchy of state interests in turn
to be weighed against the harm caused by loss of a federal forum.526
Burford jurisprudence, which often plucks insurance regulation and
zoning527 from a myriad of state interests, seems to have implicitly
recognized such a hierarchy but not to have explained the choices
made.
However difficult it is to draw these lines in a satisfying way, Bur-
ford abstention is not unique in its dependence on the recognition of
a hierarchy of state interests. The Court supervises the development
of a vaguely similar hierarchy under the Younger abstention doc-
trine.528 In the Younger line of cases, the Court first decided that
state criminal processes were central to state sovereignty and thus
exempt from federal judicial interference.52 9 Next, the Court de-
cided that "important" civil judicial proceedings brought by the
state likewise should be exempt.530 This, of course, requires the de-
velopment of a hierarchy of importance of state interests.5"'
Burford, like Younger, requires the Court to weigh the state in-
terest against the "result in the case then at bar. ' 532 I take this
passage to mean a weighing of the state's interest against the impor-
tance of the assertion of a federal right in the federal forum which
Congress has opened for its vindication. I have great concern that
such a weighing process can never be more systematic than a listing
of intuitive reactions to cases.
Assuming, however, that the difficulties of such an intuitive sort-
526. See Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988).
527. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
528. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971); infra notes 529-31 (citing cases
therein).
529. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45.
530. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1977) (holding that the principles of Younger (i.e.,
federalism and comity) are not confined to the type of action involved in that case (criminal
prosecution) but also apply to sufficiently important civil actions such as the state's civil contempt
processes).
531. For a case holding a state interest insufficiently important to warrant Younger abstention,
see First Alabama Bank v. Parsons Steel Inc., 825 F.2d 1475, 1482-83 (11th Cir. 1987).
532. More precisely, Burford as reformulated in New Orleans requires this. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (concluding that federal court
abstention is proper where the importance of implicated state policy issues "transcend[sl the re-
sult in the case at bar").
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ing are not insuperable, there are other problems. Burford requires
an even larger and more difficult undertaking than the sorting under
Younger. The weighing process under Younger promises to be more
confined.
This is true because Younger abstention is designed to protect
only the most potent state interests as the court weighs them. I say
this because the applicability of Younger is defined, and hence lim-
ited, by the type of proceeding (adjudication brought by the state)
and its importance to the state. 3 The clarity of state law involved
in the proceeding is not a factor. By contrast, Burford abstention is
not so limited. Read as a Thibodaux-style abstention 3 " applying to
cases involving unclear and important issues of state law, Burford's
first category is broader than Younger in one way. It covers the set
of cases presenting state law issues as to which a federal court mis-
take might be unacceptably harmful.
This feature not only demonstrates the greater potential breadth
of Burford, but also shows the difficulty of the calculus required to
determine its applicability to any particular case. Under Burford, a
determination of a state's interest requires some multiplication of
the importance of an issue by the risk that a federal court will re-
solve it incorrectly. Only once this is done, however intuitively, will
the product of that multiplication be weighed against various inter-
ests in the availability of a federal forum. Within its already more
limited domain of state judicial proceedings, Younger analysis is ad-
ditionally freed from consideration of any risk of mistake. This is
true because, under Younger, lack of clarity of state law is virtually
irrelevant to the decision to abstain. 535
As I have interpreted it, the almost frighteningly abstract formula
defining the first Burford category offers lower courts little guidance
in meeting the wide variety of highly particularized cases they will
confront. Still, I leave this first category not with the view that I
have proven it unworkable or even unwise. I leave it, rather, with
the conviction that the decision to abstain under the first category
will often be based on the reaction of a federal trial judge to a
highly particularized situation, not readily amenable to appellate re-
533. See supra notes 528-31 and accompan;ing text.
534. In Thibodaux, it was the combination of the lack of clarity and the public importance of
an issue which justified abstention. See supra part I.E.
535. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (citing federalism and comity as the reasons
underlying the Younger abstention doctrine).
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view. In the conclusion to this Article, I suggest that the Supreme
Court monitor the case law produced by this formula, adjusting it to
achieve the desired results.53 6
B. Category Two. "Federal Review of the Question in a Case
and in Similar Cases Would Be Disruptive of State Efforts to
Establish a Coherent Policy with Respect to a Matter of
Substantial Public Concern."53
7
The second category of Burford abstention recognized in New Or-
leans is intended to reflect the original doctrine as embodied in Bur-
ford itself and in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
Railway Co.5"8 The recent New Orleans Court's formula for this
category of Burford abstention, quoted immediately above, is almost
a word-for-word version of one appearing in the earlier Colorado
River opinion.539 After presenting the formula, the Colorado River
Court stated:
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co. for example, the Court held that a suit seeking
review of the reasonableness under Texas state law of a state commission's
permit to drill oil wells should have been dismissed by the District Court.
The reasonableness of the permit in that case was not of transcendent im-
portance, but review of reasonableness by the federal courts in that and fu-
ture cases, where the system had established its own elaborate review sys-
tem for dealing with the geographical complexities of oil and gas fields,
would have had an impermissibly disruptive effect on state policy for the
management of those fields.5"0
In this passage, the New Orleans Court makes it clear that the
particular agency determination in Burford itself was not of tran-
scendent importance, 541 hence the appropriateness of second, rather
than first, category treatment.
If the first category does not draw bright lines, at least the nature
of the lines it intends to draw is intelligible: some issues of state law
are both so unclear and so important to a state's interests as to
render federal court's guessing about them unacceptable. The sec-
ond category not onlypresents difficulties similar to those of the first
536. See infra p. 981.
537. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989).
538. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
539. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15
(1976).
540. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
541. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 360.
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(e.g., the problem of determining the relative importance of state
regulatory efforts), but the resemblance leads to a more fundamen-
tal difficulty: Is the second category intelligibly distinct? It is simply
not clear what sorts of cases the Court intends to cover by this cate-
gory which are not adequately covered by the first.
Certainly if a federal court mistake as to a pure issue of law (e.g.,
a fundamental misconstruction of a state agency's enabling act)
threatens to disrupt an important state regulatory scheme, then the
New Orleans test is met. But such circumstances can be dealt with
just as easily under category one of the formula as under category
two. Presumably such a mistake of law is of transcendent impor-
tance precisely because of the importance of the regulatory scheme
it threatens to disrupt.
The second category is described as covering cases in which "fed-
eral review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be
disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect
to a matter of substantial public concern." This suggests that the
concern is with the harm caused, not by a federal court mistake as
to a single "transcendent" issue of state law, but rather by the cu-
mulative disruptive effect of a series of possibly erroneous federal
decisions. It is worth thinking carefully about how a series of federal
decisions might disrupt state efforts to "establish a coherent policy."
It will be useful to distinguish between establishing and realizing
a policy. No single federal decision, nor series of such decisions, can
stop a state from establishing a policy, if the latter is within the
domain left to the states by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Erie guarantees the states that much. While a decision or
series of federal decisions as to state law may be wrong, the states
are free to refuse to follow them and, in doing so, clarify state policy
in ways that are binding on the federal courts.
There is, however, a way in which federal decisions might be seen
as "frustrating" state attempts to form policy: by depriving the
states of a case or a series of cases to be used as vehicles for the
determination and declaration of policy. This analysis seems con-
vincing, however, only if federal court cases hearing state contract
and tort law claims could be likewise described as frustrating state
policy formation. These too deprive state courts of the opportunity
to elaborate policy. Erie-Meredith, however, clearly forbids absten-
tion in such common law cases on the basis of unclear law alone. It
seems, then, that loss of decision-opportunities can hardly be the ba-
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sis for a category of Burford abstention.
Additionally, one could argue that part of state regulatory policy
is the equal treatment of regulated interests under state law, and
that federal mistakes disrupt that equality. Consider, for example,
an implicit county policy that all similarly situated welfare recipi-
ents should receive the same treatment from a county agency pro-
viding funds to the poor. One could argue that federal court mis-
takes might result in inequality of treatment between those seeking
state court review of an agency eligibility decision and those bring-
ing federal suits raising comparable issues. This, however, would be
insufficient to justify abstention. Arguments similar to those made
against a decision-opportunity rationale for Burford also indicate
that the equal treatment rationale does not suffice to ground that
variety of abstention. The equality of treatment argument could be
made for victims of federal court misconstruction of state contract
and tort law. Presumably the state would desire that those similarly
situated in tort litigation receive equal treatment, but under Erie-
Meredith that has never sufficed to oust diversity jurisdiction. Some-
thing more must be required to distinguish category two cases from
the usual contracts or tort case in which the possibility of inequality
must be tolerated under the rule of Erie-Meredith.
Perhaps what the New Orleans Court meant to deal with is not
state policy formation, but rather the realization of state policies
going beyond those aiming at equal justice to individual litigants. If
there is a state public interest going beyond those interests, it could
suffice. City planning provides the clearest example in which a state
is concerned, not just about justice or equal justice to individual liti-
gants, but also about the overall pattern of development which
emerges. Individual decisions are not only significant in themselves.
Each building permit decision is like a move in an elaborate game of
tic-tac-toe, blocking off space and constraining future development.
The focus here is not on the making of policy, but on the effects of
real world decisions on its realization. I will call regulatory schemes
of this sort "developmental regulatory schemes." Certain sorts of
familiar regulatory schemes may be developmental, depending on
what animates them. The pattern is hardly limited to zoning. A
state may care about the structure of an industry, wanting the right
combination of banks or insurance companies to offer the public the
right array of features. Missteps caused by federal court mistakes of
state law can make it difficult to achieve a desirable pattern. On the
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other hand, any conventional state welfare scheme is not "develop-
mental" in my sense.
Burford itself may have been developmental, if what was at stake
was plausibly the state's power to control the overall pattern of pro-
duction of an oil field as opposed to simply a fair allocation among
individual claimants. A portion of such control is lost with each er-
roneous decision and, as a result, future decisions have a different
meaning in the context shaped by earlier ones. Except on such a
rationale, the Burford decision itself and category two, which it is
meant to exemplify, are hard to justify.
Assuming that the second category is aimed at avoiding the dis-
ruption of developmental regulation, then in each case, two sorts of
issues will govern the applicability of the second category. First, is
the regulatory program sufficiently important to warrant absten-
tion? Second, is it threatened with a sufficiently serious possibility of
the sort of disruption I have identified above as developmental?
Like the problems discussed in the preceding section, which are
created by the need to determine what questions of law are of
"transcendent" importance, similar problems result from the
description of the second category: the need to determine which
state regulatory schemes are of substantial public importance and
which are not. It may be difficult for the federal courts to work out
a hierarchy of state regulatory schemes in terms of importance. I
will not offer my own way of determining a hierarchy of schemes,
except to suggest that encouraging honest input from individual
states as to the relative importance of their statutory schemes is de-
sirable, even in cases where the state is not a party. An authoritative
concession that a scheme is not important or is not threatened by a
particular federal lawsuit, should normally suffice to preclude Bur-
ford abstention. Short of that, statements by authoritative state or-
gans as to the relative importance of regulatory schemes should be
taken into consideration, however skeptically, by the federal courts.
For present purposes, I assume that, despite the difficulties in-
volved, the federal courts can determine, in some at least satisfac-
tory way, which state schemes meet the requirement of substantial
public importance.
The next issue is whether federal court intervention poses the suf-
ficient threat of disruption that Burford abstention seeks to avoid. If
the analysis earlier in this section is correct, the next question is
whether federal court "review in [this] case and, in similar cases"
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would disrupt "developmental" regulation. First, this requires a de-
termination of whether the portions of the regulatory scheme before
the court are "developmental" in the sense used above. Assuming
that this can be determined satisfactorily, the court must guess
about the aggregate disruptive effects of review in a group of cases,
many of which are hypothetical when the court decides whether to
abstain under Burford. More importantly, it requires a decision
about the degree of prophylactic generality to be used in defining a
category of similar cases.
There is a continuum of possible ways for a federal court to re-
solve these issues, defined by the degrees of generalization and prob-
ing a federal court should engage in to determine the risk of warp-
ing a regulatory scheme. Both ends of the continuum are absurd and
unsatisfactory. At the most deferential end, the remotest possibility
of mistake as to any portion of a developmental regulatory scheme
warrants abstention in all cases involving that scheme.
In a moment of exaggeration, Justice Frankfurter characterized
Burford as occupying this end of the continuum.542 Citing the Bur-
ford case decided eight years earlier, the Court in Alabama Public
Service abstained on the ground that a complex state regulatory
scheme was involved.543 Although Justice Frankfurter concurred in
the result, he objected to Burford abstention on the ground that
there was no risk of disruption to the state's regulatory scheme:
"[I]f [Burford] means anything beyond disposing of this particular
litigation it means that hereafter no federal court should entertain a
suit against any action of a State agency. 54 Pushed so improbably
to the wall, Burford would require abstention as to any decision
made by a state agency if its work was of substantial importance
and if some portion of its functioning might be disrupted in some
case, even if the case at bar could in no plausible way contribute to
the disruption.
At the other and least deferential end of the continuum, courts
would not presume disruption. They would need to make a careful
review of the state law portion of a case before them in order to
determine whether to abstain. Weeks of substantive work could re-
sult in a conclusion that the state regulatory materials were suffi-
542. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 362 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
and Jackson, J., concurring).
543. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. at 345-50.
544. Id. at 362 (Frankfurter, J., and Jackson, J., concurring).
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ciently unclear, thereby warranting abstention and rendering the
work largely wasted. In the real world of decided cases, this does
not seem to happen.
I believe that the Burford doctrine lies closer to, but not quite at,
the deferential end of the continuum. It allows a court to err on the
side of avoiding any real possibility of disruption through mistake of
state law. All of the Supreme Court cases that I have read discuss-
ing Burford abstention suggest that a federal judge need not delve
deeply into the workings of a state administrative scheme before ab-
staining. They suggest that the federal courts may, by looking at
surface characteristics, recognize categories of decisions under a
particular state administrative scheme where the risk of error as to
state law is too great to tolerate. Indeed, I know of no case in which
a federal court has made any sort of relatively deep inquiry into the
workings of an administrative scheme in order to make a guess
about the predictability of various agency determinations.
Still, it is possible that the proper disposition of some issues
within an otherwise confusing administrative scheme are so clear on
the surface that abstention is not warranted.545 By analogy, New
Orleans itself shows that deference is not always required. In cases
such as New Orleans, where state administrative action which is ap-
parently clear on its face is attacked on federal preemption grounds,
Burford abstention has been rejected at all levels of the federal
judiciary.546
Still some inquiry into the likelihood of federal court mistakes as
to state regulatory law must be required. As the Seventh Circuit
recently put it, "abstention in favor of pure speculation cannot be
what Burford had in mind. '54 7 Even outside the contexts of broad-
scale attacks made on preemption grounds, it seems possible that a
rule of order of a state administrative agency, running a program of
substantial public importance, might be sufficiently clear so that a
federal court should undertake to deal with it without awaiting fur-
ther elaboration'
545. After the Colorado River Court's description of Alabama Public Service and Burford
itself, the Court says that Colorado River does not fall within the "impermissibly disruptive"
category exemplified by them because "[w]hile state claims are involved in the case, the state law
to be applied appears to be settled." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 815 (1976).
546. See supra notes 245-47, 291-92, and accompanying text.
547. Property & Casualty Ins., Ltd. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 319, 326 (7th Cir.
1991).
19931
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
It is difficult to devise standards to specify: (1) what degree of
risk of what level of harm to an administrative process of what de-
gree of importance is unacceptable and (2) what degree of probing
is required by the district court to determine the risk of harm in a
particular case. Burford abstention has been and remains a murky
doctrine precisely because its appropriateness is not determined by
gross identifiable features of a case (as is often true in Younger ab-
stention) but by a formula whose terms can never be specified with
anything approaching real clarity. Perhaps the best that can be said
is that a federal court should not abstain under Burford if the
meaning of state agency action is clear beyond reasonable doubt on
the surface of state legal materials. 48
To return to Burford's oil well theme, if the agency denial of a
permit is based upon the application of an indisputably clear and
applicable regulatory mathematical formula (three wells to an acre)
to undisputed facts (one acre), Burford abstention should not block
a federal court challenge under some applicable federal law. This
proposed standard leaves room for dispute about what is clear be-
yond reasonable doubt in a particular context and as to what is a
sufficiently important regulatory scheme.
I believe that federal appellate courts ought to defer greatly to the
district courts' judgments of lack of clarity, reversing only if there is
a clear error of judgment as to whether state law is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. As for district courts' judgments as to which state
regulatory schemes are "developmental" and sufficiently important,
it may be possible for the federal appellate courts, over a period of
years, to provide guidelines which will limit district court discretion
to some degree. Again, I refer the reader to my conclusion sug-
gesting that the Court monitor the real world results of its
formula.54 9
VIII. SOME GENERAL THOUGHTS ON BURFORD AND FEDERALISM:
SHOULD BURFORD BE RETAINED, MODIFIED, OR ABANDONED?
Below, this Article considers the compatibility of the current Bur-
ford doctrine with the values immanent in the largely court-made
548. REDISH. supra note 7, at 246. Redish suggests that Burford should apply only if, among
other things, the federal court would be required to "immerse itself in the technicalities of the
state regulatory scheme." Id. He also would require that the subject matter be of significant con-
cern to the state and, in fact, detailed and complex. Id.
549. See infra p. 981.
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law of judicial federalism. The main focus is on federal question
cases. A second short section deals with diversity cases.
A. Federal Question Cases
This Article began with the observation that the critical features
of judicial federalism have been drawn not by Congress, but by the
Supreme Court.55 Whether in the form of interpretations of ex-
tremely malleable statutory language or in the form of relatively
freestanding federal common law, these major features, determining
whether federal claims will have a federal trial, have been*designed
by the Supreme Court. Much of this architecture has been put in
place during the years of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.55'
Sections 1331 and 1441 of the Federal Judicial Code are aimed at
determining the circumstances under which reliance on federal law
brings a case within the jurisdiction of federal trial courts.5"2 Sec-
tion 1331 states that the federal district courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over "cases arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties
of the United States,1 5 3 tracking the constitutional language which
brings such cases within the federal judicial power.554 Section 1441
permits a defendant to remove a case to federal court only if the
plaintiff might have brought the case there originally but chose in-
stead to file in state court.555
One significant feature of judicial federalism is the Supreme
550. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
551. The architecture metaphor comes from the last work of my former teacher, Paul Bator,
The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article 111, 65
IND. L.J. 223 (1990).
552. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1992) (federal question); id. § 1441 (1992) (actions removable gener-
ally). These are the general federal question jurisdiction statutes. There are others. For example,
in a small subset of cases, federal statutes make removal possible on the basis of a federal defense
alone. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442(3) (1988) (affording removal to federal court to federal officers
sued in state court for "acts done under color of his office or in the performance of his duties").
553. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1992). Section 1331 reads in full as follows: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." Id.
554. The Constitution states that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ....
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
555. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1992). Section 1441 states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
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Court's interpretation of Section 1331 federal question jurisdiction
to cover only those cases where the plaintiff raises a federal issue
central to her cause of action. 556 As a result, a segment of those who
wish to assert federal rights in federal court - defendants with fed-
eral defenses to state lawsuits pending against them in state court
- cannot do so.557
While it can be argued that this result is compelled by statutory
language, there is no doubt that other significant doctrines of judi-
cial federalism have little or no basis in statutory law. 8  Current
rules governing the availability of federal habeas corpus relief
against state criminal conviction are based loosely, if at all, upon the
federal habeas corpus statute and largely represent the Court's com-
promise of what it sees as the interests of the state on the one hand
and, on the other, the interests of the federal sovereign and the
habeas petitioner. 559
556. The general proposition is that the assertion of a federal defense is not sufficient to ground
federal trial jurisdiction under §§ 1331 and 1441. The plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint must
depend upon a federal issue of law. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
(1908); see BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 997-98. Most suits fitting such description involve
causes of action created by federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (noting that the "vast majority" of cases fitting within the "arising
under" limitation arise under the federal law creating the plaintiff's cause of action). Some, how-
ever, have involved state-created causes of action "incorporating" federal law in some way. See
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) ("[W]here it appears ... that
the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable
foundation, the [federal courts have] jurisdiction .... "); see also Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 214 (1934) (concluding that certain questions arising in a state court action to
recover for injuries sustained by employees in intrastate commerce and relating to the scope or
construction of the Federal Safety Alliance Act are federal questions for purposes of grounding
federal question jurisdiction). More recent case law tends to eliminate or, more plausibly, limit the
sorts of cases in which a state cause of action incorporating federal law will be deemed to be
within the federal question jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (holding that where Congress has
determined that there is no private federal cause of action under the Federal Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act (now the FDA), a violation of the Act, when an element of a state cause of action,
does not give rise to a federal question).
557. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.
558. See Shapiro, supra note 130, at 568, 577-89.
559. Do principles of finality similar to issue preclusion bar federal habeas corpus relitigation of
federal issues fully raised in state criminal prosecutions? To a large degree, such relitigation was
barred before Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), and was not thereafter. See id. at 457-58.
This change made possible modern habeas corpus, which uses the lower federal courts as surro-
gate supreme courts largely replacing the Supreme Court itself, which was too overburdened to
assure correct application of federal law- in every case coming from the state courts. See Paul M.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L.
Rav. 441, 513-15 (1963). This redesign, based upon no statutory provision whatsoever, resulted in
a truly major increase in the power of the federal courts to supervise the state courts and hence is
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The contours of state sovereign immunity from federal suit under
the Eleventh Amendment have been worked out by courts with
more of an eye toward creating an acceptable and balanced judicial
federalism than toward text or history.56 0  The same is true of
largely Court-made doctrine under the Anti-Injunction Act. 561 The
abstention doctrines discussed above, not remotely generated by
statutory law, are even more clearly the creatures of Court
a major piece of the architecture of judicial federalism. Recent cases effectuating a partial resto-
ration of finality for state court determinations of federal issues in criminal cases are of course not
closely tied to the language of the federal habeas corpus statutes. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 480-82 (1976). Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989), also reduces the variety of
claims as to which federal habeas corpus relief is available in connection with state criminal cases.
560. The Eleventh Amendment is enigmatic. It prohibits federal court suits against a state
brought by citizens of other states. US. CONST. amend. XI. Despite the language strongly sug-
gesting the contrary, the Court extended Eleventh Amendment-based protection to suits brought
against a state by its own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans has been read
by the Court to prohibit suits seeking money damages against the states. See Edelman.v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1974). Hans does not, however, preclude those seeking injunctions against
state programs and other state action. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The
latter exception is built on a fiction created by the Court to permit meaningful enforcement of the
Bill of Rights against the states. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
106 (1984). The Pennhurst case itself reversed a longstanding pattern of allowing federal courts to
hear suits seeking injunctive relief against the states based on state law as long as there was
proper diversity or pendent federal question jurisdiction. Id. Some judges and commentators see
the amendment as more limited, applying only to certain diversity-based suits and not to those
grounded on federal question jurisdiction. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
299-302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Inmunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004-05 (1983). While never
embracing this position, the Court has recognized congressional power to override the Eleventh
Amendment and subject states to monetary liability to United States citizens as long as Congress
legislates under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause and makes its decision to
override express. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. I, 19-20 (1989) (Commerce
Clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment). All of this
suggests just how malleable this constitutionally based part of the design of judicial federalism has
been in the Court's hands.
561. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). Section 2283 provides: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
Id.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), concludes that the broad spectrum civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), is an express exception to § 2283 even though neither it nor its legisla-
tive history mentions § 2283. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242-43. This statutory interpretation has the
advantage, from the courts perspective, of eliminating an absolute barrier to civil rights suits and
making court-designed doctrines of judicial federalism, such as standing, ripeness, and the absten-
tion doctrines, the principal devices for screening out cases troubling to federalism. Needless to
say, making these doctrines the crucial ones leaves the court in direct control of judicial federal-
ism. Changing the rules requires no overruling of a decision as to the meaning of the Constitution
or a federal statute, but rather an adjustment by a judicial regulator to a judicial regulatory
scheme.
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creativity."6 2
I agree with David Shapiro that judicial discretion regarding ju-
risdiction is not entirely bad.56 There are good reasons to allow the
federal courts to fine tune their jurisdiction. 64 But I also agree with
his conclusion that discretion as to the exercise of jurisdiction ought
to be principled. " " There is no principle in a contradiction. Over its
lifetime, Burford has often seemed close to a contradiction, at least
as it has been reflected in the lower court decisions before the New
Orleans decision. One could read New Orleans and Ankenbrandt,
decided just three years apart, as making directly contradictory
statements about the applicability of Burford abstention to cases not
involving state administrative agencies. At one pole, most Burford
cases allude to the Cohens v. Virginia"6 view that statutorily con-
ferred federal jurisdiction is mandatory.6 At the other pole, the
Burford formula has often proved so malleable that virtually any
case involving unclear state public law arguably fits its mold.
Does the Burford doctrine make any sort of principled sense in
the larger current scheme of judicial federalism? The problem ini-
tially involves finding a critical perspective from which to examine
these current doctrines, including Burford. When should the federal
courts be open and when should they be closed to a litigant with
federal issues relevant to the outcome? The problem is, of course,
one of balancing competing values, context by context.6 68 Some ex-
amples of those contexts are: federal suits to enjoin state administra-
tive proceedings or decisions; federal injunctive suits to abort state
criminal proceedings; habeas proceedings to review state criminal
proceedings; and federal civil suits involving unclear state law.
In each context where federal jurisdiction has an effect on state
institutions, unless the grants of jurisdiction are to be read as
mandatory in the fashion of the Cohens Court, 69 the values under-
lying the existence of those grants of jurisdiction must be balanced
against the state interests.57 0 The Court has offered its own implicit
562. The various main abstention doctrines are discussed throughout the text above. For a brief
summary of these doctrines, see supra part 1.
563. Shapiro, supra note 130, at 545.
564. Id. at 579-89.
565. Id. at 575.
56 6. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
567. Id. at 404.
568. See infra notes 569-70 and accompanying text.
569. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404.
570. This is, of course, the theme common to all abstention doctrines but less so to Pullman
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weighing, context by context, as it decides cases. I am not sure that
either the members of the Court or other concerned judges or law-
yers have worked hard enough to find some common ground as to
the proper weight of state interests in these contexts or to under-
stand the real threats to those interests which are posed by various
sorts of federal suits. Still, that task is beyond the scope of this or
any traditional law review article. That kind of work would involve
an attempt to determine: (1) what state government currently
means and might optimally mean in our country and (2) the pos-
sibilities of disruption of such government by the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.
I propose, instead, to criticize Burford in the federal question con-
text, based on the implicitly predominant value underlying the juris-
dictional grant. I leave a more foundational reassessment to Con-
gress or some task force, whether legislative, executive, judicial, or
academic. That value is the great importance of providing federal
courts for plaintiffs who assert federal causes of action. Again, one
might ask why not provide federal courts for litigants with federal
rights defenses to state law claims, and I could not provide a good
answer based on policy or logic.571 History has foreclosed the courts
from such an approach. It was rejected no later than 1908 in the
Mottley57 2 case, the same year that Ex parte Young 7a and Pren-
tis5 74 laid the foundation for federal injunctions against state officers
who violated federal law. 575 Mottley held that the presence of a fed-
eral defense was not sufficient to ground federal jurisdiction under
the federal question statute.578
It is worth noting, however, that in many federal rights cases, the
distinction between federal claims and defenses has been circum-
vented, because many federal rights against states have been seen as
abstention, where the desire to avoid unnecessary constitutional law-making is the driving force.
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
571. See BATOR ET AL.. supra note 2, at 997-98.
572. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
573. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
574. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
575. See supra notes 138-44, 205, and accompanying text (paving the way for federal injunc-
tions against state officers by harmonizing them with the requirements of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and by permitting such suits without prior resort to state courts).
576. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152 ("It is the settled interpretation of [28 U.S.C. § 1331, the fed-
eral question jurisdiction statute,] . . . that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the
United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based
upon those laws or that Constitution.").
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providing both a sword and a shield. These provide both a defense to
prosecution and a cause of action - a federal right to an injunc-
tion.5" To illustrate, the plaintiffs in Ex parte Young had a choice
between asserting their federal rights as a defense to a state crimi-
nal prosecution 578 or asserting them as a claim for relief in a pre-
emptive federal injunctive action. They chose the second course.579
This second, sword-like aspect of most federal rights to be free of
specified sorts of state action indicates the importance attached to a
federal forum. The full blown abstention doctrines came decades af-
ter Ex parte Young, most often in extremely apologetic opinions
stressing both the generally unflagging responsibility of federal
courts to hear cases within their statutory jurisdiction and the ex-
tremely limited nature of any exception to such obligation. 580 Indeed
the whole design of the system makes no sense if federal courts are
not seen as having a strong presumptive obligation to hear plaintiffs
who assert federal causes of action. What are federal courts there
for if not for that?
Despite what the case law has to say on the importance of federal
plaintiffs' access to federal court, I am not tempted to push argu-
ments for Burford's illegitimacy too far. After all, the general rule
of plaintiffs' access has been tempered by requirements of standing,
ripeness, abstention, and other doctrines which often make it diffi-
cult for someone with a federal right, presumptively available in an
injunctive action, actually to assert it. These seem to be fixed fea-
tures of our current system. I am, however, not entirely comfortable
577. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Both
of these federal suits to enjoin state court proceedings, allegedly predicated on constitutional error,
recognized federal question jurisdiction to settle affirmatively constitutional issues which otherwise
would have arisen only as defenses in state criminal proceedings. In Young, the suit was allowed
to proceed. 209 U.S. at 168. In Younger, there was no suggestion that the suit was not within the
judicial power as defined in Article II of the Constitution or within the court's statutory federal
question jurisdiction. The Court decided only that abstention prohibited the suit and that it was
unnecessary to decide whether the Anti-Injunction Act was also a bar. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
Its premise was that judicial federalism, not § 1331, required that such issues be raised only as
defenses in state court. See id. at 52-54. Younger left open the possibility that, in particularly
compelling circumstances, such suits would lie to terminate state criminal prosecutions. Id. at 54.
For a view that Fourteenth Amendment rights, but not nearly all federal rights, found an implied
injunctive cause of action as well as a defense to state proceedings, see Henry P. Monaghan,
Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 233, 238-41, 240
n.55 (1991).
578. This was the course forced upon the plaintiffs in Younger. 401 U.S. at 37.
579. Young, 209 U.S. at 131.
580. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813,
817 (1976).
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with Burford's method of compromising the clear federal interest,
implicit in the current system, with perceived contrary state inter-
ests. Burford, as currently practiced, seems inconsistent with the
long prevailing thrust of the current pattern of federal rights juris-
diction that federal courts be open to plaintiffs with federal rights
claims. 581 While it is impossible to attach definitive weights to the
state's interests protected by the various possible Burford doctrines,
all but the implausible "local" matter interpretation seemed con-
cerned not with symbolic noninterference as in Younger, but with
the possible federal court distortion of state law and institutions.5 82
The cases which I have termed primary jurisdiction pattern cases,
if they are properly seen as Burford variants at all, would most nat-
urally adopt a Pullman approach.58  The only other Burford variant
is a review pattern case, a case like Burford itself, in which a partic-
ular state court has exclusive power initially to review state adminis-
trative action under state law. Here the problems of return to a fed-
eral court and abstaining in favor of state judicial proceedings are
difficult and the answers depend on a variety of possible
perspectives.
Allowing return to the federal court for resolution of federal is-
sues after the state litigation, spawned by Burford abstention, has
run its course will not be universally popular; the similar practice
under Pullman has been criticized as leading to unreasonable de-
lay.584 There is, however, a strong case to be made for the Pullman
approach if the concerns supporting Burford abstention are only
that a specialized state court is part of the policy-making process.
I argued in the first portion of this Article that it was the hybrid
nature of the trial court in Burford which resulted in the current
approach. 585 Viewing the state court as a state policy-making organ,
the Court in Burford refused to threaten its potential contribution to
state policy. 586 But refusing to fully accept the implications of that
view, the Court accepted the state's characterization of that body as
581. See supra notes 577-80 and accompanying text.
582. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
583. See supra note 388 and accompanying text. Typically, but not always, in primary jurisdic-
tion cases, an agency is consulted in order to enable a court to proceed with a case before it.
584. For a discussion of difficulties of delay under Pullman abstention and a discussion of judi-
cial and scholarly criticism, see BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, 1363-64.
585. See supra notes 209-11, 219-24, and accompanying text.
586. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325, 327 (1943).
1993]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
a court for purposes of federal claim preclusion. 587
I believe that the Burford Court's approach was mistaken in this
respect. If the reason for deferring under Burford is that the state
policy-making process has not come to an end until one or more
state courts have "reviewed" the agency's decision, then those courts
are functioning as a higher level of the agency. The Supreme Court
could force the states to choose whether a specialized state court
should be treated as part of the agency or as a court. If the first
treatment is chosen, no full res judicata effect would attach to the
court's judgment although it might have a collateral estoppel effect
as to facts found. If the state selects the second sort of treatment,
there would be no need to resort to that body before filing in a fed-
eral district court. The Supreme. Court could accomplish this by
presuming that any state body officially called a court is a court and
by requiring a state legislature to indicate otherwise. The price of so
indicating would be that the body's judgments would not be ac-
corded full res judicata effect.588 Michigan v. Long,5s 9 in an analo-
gous context, indicates the Court's power to adopt this approach.5 90
Certainly there will be delay occasioned by allowing federal re-
view after specialized state courts have decided. But in an important
sense, the plaintiff's federal claim is not ripe until those state courts
have spoken. 59 1 If, at this point, a substantial federal claim still ex-
ists, do not the federal courts exist largely for the purpose of vindi-
cating such claims? The Court's handling of res judicata in connec-
tion with Pullman abstention makes it clear that the federal statute
dealing with claim preclusion is not an absolute barrier.592
From a traditional perspective, it is precisely because an original
Burford-style federal claim is in some sense not ripe until one or
more state courts have contributed to the administrative process
that Burford makes a stronger claim than Pullman for suspending
the rules of res judicata and allowing return to federal court after
587. Id. at 328.
588. See supra part IlI.C.2.a.
589. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
590. In Long, the Court made clear its power to create presumptions concerning the meaning of
state decisions in order to determine its own appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 1042 n.8.
591. In effect, the specialized state court proceeding constitutes one more administrative rem-
edy which must be exhausted before a federal court can proceed.
592. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421 n.12 (1964)
(noting that the Court is "confident that state courts, sharing the abstention doctrine's purpose of
'furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority,' will respect a litigant's
reservation of his federal claims for decision by the federal courts" (citation omitted)).
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state litigation. 9 The reason for this is that, after Pullman absten-
tion, a case must often be litigated through several levels of the state
judiciary before return to the federal court is possible. If Burford
abstention is based solely on the need for input from an expert state
court, a federal suit could be pursued once that court has reached
its decision. There is no need to pursue the case any further through
the state courts.
If Burford is seen as grounded on premises going beyond the need
for expert state court review, the problem of a return to federal
court may be more difficult. In Section VI, I described a possible
alternative, but still reasonably mainstream, foundation for Burford
abstention. 94 On this view, the problem is not that some state court
is an extension of the agency. It is, rather, that review of agency
action, even in conventional state courts, poses issues which cannot
comfortably be accommodated under Erie-Meredith. The notion is
that it is impossible for a federal court acceptably to anticipate and
apply state law and practice dealing with the scope of review of
agency action.
Such a view moves Burford beyond its original province but not
into very strange territory. It does, however, require federal court
abstention until all state appeals are at an end. As a result, its costs
are identical to those of Pullman abstention.
Finally, there is the third, more radical, perspective, which I pro-
pose above. On this view, some issues resolved in state courts, with
no agency involvement at all, implicate sensitive state policy-making
indistinguishable from that made in agencies. Extending Burford to
such unclear and sensitive issues would narrow the general require-
ment of Erie-Meredith that federal courts interpret state
nonadministrative law no matter how sensitive and unclear. In so
doing, it would expand Burford or Thibodaux abstention to a new
set of cases.
I believe that the price of this extension of Burford should be
adjustment of the rules of res judicata, 595 as under Pullman absten-
tion, but with a recognition that the cost is high in terms of delay. It
593. But see id. (allowing for the relaxation of traditional rules of res judicata only where the
federal courts have abstained on Pullman grounds).
594. See supra part VI.B.2.
595. Burford's sibling and occasional alter ego, Thibodaux, permitted a federal trial court to
stay, rather than dismiss, its proceedings of state proceedings. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 25-26, 30-31 (1959). Ankenbrandt suggests that, at least occa-
sionally, this will be an appropriate post-Burford abstention procedure. 112 S. Ct. at 2216 n.8.
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is only where an issue of state law is so sensitive and unclear as to
justify the delay that such extended Burford or Thibodaux absten-
tion should be allowed. While I believe that these cases may be rela-
tively rare, federal law needs such a category. Indeed, Thibodaux
and Colorado River seem to have recognized as much. The apparent
suggestion in New Orleans to the contrary is unfortunate. An Erie-
Meredith doctrine without exceptions seems unjustifiable. It is im-
probable that absolutely all state law can be developed and applied
acceptably well by federal courts.596 I hope that this is the meaning
of the Court's cryptic statements in Ankenbrandt.197
B. Diversity Cases
The presence of a federal question has been seen as strongly but
not conclusively counseling against Burford abstention.598 Such ju-
dicial restraint generally has been seen as least problematic in diver-
sity cases. 99 In sections other than those immediately above, I have
neglected diversity cases only somewhat. The discussion of Bur-
ford's origins, current ambiguity, and preemption by other doctrines
applies to diversity cases as well.
However, Burford seems paradoxical in a pure diversity case.6"'
On the one hand, the federal interest seems less; on the other, the
jurisdictional grant carries precisely the message that there are rea-
sons for getting involved in local disputes, whenever parties are tech-
nically diverse even though the issues concern state law.6 0'
I favor allowing Burford's expansion to nonadministrative cases
596. See supra parts IV.B, VI.
597. See supra notes 15-16 for a discussion of Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206
(1992) (suggesting that Burford abstention may be warranted in some cases involving no state
agencies).
598. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
599. See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that abstention was justified in a diversity action where there was considerable
uncertainty in the state law as to the validity of an insurance clause and there was a strong state
interest in the doctrinal integrity of the regulatory scheme); Urbano v. Board of Managers of N.J.
State Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 253-58 (3d Cir. 1969) (finding abstention justified in a "non-routine"
diversity action that involved "serious issues" of state public trust law); City of Monroe v. United
Gas Corp., 253 F.2d 377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1958) (dismissing the suit on Burford abstention
grounds after concluding that there was no federal question presented).
600. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 344-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("There may be excellent
reasons why Congress should abolish diversity jurisdiction. But, . . . it is not a defensible ground
for having this Court by indirection abrogate diversity jurisdiction when, as a matter of fact,
Congress has persistently refused to restrict such jurisdiction.
601. See id.
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as formulated above but, of course, without the possibility of return
to federal court for redetermination of state law issues. This is ad-
mittedly a partial abolition of diversity by the Courts, 0 2 but one
which operates when the federal court finds an unacceptably high
possibility that some unclear issue of state law of vital importance to
the states may be decided mistakenly. In this context, too, the in-
volvement of state administrative action should matter less than the
fact that a federal district court finds itself unacceptably unsure as
to how a state organ, agency, or court will develop important state
policy.
CONCLUSION
The Burford doctrine has been a mysterious form of abstention,
never carefully justified by a commentator or a judicial opinion. The
Supreme Court formulations of Burford have been abstract, leading
to a variety of views concerning its requirements among the federal
circuits. The Supreme Court's formulaic gyrations from Colorado
River to New Orleans to Ankenbrandt have been unsettling. The
Court should attempt to answer the following questions at the next
appropriate opportunity:
1. Regardless of whether it is called Burford or Thibodaux ab-
stention, is there a general abstention doctrine, applicable beyond
cases involving state administrative agencies, which requires or per-
mits federal courts to defer to state judicial proceedings for the de-
termination of unsettled and sensitive issues of state law and policy?
2. If so, does the Court intend at least some special treatment for
cases involving state administrative agencies? If so, why, and under
what circumstances?
3. If the answer to question one is yes, are there to be further
guidelines as to what state law questions are sufficiently sensitive
and unclear to warrant abstention under the first category of the
Burford doctrine as described in New Orleans? Or is the doctrine a
greatly discretionary and amorphous exception to the Erie-Meredith
principle?
4. How does the second category of Burford abstention, recog-
nized in New Orleans, differ from the first? Does it apply, as I ar-
gue above, only to cases in which the federal court confronts what I
602. For a general discussion of the utility of diversity jurisdiction, proposals to abolish it, and
attacks on such proposals, see BATOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1695-1700.
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have termed "developmental" state regulatory schemes?
5. To what extent is the flat dismissal, typical of most Burford
cases, still appropriate under the Burford or Thibodaux doctrines?
To what extent is a Pullman-style approach now recommended or
required?
Some issues have been clarified by recent cases, however. Until
the New Orleans opinion, Burford abstention was much more widely
available, because a remote connection between a case and a state
policy-making process often sufficed under the law of a particular
circuit. New Orleans now requires a close connection in order to
justify Burford abstention. In particular, it requires some real possi-
bility that the exercise of federal jurisdiction will interfere with state
policy-making.
I believe that many lawyers, including Supreme Court Justices,
will be surprised at how limited Burford's practical scope is after
New Orleans and in light of other doctrines of federal judicial re-
straint. The form of federal proceeding in which state administrative
policy is most likely to be warped is one in which state administra-
tive action is attacked in federal court. After Pennhurst, most such
attacks based on state law invalidity are precluded by the Eleventh
Amendment. Other doctrines including ripeness, claim and issue
preclusion, Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and Pullman ab-
stention will often provide clearer grounds for abstaining in a case in
which analysis under Burford would otherwise be necessary.
For the set of cases in which Burford retains practical signifi-
cance, often suits against local government, the doctrine has been
changed by New Orleans in other ways. Burford, and possibly Pull-
man abstention as well, may be limited to its original province of
suits of an equitable nature. There were suggestions in a 1976 Su-
preme Court opinion that Burford may apply beyond cases involving
administrative law to cases involving regular state statutory and
case law of an unclear and particularly sensitive nature. If New Or-
leans has limited Burford to cases involving administrative agencies,
it is regrettable in light of changes in our view of the judicial pro-
cess since Erie and Meredith forbade abstention in nonadministra-
tive cases simply to avoid difficult questions of state law. Today it is
clear that judges often make sensitive state policy in ways signifi-
cantly similar to administrative agencies. If the recent Ankenbrandt
case broadens federal abstention to cover some cases involving sensi-
tive and unclear issues to be resolved by state courts alone, that is
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laudable.
While I reject it, unique treatment for cases coming from state
agencies is not indefensible. Even if judges are not seen as making
policy in any strong sense, state scope of review law may be an ex-
ception to the assumption that state law is communicable to federal
judges. The federal experience, both before and after Chevron, sug-
gests that scope of review law is not ordinary law. There is every
reason to believe that the cognate state scope of review law is
equally ineffable.
I am troubled by procedural differences between the Burford and
Pullman varieties of abstention. Pullman allows a return to federal
court for litigation of federal issues after abstention; Burford gener-
ally does not. This seems inconsistent with the strong values under-
lying the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction and insensi-
tive to the predominant nature of Burford abstention as a somewhat
disguised and highly specialized administrative exhaustion doctrine.
Once again, if the hazy Ankenbrandt case signals the beginning of
such an approach, that is laudable.
Finally, whether or not Burford is confined to administrative
cases, the current formula for Burford abstention seems to require
very difficult judgments about the importance of certain processes of
state policy formation and the likelihood that a federal suit will dis-
rupt them. At least the latter is difficult for federal appellate courts
to review on a case-by-case basis.
As a result, the Supreme Court should monitor Burford absten-
tion in the lower federal courts over a number of years. Perhaps
several Supreme Court law clerks should be given the task of start-
ing and continuing a multi-year longitudinal study for the Justices.
Its focus should be the performance of the lower federal courts
under all major forms of abstention possessing a large discretionary
component, particularly Burford abstention. This would permit each
Justice, whatever his or her personal criteria of doctrinal success, a
broader feel as to whether such criteria are being met. Possession of
such information seems vital to determining whether any such form
of abstention should be abandoned or whether the formula defining
it should restricted, expanded, or further elaborated. With the near
total demise of its mandatory jurisdiction, the Court's primary role
as a policy-maker has become impossible for anyone to deny. Even
this fractious Court should, more often than I believe it does, at-
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tempt to think collectively through the whole bodies of doctrines
which in the past it has carelessly created one case at a time.
